This is Part 6 of Running to Disaster, CommandEleven’s eight-part study of how Pakistan’s radicalization and terrorism problem was built, from the Soviet-Afghan war to today.
Pakistan
The KGB’s read on Pakistan was that its own relationship with India drastically limited the Soviet Union’s influence on Pakistan. The Soviets also believed that Pakistan was fully pro-West since 1947. The KGB also saw the authoritarian military regimes more difficult to penetrate than India’s Congress Party.
The communist influence in Pakistan was largely limited to certain parts of Sindh, with full KGB support and Soviet contracts that allowed supporters to earn millions.
For the KGB, the main role of Soviet active measures in Pakistan, both during and after the Ayub Khan era was to spread suspicion of the United States. When the US suspended military assistance after the September 1965 war with India, the KGB leveraged the bitterness felt at American abandonment in Pakistan’s hour of need.
The main target of the KGB influence operations was Ayub Khan’s foreign minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
Four years earlier, Bhutto had invited Mikhail Stepanovich Kapitsa, the Soviet ambassador, and his wife to his family estate, where he made it clear that he saw himself as the future foreign minister (Bhutto was Minister for Natural Resources) and his ultimate ambition was to become the Prime Minister and President. Leonid Shebarshin, Kapitsa’s translator and former KGB head in India, found Bhutto’s conversation ‘desperately bold and even reckless.’
Bhutto wanted Soviet assistance to end American influence in Pakistan.
Operation REBUS launched in the spring of 1966 was principally designed to reinforce Bhutto’s hostility to the United States by passing forged documents to the Pakistani government supposedly showing Walter McConaughy, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, plotting to overthrow Ayub Khan, Bhutto, and other ministers. The operation achieved its influence on Bhutto, who fully believed he was removed from his ministry in June 1966 because of US pressure.
After REBUS, Operation SPIDER was launched to convince Ayub Khan the United States was using the West German Tarantel press agency to attack his government and its close links with China. As part of the operation, a bogus agency report, including an anti-Ayub cartoon, on genuine Tarantel stationery was distributed in Karachi to newspapers and opposition figures. Additionally, forged letters from outraged Pakistanis were sent to the Police Chiefs of Lahore and Karachi, with the agency report attached.
In late 1967, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took the initiative in founding the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under the populist slogan:
“Islam is our faith, democracy is our polity, socialism is our economic policy: all power to the people.”
During the winter of 1968-69, the PPP coordinated a wave of popular protests, which in March 1969 brought Ayub Khan’s government to an end. Ayub submitted his resignation to the Commander-in-Chief, General Yahya Khan, a constitutional violation, and Yahya quickly abrogated the constitution and declared martial law.
The KGB launched active measures to make Yahya Khan suspicious of both China and the United States.
Operation RAVI sent forged documents supposedly from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Chinese Chargé d’affaires in India and the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These documents outlined plans to turn Kashmir into a pro-Chinese independent state. On June 28th, both forgeries were sent to the Pakistani ambassadors in Delhi and Washington, hoping the contents would be reported to Yahya Khan.
Simultaneously, the KGB also launched Operation ZUBR to spread reports that Americans had lost faith in Yahya Khan’s ability to hold on to power and were afraid that he would be replaced by a left-wing government, which would nationalize banks and confiscate their deposits. The US embassy had supposedly reported to Washington that Yahya Khan’s government was extremely corrupt and would squander any foreign aid given to it.
Operation PADMA was designed to persuade the Yahya Khan regime that the Chinese were inciting rebellion in East Pakistan. The KGB fabricated a Chinese appeal to Bengali revolutionaries urging them to take up arms against the Punjabi landowners and the reactionary regime of Yahya Khan. A copy was sent to the Indian ambassador, under the full understanding that Pakistani intelligence would open it on arrival. Another copy was sent to the US ambassador with the hope that he would show it to the Pakistanis. All of this while KGB agents in Kabul warned Pakistani diplomats of Chinese subversion in East Pakistan.
