As of November 13, 2026. Evidence tiers: CONFIRMED, REPORTED, ASSESSED, DATA DEFICIT. Lead image: a February 2025 file photo, not from the events described.
Key Judgments
- CONFIRMED: The Departments of Defense, Transportation, Homeland Security, Energy and Justice signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on counter-drone efforts, announced November 9. The agencies have not published the text.
- CONFIRMED: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth issued a corrected copy of his counter-drone memo, dated November 5. The correction changed legal-review routing only. The Pentagon did not say why.
- REPORTED: The memo requires any delay or denial of a counter-drone request to be logged as an inaction risk and reported to Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF-401).
- ASSESSED: Federal policy is moving toward faster fielding with less case-by-case friction. The unresolved cost is civil aviation: a fatal May crash in New Mexico is linked in the NTSB preliminary report to GPS loss associated with military electronic-warfare testing.
- DATA DEFICIT: The MOU text, the interagency approved technologies list, and any public count of drone incursions or engagements.
What Changed This Week
Tier: CONFIRMED (events); REPORTED (provisions)
The MOU, announced by press release on Monday, November 9, creates a more coordinated federal process for testing and deploying counter-drone technology in the United States. DefenseScoop reports that it is led by the White House task force created under Executive Order 14305, “Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty,” signed June 6, 2025. According to the release, the FAA will quickly review proposed systems, run safety risk assessments and share technical data on unsafe conditions. If it sees a need for more mitigation, it can act on its own, including by restricting airspace. The signatories also work with the FAA and the Federal Communications Commission on systems that can track, monitor or take control of dangerous drones.
The MOU responds to a rise in unauthorized drone incursions over military bases and sensitive sites, including Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. A Pentagon spokesperson declined to add to the release. The FAA’s chief strategy officer told DefenseScoop the document is not approved for public release, so its text would have to be requested under the Freedom of Information Act.
The Pentagon track moved the next day. DefenseScoop viewed the corrected copy of Hegseth’s five-page memo on November 10. It updates an earlier directive and aims to speed the Department’s historically slow approval process for buying and fielding counter-drone weapons. In the memo’s words, protection against drones “will not be delayed by self-imposed restrictions.” Completed legal reviews now route to the Office of the General Counsel through JIATF-401’s legal advisor.
Who Is Running It
Tier: REPORTED
JIATF-401 is the Pentagon-led hub that coordinates counter-drone initiatives, policy and procurement across the Defense Department and its interagency partners. Its director is Army Brig. Gen. Matt Ross. On November 12, he said the task force has drawn on the whole Intelligence Community for threat assessments, and urged defense, federal and law enforcement officials to define their own threats before buying commercial systems. His test is whether a buyer can say what threat they actually face. A task force spokesman said needs vary by location and by what is being protected.
Two details matter for anyone planning around this. An interagency approved technologies list is expected eventually. The FAA official said that once one agency has reviewed a system, others can often decide on its use within about 24 hours. And the money is slower than the rhetoric: per the JIATF-401 reporting, the task force and the Army announced billions in counter-drone awards on September 29, but only about $50 million of the ten new awards had been obligated.
The Safety Problem
Tier: REPORTED; cause DATA DEFICIT
The MOU is framed around not compromising civilian safety. DefenseScoop’s November 6 reporting shows why that framing carries weight. On May 14, a medical evacuation aircraft crashed into a ridge in the Capitan Mountains near Ruidoso, New Mexico, killing all four on board. The NTSB’s August preliminary report describes an abrupt loss of GPS associated with military electronic-warfare testing from White Sands, and pilots told air traffic control that jamming affected the aircraft. The NTSB has not determined a probable cause, and the investigation is continuing.
The GPS Innovation Alliance says some government tests took place without notices to airmen, and others went wrong even when notices were issued. The military is building more test sites that combine directed-energy and jamming systems, and the FCC is considering a proposal that would allow jamming near correctional facilities. Army and Air Force spokespersons did not comment on the recommendations, citing the investigation.
Base-Security Context
Tier: REPORTED
The same week, NPR reported a New York indictment over an Iran-backed campaign that includes a September plot against RAF Fairford. As reported, that case involves vans, fuel and paid associates filming the perimeter, not drones. We cover the charges in RAF Fairford: U.S. Charges Three Iran-Backed Men and Names the HAYI Network. The link to this story is the base-protection problem, not a shared method: drone incursions and ground-level plots are different threats to the same sites.
What It Means for Operators
Tier: ASSESSED
Executive Order 14305 contemplates a limited role outside the federal government. It makes state, local, tribal and territorial agencies eligible for grants for drone detection equipment, and it directs guidance for private critical infrastructure owners. We have not seen the MOU text, so we cannot say whether it changes that. Until it is public, treat claims about what the MOU authorizes, and who may use which tools, as the agencies’ description and not the document.
What We Cannot Say
- What the MOU actually permits, who may take control of a drone, and under what conditions. All we have is the press release.
- How many incursions have occurred, at which sites, or how many were swarms. Officials have described a rise but have not published counts.
- Which systems will be on the approved list, and when.
- What caused the Ruidoso crash. The NTSB has not said.
What to Watch
- Release of the MOU text, through FOIA or otherwise.
- The first approved technologies list and how quickly agencies adopt it.
- The NTSB’s probable-cause finding on the Ruidoso crash, and any change in how test notices are issued.
- How much of the announced counter-drone funding is obligated.
- Further incursions over bases and sensitive sites, and whether officials publish data.
Related CommandEleven Intelligence analysis:
- Tactical Diffusion: How Militant Drone Warfare Spreads, Part I
- CENTCOM’s 25,000 Systems: Bases Still Exposed.
Related Reading
- CENTCOM’s 25,000 Systems: Bases Still Exposed
- The Afghan Taliban’s Drone War Against Pakistan
- America’s Low-Altitude Airspace Control Has Collapsed
- Iran’s Drone Threat to the US: Multi-Vector Assessment
Sources
- DefenseScoop, Agencies agree to counter unauthorized drones without compromising civilian safety under new MOU (Nov. 9)
- DefenseScoop, Hegseth issues corrected copy of recently unveiled counter-drone guidance (Nov. 10)
- The White House, Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty (Executive Order 14305, June 6, 2025)
- DefenseScoop, Counter-drone task force and intelligence community threat assessments (Nov. 12)
- DefenseScoop, JIATF-401 coverage
- DefenseScoop, GPS jamming risks to civilians from military testing (Nov. 6)
- NPR, An Iran-backed trio is accused of plotting attacks on a U.K. base hosting U.S. jets (Nov. 11)
