



# Running to Disaster

## Part II – Operation: Dinner Out

Briefing Paper  
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## ABOUT COMMANDELEVEN

CommandEleven is a private intelligence firm, based in Pakistan, with assets, analysts, and researchers offering apolitical analysis on topics such as security, geopolitics, defense, and espionage. CommandEleven's intelligence includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir.

CommandEleven, founded in 2015 as a think tank and policy advisory, with the objective of democratizing intelligence, simplify its understanding and real-life application, while offering guidance to governments, agencies, media, and private organizations.

CommandEleven continues to inform and guide public policy and decision-makers in the government, business, and military through a rigorous program of publications, conferences, digital media, policy briefings, and recommendations.

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**Running to Disaster** is a multi-volume study from [CommandEleven](#), digging deep into:

- The Roots of Radicalization
- Operation: Dinner Out
- What has failed
- What needs to be done
- How we get there

The information included and analyzed in *Operation: Dinner Out* is based on internal documents obtained from various intelligence agencies and operatives, government agencies, studies and hearings, books, interviews, articles, and additional research sources.

Intrinsic to this study is the assignment of responsibilities for Pakistan to move forward as a nation, meaning that roles are defined for all stakeholders with defined objectives.

## INTRODUCTION

To fully understand the Afghanistan chessboard, it is important to understand all the overt and covert players. **Operation: Dinner Out**, the second volume of **Running to Disaster**, an extensive examination and explanation of the conflict.

An old quote circulates in intelligence community circles when they discuss the Muslim world, granted its originally quoted source unknown, about the Middle East:

*"A voluntary resignation is slightly more elegant than a bullet to the brain. But without the threat of one, we can never achieve the other."*

Creating conflict, whether real or imagined, is the job of the intelligence community.

We cite the intelligence community because their role was, and continues to be, significant in the creation of the model, use of resources to mature and mutate conflicts, and convert them into terrorism and/or insurgencies.

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought nearly every major intelligence agency into the region. Besides the fact of direct confrontation between the CIA and the KGB, which was started well before the invasion, every other intelligence agency was using the battlefield to capture their own advantage.

The former KGB officer, Yuri Bezmenov, who commented on the activities of the KGB, was quoted once:

*"Only about 15% of time, money, and manpower is spent on intelligence as such. The other 85% is either ideological subversion or active measures."*

Another former KGB official, author of [\*Spymaster: My Thirty-two Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West\*](#), and former head of political operations in the US, [General Oleg Kalugin](#), said

*"Not intelligence collection, but subversion: active measures to weaken the West, to drive wedges in the Western community of alliances... to sow discord among allies..."*

The CIA's role during the invasion of Afghanistan was neither covert, nor were attempts made to deny their role. The KGB, however, has been excluded from most conversations related to terrorism, as they are blamed for the invasion itself.

It should also be clear that without the involvement of the CIA in Afghanistan, Pakistan's own Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) would not have matured exponentially in intelligence, espionage, and covert measures.

The role of intelligence agencies is both key to the foundation and eventually regional and global expansion.

Some will wonder the rationale behind decades-old historical information, which many think they already know.

The point of a historical review is to simplify understanding of the actions, incentives, and opportunities to damage Pakistan, not only since, but also because of, supporting the United States against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. And, as if the scars from the first battle weren't memorable enough, Pakistan repeated the mistake again post-9/11 as

another ill-conceived, mismanaged decision was again taken by the military leadership of Pakistan.

This historical review is also important, as it filters rumor mills that speak based on the snippets of information gleaned from friends, drawing rooms, media channels, social media, and politicians.

There is enough blame for everyone, but maybe some would like to avoid highlighting their role in a disaster that has taken the world by storm.

This report is a compilation and analysis of documents that have been either received, collected, or published by government departments, intelligence agencies, research reports and studies from multiple countries that were involved in the conflict. This analysis has purposely excluded India due to their pro-Communist position the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, her Congress Party, and her government. We have included broad strokes of the KGB's involvement with India, but not gone into detail.