By late 1969, the Kremlin decided that separation of the eastern and western wings of Pakistan would be in Soviet and Indian interests.
The KGB approached Sheikh Mujib Rahman, and claims it was successful in persuading him that his arrest in January 1968 was the work of the US, when he was charged in the ‘Agartala conspiracy.’
The Agartala conspiracy was related to a series of meetings held with Indian officials in Agartala to bring about the secession of East Pakistan with Indian help. Mujib was told in September 1969 that the names of all the conspirators had been personally passed to Ayub Khan by the US ambassador. The KGB believes this recruitment was extremely successful because Mujib had completely believed the disinformation.
The ‘Agartala conspiracy’ trial turned into a public relations disaster for Ayub Khan, when evidence emerged that Pakistani police had tortured the alleged conspirators, and one of the defendants was murdered in custody. The trial was never completed and charges were dropped as a precondition for meetings between opposition leaders and Ayub in early 1969.
In late 1969, Yahya Khan announced that while martial law would remain in effect, party politics would be allowed to resume on January 1, 1970 in preparation for elections at the end of the year. The Kremlin’s strategy was to ensure the victory of Bhutto’s PPP in the West and Mujib’s Awami League in the East.
In June 1970, V.I. Startsev, head of the FCD South Asian Department, devised an active measure to discredit all the main opponents of the PPP and Awami League:
- Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, President of the Pakistan Muslim League – Qayyum faction, was to be discredited with speeches he allegedly made before 1947 opposing the creation of Pakistan.
- Sayyid Abul A’la al-Maududi, founder and leader of Jamaat-i-Islami, was to be exposed as a reactionary and a CIA agent.
- Mian Mumtaz Daultana, head of the Council Muslim League, was to be unmasked as a veteran British agent and accomplice in political murders.
- Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry, leader of the Convention Muslim League, was to also be implicated in past political murders, as well as plans to murder Bhutto.
- Nurul Amin, President of the Pakistan Democratic Party, was to be unmasked as a leading figure in the Agartala Conspiracy.
Though the 1970 elections delivered the result the Kremlin desired, they were unable to determine if their specific active measures had any significant effect.
The PPP won 81 of 138 seats in West Pakistan, while Mujib’s Awami League carried a sweeping victory in East Pakistan, winning 160 out of 162 seats. Though the Awami League did not win a single seat in West Pakistan, its overall majority in the National Assembly entitled Mujib to the Prime Minister’s chair. Bhutto colluded with Yahya Khan and the army to refuse Mujib taking power.
In March 1971, Mujib was arrested and a brutal military oppression campaign was started in East Pakistan.
The Kremlin reported to the Central Committee that the end of Pakistani unity was imminent, while Bhutto declared “Pakistan has been saved.”
Bengal was engulfed in bloodshed that could only be compared to the intercommunal violence during the 1947 independence. India provided safe haven to Bengali rebels, and in November civil war converted into an Indo-Pak war.
On December 16, 1971, Dhaka fell to Indian troops and an independent Bangladesh was declared.
The transformation suited Soviet interests. The Indo-Soviet relationship had been enhanced, Indira Gandhi’s personal prestige rose to an all-time high and Pakistan was dramatically weakened by the loss of East Pakistan. Additionally, Moscow’s preferred candidates were in power in Islamabad and Dhaka.
After the defeat to India, Yahya Khan handed power over to Bhutto as President.
In January 1972, Mujib was released from prison and returned to a hero’s welcome.
The KGB believed that Mujib’s Awami League would win a five-year term and its main opposition would come from the pro-Chinese left. A series of KGB forgeries were used to influence Mujib and the Bangladeshi media that the Chinese were conspiring with left-wing opposition. The real threat to Mujib was not from the Maoists, but opponents within his own armed forces.
On August 15, 1975, Mujib and a significant portion of his family were murdered by a group of army officers.
The KGB immediately started an active measure to inspire newspaper articles, in various countries, that the coup was the work of the CIA.
