CommandEleven Intelligence Desk · Transnational Threats Desk, status as of November 12, 2026
Bottom Line Up Front
We graded 35 links across Parts I through IV of Transcontinental Convergence and cut 11 more that we could not source. 15 are documented by an official or primary source, 9 rest on credible reporting we could not verify, 4 are our own judgments, and 7 are open questions where the public record is silent. The pattern is the same in every part. Terrorist and criminal groups share rails, routes and technology trends, and criminal groups link up with each other. No public source shows the two kinds of group coordinating. This ledger is open to correction, and any change will be logged here and on the affected part.
Key Judgments
- CONFIRMED: Parallel use is documented across all four areas: armed drones in several theaters (Part I), the same hawala, stablecoin and laundering rails (Part II), overlapping routes in the Red Sea, Sahel, Makran and Syria (Part III), and criminal supply chains that now carry legal terrorist labels (Part IV).
- CONFIRMED: The best-documented cross-group link in the series is a Panel finding. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen reported in S/2025/650 that the Houthis trained al-Shabaab in explosives and drone adaptation. It rests on official sources and the confession of a detained liaison, so we hold it as a Panel finding, not an adjudicated fact.
- CONFIRMED: The best-documented criminal-to-criminal links are Europol’s Ecuadorian-Albanian cocaine case and the Treasury’s Chinese-Mexican precursor action. Neither involves a terrorist group.
- ASSESSED: Convergence in this series means shared infrastructure and parallel adoption. We found no case in the public record where a terrorist group and a criminal group are documented working to a common plan.
- DATA DEFICIT: The questions that matter most for policy remain unanswered in public sources: who profits from Balochistan heroin revenue, whether terrorist groups gain from migrant smuggling in the Sahel, and whether any Southeast Asian precursor route to Mexico exists.
Sourcing and Analytical Confidence
The ledger uses the same scale as every part. A designation, indictment or panel finding is an official allegation or finding, not a court judgment. “(Unconfirmed)” is an inline hold tag only.
| Tier | Meaning |
|---|---|
| CONFIRMED | Documented by an official source, a primary document or multiple independent credible sources |
| REPORTED | Credible outlet or analyst, not independently verified by us |
| ASSESSED | Our judgment from the confirmed and reported record |
| DATA DEFICIT | We looked and the public record does not answer the question |
The Ledger at a Glance
How to Read the Ledger
Each row is a link between two kinds of actor, or a claim about one, as stated in the part where it first appeared. The Part column tells you where to find the full sourcing. Rows are grouped by tier, and within a tier they follow the order of the parts. A row’s tier is the tier we hold today. If new evidence changes it, we will change the row and log the change.
Documented Links
| Link | Part | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Armed commercial drones are used in each theater: TTP and IMP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, JNIM and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, CJNG in Mexico | I | Official, claimed and press-documented incidents with dates |
| The Islamic State first used a bomb-laden commercial drone in October 2016 | I | Combating Terrorism Center, 2018 |
| Pakistani drone-attack counts for 2025 disagree: 405 (army, December 2025) against 246 (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police, May 2026) | I | Two official counts, both cited |
| U.S. Treasury sanctioned Islamic State financiers using hawala and exchange houses in Syria, Türkiye and Nigeria on June 22, 2026 | II | Treasury release |
| Treasury added 134 cryptocurrency addresses to the ISKP sanctions entry on July 1, 2026, and Tether froze 131 Tron balances | II | Treasury; the dollar flows are Chainalysis figures and REPORTED |
| Chinese money laundering networks launder Mexican cartel proceeds; FinCEN flagged about $312 billion in suspicious transactions, 2020 to 2024 | II | FinCEN, August 28, 2025; flagged reports, not proven laundering |
| Prince Group and Huione were sanctioned over scam compounds and laundering, with no terrorist group in the release | II | Treasury, October 14, 2025 |
| A Russian-linked laundering network served organized crime groups including the Kinahan cartel | II | UK NCA and Treasury, December 3, 2024 |
| The dhow Al Sharwa carried about 750 tons of weapons described as Iranian and bound for the Houthis | III | Seizure and cargo description from multiple outlets and U.S. Central Command; crew-testimony routes are REPORTED |
| The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen found Houthi cooperation with al-Shabaab, including training in explosives and drone adaptation | III | UN S/2025/650, paras 74 to 82, as a Panel finding; rests on official sources and one detained liaison’s confession |
| Weapons held by jihadist groups in the Central Sahel come mainly from battlefield capture, with no evidence of outside supply | III | Conflict Armament Research, 700+ weapons, 2015 to 2023 |