For the purpose of the first two volumes of the **Running to Disaster** series, CommandEleven has focused its research and analysis on:

- guerrilla warfare and terrorist organizations created by the United States and CIA
- active measures taken by the Soviet Union and KGB used against Pakistan and its people
- machinations of imperialism and regional dominance from the Pakistan and the ISI
- ideations of a global Khalifat by high-net-worth Middle Easterners, radicalized fighters, and mullahs
- motivations of independence induced by those who have nothing to lose and a great deal to gain from instability

## SUMMARY OF THE ROOTS OF RADICALIZATION – VOLUME I

Since the Soviet Union's Red Army invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the world was set ablaze by Jihadi terrorism. In the past 40 years, jihadi attacks have multiplied, reaching the heart of Western countries such as New York, Madrid, London, Paris, and Moscow, places never believed possible.

By instilling feelings of fear and mistrust, through repetitive, indiscriminate violence, jihadi terrorism fuels or reinforces the demands for authoritarianism and closure that are increasing in democracies.

Civil rights are being stripped in the name of national security. People are jailed without trial, tortured without justice, all things that no one would have accepted had there not been a terrorist attack on Western soil. Since 1980, terrorism has been growing and growing, but it wasn't until the sacrifice of over 3,000 lives that the world became serious about fighting terrorism, but not stopping it.

During the Soviet invasion, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), along with the University of Nebraska – Omaha and their Center for Afghanistan Studies, developed textbooks and training materials for mujahideen schools. These textbooks, rather than teaching math, science, and language, taught jihad to children starting from ages 3–4 years.

Since then, every madrassa, not just in Pakistan or Afghanistan but globally, has been teaching these textbooks.

In this analysis, we will also introduce, detail, and interlink how the Soviet Union chose to punish Pakistan and General Zia-ul-Haq for supporting the United States through both overt and covert measures that would increase political and economic instability, ramp up ethnic and sectarian divisions, further destabilize the region by fabricating incidents, and significantly radicalizing the population against themselves, the government, and the military.

The Soviet Union's addition is known as "Active Measures," covered in detail in another section, while active measures are mentioned throughout the study providing a clear picture of how deep these operations went.

Let simplify.

*Under the guise of defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the United States worked with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, USAID, and the University of Nebraska – Omaha, to develop and indoctrinate a method to turn good children into extremists.*

*During the Soviet invasion, they were able to immediately utilize their newly minted soldiers, working with the CIA and ISI to further improve the programme. The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.*

*The Soviets, angered by Zia's support of the United States, activated their KGB to develop and implement "active measures" against Pakistan internally, regionally, and internationally.*

***This was the first decade (1979–1989) of the operation.***

*From that time onward, the seven mujahideen groups and the Taliban used the same textbooks and methodologies.*

*It is also well known that al-Qaeda adopted these textbooks and methodologies, which means that the materials have been more radicalized and the operation has turned into an ongoing experiment.*

*This also created many versions of the original model that were tweaked by the creators of these groups, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Boko Haram.*

*During the experimentation phase, there were no major conflicts that the radicalized fighters could engage, so small battles were created around the Muslim world, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa turned into Afghanistan II.*

***This was the second decade (1989–1999) of experimentation.***

*Yuri Bezmenov, who [defected from the Soviet Union in the 1970s](#), considered on the [best "Chaos Agents" the Soviet Union ever created](#), once said:*

*"It takes from 15–20 years to demoralize a nation... This is the minimum number of years required to educate one generation of students."*

*In 2001, when the World Trade Center was attacked, the globally motivated jihadi found a place to wage war again, Afghanistan, to defend al-Qaeda, who had been forced to shift international operations there after the Clinton administration carried out a strike in the Horn of Africa.*

*With the US invasion of Afghanistan, it was possible to return the jihadi movement to its roots in guerrilla warfare, where the movement began.*

*When the United States invaded Iraq and deposed Saddam Hussain, many of his Baathist Generals, high-ranking military officers, and soldiers gave their support to a new jihadi group known as The Islamic State (IS).*