Within 24 hours of Mujib’s murder, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was the first to recognize the new military-backed government in Dhaka.
Bhutto later lamented his enthusiasm as it became clear that Dhaka would be closer with Delhi than Islamabad. He also became concerned that the Dhaka military coup might set a bad example to the Pakistani military.
During the mid-1970s, the KGB significantly increased its influence in the Pakistani media:
- 1973 – placed 33 articles, little more than 1% of the number in India
- 1977 – placed 440 articles and acquired direct control of one periodical
The main objective of the active measures was to increase Pakistan’s distrust of the United States.
Disinformation passed to the Bhutto government claimed the US considered Pakistan too unreliable an ally to deserve substantial military aid. Washington was, allegedly, increasingly distrustful of Bhutto’s government and regarded the Shah of Iran as its main regional ally. The Shah was also reported to be scornful of Bhutto’s failure to deal with unrest in Baluchistan and was willing to send in Iranian troops if the situation worsened.
Despite the success of the disinformation on Bhutto, Moscow continued to see him as a loose cannon. Rafi Raza, one of Bhutto’s ministers and closest advisers, claimed “neither superpower considered him reliable.”
Among the initiatives of Bhutto that infuriated the Kremlin was his campaign for a ‘new economic order to redress the grave injustice to poorer nations of the world.’ Pakistan was kept out of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) by an Indian veto and Bhutto challenged its authority. In August 1976, on the eve of the NAM Summit in Colombo, Bhutto published an article called “Third World – New Direction,” calling for a third world summit in Islamabad to discuss global economic reform.
The Kremlin feared that by bringing non-NAM nations together under Bhutto’s chairmanship, such a summit would damage the prestige of NAM, which was itself an important vehicle for Soviet active measures. After the Politburo condemned Bhutto’s proposal, the Kremlin launched a massive active measure, using KGB agents to inform the chairman of NAM, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and other Sri Lankan politicians that Bhutto’s aim was to undermine her authority, divide NAM nations, and weaken the movement’s commitment to anti-Imperialism. Similar disinformation, designed to discredit Bhutto’s initiative, was forwarded to Somalia, Nigeria, Ghana, Cyprus, Yemen, Mexico, Venezuela, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nepal.
On July 5, 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a military coup.
On September 3, Bhutto was charged with conspiracy to murder the father of a PPP politician. The popular sentiment that had swept Bhutto to power had been dissipated by his autocratic manner and the corruption of his regime. One of Bhutto’s most fervent supporters commented:
“It was painful to see that while Bhutto stood trial for murder in Lahore, the people of the city were showing greater interest in the test match being played there.”
Bhutto was sentenced to death on March 18, 1978 and executed on April 4, 1979.
KGB active measures and disinformation blamed Bhutto’s overthrow and execution, like Mujib’s, on a CIA conspiracy.
Neither General Ziaur Rahman in Dhaka nor General Zia-ul-Haq in Islamabad was favorably regarded by the Kremlin; in its analysis, both were more supportive of Washington than Moscow.
All the active measures used against East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and West Pakistan, now Pakistan, lost all their value when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.
Until the invasion, General Zia-ul-Haq had been widely underestimated in both the East and the West. The Economist, in the summer of 1978, dismissed him as a “well-intentioned but increasingly maladroit military ruler,” while The Guardian declared that, “Zia’s name has a death-rattle sound these days. There’s a feeling he can’t last much longer.”
Once the war in Afghanistan began, General Khalid Mahmud Arif, Zia’s Chief of Staff, said:
“All eyes were focused on Pakistan. Would she buckle under pressure and acquiesce in superpower aggression? The Western countries quickly changed their tune. The arch critics of the autocratic military rulers began to woo him. They suddenly discovered Zia’s hitherto unknown ‘sterling qualities’ and the special importance of Pakistan in the changed circumstances.”
Zia began pressing the Carter administration to provide arms and assistance to the mujahideen insurgents against the Communist regime even before the Soviet invasion. President Carter had approved covert non-military support starting in July 1979. Pakistan’s ISI also made several approaches to the CIA.