| An Ecuadorian network linked to Los Lobos cooperated with an Albanian drug trafficking organization to ship cocaine to Europe | IV | Europol, March 3, 2026 |
| A Chinese syndicate supplied fentanyl precursors to the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG | IV | U.S. Treasury, October 3, 2023 |
| Latin American criminal groups have been designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and the notices describe no tie to a terrorist group | IV | Federal Register: 90 FR 10030, 90 FR 43020, 91 FR 34267; the total of 21 is AP, REPORTED |
| Potential global cocaine manufacture reached about 4,100 tons in 2024 | IV | UNODC World Drug Report 2026 |
Reported Links
| Link | Part | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Mexican cartels are learning from the Ukraine war, and some operatives reportedly trained there | I | Small Wars Journal via Brookings; not independently verified |
| JNIM taxes migrants, foodstuffs, cannabis resin, cocaine and gold in Mali | III | GI-TOC, April to May 2026 |
| About 40 percent of Afghan opioids pass through Pakistan, leaving by the Makran coast | III | GI-TOC, July 2026 |
| Syria’s Captagon trade has fragmented; 2025 seizure counts differ by about 100 million pills (256.4 million against 365 million) | III | New Lines Institute, July 2026 |
| A Sinaloa-linked cell in Sicily sought ’Ndrangheta contacts (Operation Halcon) | IV | OCCRP, citing an informant, wiretaps and Italian indictments |
| Sinaloa is probably a premier wholesale supplier to Europe, working with ’Ndrangheta | IV | Brookings analysis, 2022 |
| Daniel Kinahan is charged with directing a criminal organization in Ireland | IV | OCCRP and Khaleej Times; charged, not convicted |
| A scam-center site and a methamphetamine lab sat about 800 meters apart in northern Shan State | IV | UNODC, 2026; the report says this “suggests” shared conditions |
| Governments allege D-Company has links to terrorist groups | IV | Official allegations only: Treasury 2003 and 2012, NIA charge sheet 2022; not verified by us |
Our Assessments
| Judgment | Part | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Militant drone tactics spread by demonstration, not by a documented transfer chain | I | Our judgment from the confirmed record |
| The money overlap is parallel use of the same rails, not coordination | II | Our judgment from the confirmed record |
| Corridors are geography plus local brokers; armed groups tax or capture along them, and none is shown running a route end to end | III | Our judgment from the confirmed record |
| Documented links are between criminal groups; none ties a Latin American criminal group to a jihadist group | IV | Our judgment from the confirmed record |
Open Questions: Data Deficit
These are links we looked for and could not find in public sources. Absence of a source is not proof that a link does not exist. It means we do not hold it on the record.
| Question | Part | What we found |
|---|---|---|
| Direct drone know-how transfer from a jihadist group to a Mexican cartel | I | No credible public source |
| The ISKP wallets and the PCC network are one operation | II | Announced the same day; no source states a tie |
| Heroin revenue in Balochistan funds a named militant group | III | GI-TOC says “repeatedly linked” but names no group |
| Terrorist groups profit from migrant smuggling across North Africa and the Sahel | III | The GI-TOC analysis names no group profiting |
| Southeast Asian precursors reach Mexican ports through Myanmar, Laos or Cambodia | IV | Documented precursor sources are Chinese and Indian |
| The Kinahan group belongs to a “super cartel” supplying a third of Europe’s cocaine | IV | One press source, not corroborated |
| Southeast Asian scam compounds are tied to a designated terrorist group | II | No official source; Prince Group and Huione releases name none |
Claims We Cut
These claims circulate in commentary and in the early draft this series began from. We found no public source for each and did not carry any of them. What we cannot source, or defend, we cannot include on the record.
| Claim | Part | What we found |
|---|---|---|
| ’Ndrangheta brokers Captagon from the Levant | II | No public source found |
| Southeast Asian casinos and junkets clear money for cartels | II, IV | No public source found |
| Kinahan group clears scam-compound cryptocurrency | II, IV | No public source found |
| Russian organized crime brokers arms to the Houthis | III | No public source found |
| A Sahel funnel moves weapons and funds to Egypt, Gaza and Yemen | III | No public source documents the route |
| Sahel territory is a sanctuary for senior jihadist commanders | III | Not supported by the sources we reviewed |
| Islamic State core sends cryptocurrency to ISKP | III | Part II documents ISKP wallets; no source ties them to funds from the core |
| Levant-developed attack designs are delivered to a South Asian border | III | No public source found |
| PCC acts as a procurement partner for the Kinahan group | IV | No public source found |
| Russian Vory v Zakone brokers arms for armed groups | IV | No public source found |
| Mexican cartels learned drone tactics from Levant or Sahel groups | I, IV | No public source found |
What To Watch
- Any court filing, indictment or official report documenting a criminal group and a terrorist group working together, which would move several rows from DATA DEFICIT to REPORTED or CONFIRMED.