*The Islamic State brought extreme brutality to the global jihad causing al-Qaeda to distance itself from IS methodologies, ideologies, and the group themselves.*

***Decade three (1999–2009) was characterized by mutation and maturation.***

*With the US and NATO invasion, from 2001–2019, Afghanistan was under international occupation. Pakistan, who had stood with the Taliban against the Soviet Union, supported the avowed "Great Satan" against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and became a target for jihadi groups.*

*From 2001–2015, Pakistan drowned in blood spilled in terror attacks throughout the country, with 2007–2009 being the bloodiest.*

*In the global jihadi's mind, Pakistan's role against the Soviet Union was as a training and staging area for attacks inside Afghanistan against the Soviets. Pakistan's role against the Taliban was to support and facilitate attacks against the mujahideen.*

*In Iraq, the Islamic State brought brutality and destruction to a level that was only possible with massive financial, material, and military support. The Islamic State also took al-Qaeda's propaganda methods to an international level, using*



*the Internet to spread their messages across all jihadi forums and to individuals in the Western world.*

*On the Western media channels, there was a constant blitzkrieg of conversation about the war, terrorist groups, coverage of attacks in the Muslim world on US troops, but now there is also coverage of retaliatory attacks in Western cities, and a new combatant to profile – the Lone Wolf.*

*The Lone Wolf is an individual, who has been radicalized via the internet, learned attack methods from materials provided on IS social media platforms, motivated to carry out their attack where every they are. From there began, machete attacks, running people over in crowded streets, knife attacks, and a variety of other attack methods in Western cities. It made a jihadi attack unexpected, uncontrollable, and therefore, not defensible.*

*The Islamic State took jihad to Western shores, where they had never seen it before, and honestly had no mental preparation for what was coming for them.*

**Decade four (2009–2019) was the escalation.**

**What will the 50-year anniversary bring about?**

This plague is terrorism.

**United States taxpayers invested US\$ 50 million to being the experiment, then injected another US\$ 2 billion under Reagan, to create a weapon that is impossible to track, monitor, control, target or defend against a terrorist attack anywhere in the world.**

It is impossible to calculate the costs of damage to property, loss of lives, nations, and military hardware since its introduction, failing to reduce its impact, and making its extinction an impossible thought with the current decision makers in power domestically, regionally, and globally.

Sadly, what the decision makers don't understand is that terrorism cannot be ended with military interventions. For every terrorist arrested or killed, another 10 volunteer to take their place.

The idea of a last cell is an impossibility because global leaders refuse to address the root of the problem – radicalization.

Radicalization exists in every society, every religion, and every country on the planet. It presents in various ways, including political, social, cultural and fear.

The solution to the problem lies in ending radicalization in every culture. It cannot be accomplished with bullets and bombs. It must be achieved with economic opportunities, educational opportunities, and security. Without these things, the terrorists will return and recruit entire populations because they will highlight failures to deliver necessities to the people.

## GLOBAL TERRORISM PRE-1979

Before 1979, it would have been very difficult to find cases of terrorism anywhere in the world.

At this point in history, there was no Afghan mujahideen, there was no jihadi movement anywhere, and Pakistan, while politically unstable, had never seen a terrorist attack.

Globally, there was guerrilla warfare in the Middle East, the United Kingdom, Northern Africa, and other parts of the world, but nothing like what emerged after 1989.

In Pakistan, there were no terrorist groups, no insurgent groups, and no independence groups.

Then, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

Many may wonder why our analysis revolves around the Soviet invasion; the answer is quite simple –

### ***It was the beginning***

- of the United States involvement with the Afghan mujahideen
- of the indoctrination through madrassas in Afghanistan and Pakistan
- of the visible sectarian divide between Sunni and Shia
- the initiation to warfare via Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) training camps based in Pakistan and Afghanistan
- of a re-birth of the massively more powerful and entrenched Pakistan Army, with a significantly more powerful intelligence agency in the ISI
- of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the standard bearer for all terror groups to follow

The Soviet Union withdrew in 1989, but from 1992 to 2001, these terror attacks against US targets, were carried out in the name of Islamic terrorism.