In February 1980, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, visited Pakistan to agree with Zia US covert assistance to the Afghan mujahideen across the Pakistan border. The meeting, between Zia and Brzezinski, inaugurated a secret US-Pakistan alliance for a covert intervention in Afghanistan that lasted until the Soviet withdrawal.
After Brzezinski’s departure, Andrei Gromyko declared that Pakistan was putting its own security at risk by acting as a ‘springboard for further aggression against Afghanistan.’ Yuri Andropov simultaneously approved an elaborate series of active measures designed to deter Zia from providing, or allowing the Americans or Chinese to provide, aid to the mujahideen. Pakistan’s intelligence station chief in Moscow was told that “if Pakistan was used as a base for ‘armed struggle against Afghanistan,’ the Oriental Institute, headed by Yevgeni Primakov, would be asked to devise ways of assisting Baluchi and Pashtun separatist movements on the North-West Frontier in order to seal off the Afghan border.”
The CIA also believed there was a serious possibility of large-scale Soviet aid to the Baluchi.
KGB active measures included:
- Operation SARDAR sought to persuade Zia that some of his own senior officers, who opposed his Afghan policy, were plotting against him.
- Leaflets were prepared in English and Urdu and distributed in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Karachi from February 28 to March 1, 1980. The leaflets caused Pakistani intelligence concern, who immediately opened an investigation and wrongly incriminated Lieutenant-General Muhammad Iqbal Khan. Iqbal launched a failed coup against Zia on March 5th, which led to the removal or retirement of a series of senior officers and the expulsion of two members of the US consulate in Lahore, who had been in contact with them.
- On March 25th, Andropov was informed the operation had led the Zia regime to believe that the United States was conspiring with dissidents in the Pakistan Army. Andropov approved continuing the operation and several similar leaflets were distributed over the next year.
- Letters were fabricated with the names of various informants and bogus conspirators and sent to American organizations and others in Pakistan who were known to have their mail read before delivery, as well as the Pakistani ambassador in Washington, in order to spread the impression of a CIA plot to overthrow the Zia regime. Additional disinformation planted on the Pakistani ambassador in Bangkok reported that the State Department regarded the regime as an unpopular, incompetent dictatorship which should be replaced as soon as possible.
- Attempts were made to convince the Pakistanis that the CIA was plotting with separatists in Baluchistan, promising to support their campaign for autonomy in return for help in conducting cross-border operations against the Khomeini (Iran) regime.
- Simultaneously, the KGB orchestrated a massive campaign in the Pakistani and foreign press attacking Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan. During the first eight months of the war, the KGB claimed to have planted 527 articles in Pakistani newspapers. The Politburo also went to elaborate lengths to exacerbate popular resentment against the Afghan refugees flooding across the border by planting agents in their midst with a mission to discredit them.
Sources
- Leonid Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy (The Hand of Moscow)
- Internal Soviet intelligence documents, Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chapters 5 and 7
- Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History
- Kolbenev, Kak Pakistan raskololsia na dva gosudarstva (How Pakistan Split into Two States)
- Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, 1967–1977
- Raja Anwar, The Terrorist Prince: The Life and Death of Murtaza Bhutto
- Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working with Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics, 1977–1988
- Robert Gates, From the Shadows
Next: Part 7: Al-Zulfiqar and the Covert War
Download the original report: Running to Disaster, Volume II: Operation Dinner Out (PDF). The 2024 report this part is drawn from, which covers Parts 3 to 8 of this series.
The Running to Disaster Series
- Part 1: Roots of Radicalization
- Part 2: The Alphabet of Jihad
- Part 3: Operation: Dinner Out
- Part 4: The KGB’s Active Measures
- Part 5: Afghanistan, 1978–1979
- Part 6: Pakistan in the KGB’s Crosshairs (you are here)
- Part 7: Al-Zulfiqar and the Covert War
- Part 8: Inside the Camps