- Further UN Panel and Monitoring Team reports, which are the main source of cross-group findings in this series.
- Further Foreign Terrorist Organization designations of criminal groups, and whether any notice describes an operational tie.
- The Daniel Kinahan proceedings at the Special Criminal Court.
- Whether Pakistan reconciles its 2025 drone-attack counts.
What Would Change Our Assessment
- A primary document showing a terrorist group and a criminal group sharing routes, money or personnel by agreement.
- A government or UN document naming the militant group that receives Balochistan heroin revenue.
- A government or UN document describing precursor shipments from Southeast Asia to Mexico.
- Evidence that any of the 11 cut claims is true. We will restore it with its source.
Calls We Will Score
These are the dated calls made in each part, collected in one place. We score each on its due date and publish the result, hit or miss, on the Foresight Record.
| Due | Part | Call |
|---|---|---|
| December 31, 2026 | I | No government, UN or court source publicly documents a direct operational transfer of drone know-how between a jihadist group and a Mexican cartel. |
| December 31, 2026 | I | The Pakistani military and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police do not publish a reconciled count of 2025 TTP and IMP drone attacks. |
| February 28, 2027 | II | The U.S. Treasury announces at least one further sanctions action naming exchange houses, money service businesses or hawala operators serving the Islamic State or Hezbollah. |
| March 31, 2027 | I | No cartel armed-drone attack on U.S. soil is officially confirmed. |
| March 31, 2027 | II | The Treasury adds further stablecoin addresses to the sanctions entry of at least one terrorist group. |
| March 31, 2027 | III | Another Iranian-attributed, Houthi-bound weapons seizure is reported. |
| March 31, 2027 | IV | No government, UN or court document describes precursor shipments from Myanmar, Laos or Cambodia to Mexican ports. |
| June 30, 2027 | II | No government, UN or court document ties a Southeast Asian scam-compound operator to a designated terrorist group. |
| June 30, 2027 | III | No government or UN source names a Baloch militant group receiving southern-route heroin revenue. |
| June 30, 2027 | IV | The State Department adds at least one more criminal group to the Foreign Terrorist Organization list beyond the 21 reported in September 2026. |
| June 30, 2027 | IV | The Daniel Kinahan case has not reached a verdict. |
| July 31, 2027 | III | A UN report again describes Houthi cooperation with al-Shabaab. |
What This Ledger Does and Does Not Establish
| Establishes | Does not establish |
|---|---|
| Which links in this series are documented, which are reported, and which are open questions. | That an open question has a negative answer. |
| Shared infrastructure and parallel adoption between terrorist and criminal groups, in four areas. | That terrorist and criminal groups coordinate, or that either directs the other. |
| One UN Panel finding of cross-group cooperation, between the Houthis and al-Shabaab. | That the finding has been tested in a court. |
| That the legal label “terrorist” now covers many Latin American criminal groups. | That the label reflects an operational tie to a jihadist group. |
Frequently Asked Questions
Do terrorist groups and criminal networks work together?
The public record documents parallel use of the same rails and routes, and criminal-to-criminal partnerships. It documents one UN Panel finding of cooperation between two armed groups, the Houthis and al-Shabaab. It does not document a terrorist group and a criminal syndicate coordinating.
Why are some claims marked DATA DEFICIT instead of false?
Because failing to find a source does not show that something did not happen. We hold those links open and say what would settle them.
Will the ledger change?
Yes. If a source changes a row, we will update the row and log the change here and on the affected part. The series will also keep growing, and new parts will add rows.
Related Reading
- Transcontinental Convergence: the series introduction
- Part I: Tactical Diffusion
- Part II: The Money
- Part III: The Corridors
- Part IV: The Transcontinental Crime
Sources
Full sourcing for each row is in the Sources section of the part named in the Part column. The primary documents behind the ledger’s main findings are:
- UN Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2025/650
- Europol, Europol supports takedown of cocaine trafficking network linked to Los Lobos cartel, March 3, 2026
- U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Targets Large Chinese Network of Illicit Drug Producers, October 3, 2023
- UNODC, World Drug Report 2026
- UNODC, Synthetic Drugs in East and Southeast Asia 2026