**December 29, 1992** – the *first ever al-Qaeda attack* took place in Aden, Yemen, at the Aden Hotel and the Aden Movenpick, where US troops were staying enroute to Somalia. bin Laden claimed responsibility for the attack in 1998.

**February 26, 1993** – The World Trade Center was bombed with a 1,300 lb (606 kg) truck bomb. The blast killed six and injured over 1,000 others. The attack was carried out by Ramzi Yousef, who had trained in al-Qaeda camps, although it was not an official al-Qaeda operation

**November 13, 1995** – a car bomb exploded at a facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where the US military was training the Saudi National Guardsmen. Five Americans and two Indians were killed, and over 60 wounded. The Saudi government said that it was al-Qaeda, although bin Laden had never claimed it.

**June 25, 1996** – A massive truck bomb detonated at Khobar Towers housing complex that was housing US Air Force personnel in Saudi Arabia. Nineteen Air Force servicemen were killed, and over 400 were injured. *al-Qaeda claimed* responsibility for the attack.

**August 1998** – *al-Qaeda operatives* carried out bombings of US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring more than 5,000 others.

**January 3, 2000** – *al-Qaeda planned* to attack the USS *The Sullivans*, but this effort failed.

**October 2000** – *al-Qaeda bombs* the USS *Cole*, killing 16 sailors.

**September 9, 2001** – Two Tunisian members of al-Qaeda assassinated [Ahmed Shah Massoud](#), the leader of the Northern Alliance in the Panjshir Valley of Afghanistan. It is believed that bin Laden sanctioned the assassination to help his Taliban protectors and ensure he would have their cooperation in Afghanistan.

**September 11, 2001** – two hijacked commercial airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City, destroying the entire complex. Another hijacked commercial airplane crashed into the Pentagon, and a fourth in a field during a struggle between passengers and hijackers to control the airplane. More than 3,000 people were killed in the attacks, making them the deadliest acts of terrorism to occur in history, and more than 6,000 people were injured. *al-Qaeda claimed* responsibility for the attack.

The understanding is that while the Soviet invasion was the *plantation of a seed*, the *seed germinated numerous times*, each time *producing a different mutation* of the original crop, and the *mutated seeds reached their maturity* to carry out the September 11<sup>th</sup> attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the July 7<sup>th</sup> attack on London's metro system.

When the United States invaded Iraq, the *seed again mutated*, creating The Islamic State.

### **Can the world afford another mutation?**

Moving from indoctrination to radicalization, and then reaching the point of such radicalization that violent terrorist activities become acceptable, which could not have happened without significant support from individuals, high-net-worth financiers, weapons dealers, war merchants, and transport, without considering the requirement of logistics and medical treatment.

This cannot be achieved without an international network of sponsors or supporters. This includes governments and intelligence agencies not interested in the foundational conflict, as much as they believe they can deal their enemy damage.

Proxy warfare is a dirty game.

These participants would never be seen near the battlefield. They operate in the shadows of actions and manipulate situations to their own advantage.

They also decide who will be a teacher, fighter, commander, or suicide bomber from all the resources they create.

## ACTIVE (SUBVERSION) MEASURES – USSR

**Active measures**, also known as subversion measures, is a catch-all expression for a “variety of influence activities,” a range of activities limited only by the imagination and creativity of the officer, and could include:

- Funding front groups
- Covert broadcasting
- Media manipulation
- Disinformation and forgeries
- Buying agents of influence (politicians, media personalities, celebrities, athletes, etc.)
- Supporting pro–democracy, political, and cultural change movements
- Overt and covert influence operations to manipulate perception
- Installing and undermining governments
- Assassination
- Insurgencies
- Terrorism

They are included our analysis because, we do believe two things happened pre-1979, 1979–1989, and post-1988, the Soviet Union

- Enriched their drive to affect change in the West, specifically the United States, in response to their defeat in Afghanistan
- Entrenched itself further with India to use these active measures against Pakistan for supporting the US against the Soviet Union

Developing an understanding of these active measures is essential to understanding how the global jihad reached milestones more quickly than were previously thought or projected.

KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin smuggled numerous documents from the Soviet Union, but one significant document was “[KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia \(1980–82\)](#),” attached as Appendix A to this document, details how in February 1980, General [Yuri Andropov](#), General Secretary of the Communist Party, detailed extensive retaliatory tactics to punish Pakistan:

*Through KGB Second Chief Directorate (SCD) assets, a warning is to be conveyed to the Pakistan Mission in Moscow to the effect that if a sensible line does not prevail in [Pakistani leader] Zia-ul Haq's political course, and Pakistan agrees under pressure from the US and China to turn its territory into a base for permanent armed struggle against Afghanistan*

General Yuri Andropov was also the founder of the [Red Banner Institute](#), now the Academy of Foreign Intelligence (SVR Academy), one of the primary espionage academies of Russia, and the former Soviet Union, serving the KGB and Foreign Intelligence Service (FSB), attended by President Vladimir Putin in the 1980s.

These Soviet Union Active Measures also [attempted to push Pakistan and India to war to benefit the Babrak Kamal regime in Afghanistan](#).

When you read the appendix as a student, the clarity of how intelligence agencies took the opportunity to settle scores became very evident. The sheer number of “active measures” can easily be identified in today’s radicalization or insurrections in Pakistan.


**Are these active measures unfamiliar to Pakistanis?**

The entire Bhutto political family was assassinated without any real investigation, even though the [United Nations investigated](#) the [assassination of Benazir Bhutto](#), 2-time former Prime Minister of Pakistan and leader of the Pakistan People’s Party, Pakistan’s largest political party at the time, which also brought no result or justice.

Since the end of martial law in 1988, Pakistani politics has never seen stability.

The 90s were plagued by the Pakistan Army, dismissing elected democratic governments due to accusations of massive corruption. Benazir Bhutto and Muhammad Nawaz Sharif could not spend more than 36 months in power. The 1996 Nawaz Sharif government was brought down by a military coup led by General Pervez Musharraf in 1998.

Pakistan’s trouble with sectarian violence, starting during General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law from 1977 to 1988, between the Shia and Sunni groups, uncontrolled escalated to full terror camps funneling fighters to conflict zones around the Middle East.



Pakistan has seen pro-democracy movements organized, run, and attended by the same political parties who have failed the country repeatedly.

Pakistan has seen social and cultural change movements from [Aurat March](#) to [the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement](#), which has amazingly launched its own political party, [the National Democratic Movement](#), under the leadership of the current member of the National Assembly, Mohsin Dawar.

When one can plunge an entire nation into political, social, economic, and financial unrest caused by its own people, it effectively neutralizes the nation’s ability to grow or progress.

Cicero once said:

*“A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason from within.”*

Pakistan has been able to survive the fools and is ambitious, but it has now reached a point where treason is not an impossible thought, concept, or possibility.

*The Great Bear Hug: Mrs. Indira Gandhi with Leonid Brezhnev in Delhi*, by Christopher Andrews, focused on KGB penetration into other parts of the world, including India. The thesis of the research was the *Soviet Union’s decision that the Third World was the arena in which it could win the Cold War by proxy.*

Andrews claims that the KGB’s maximum effort in a Third World country was India, where the number of KGB agents during the 1970s was the largest outside the Soviet Union.

Some of the [exploits detailed in the book](#) are as follows:

- Indira Gandhi was sent suitcases of money meant for the Congress coffers.
  - On one occasion, a secret gift of Rs 2 million from the Politburo to Congress Party was personally delivered by Leonid Shebarshin, head of the KGB in India.
  - Another million rupees were given on the same occasion to a newspaper that supported Mrs. Gandhi.
- In 1977, the KGB files identified 21 non-communist politicians (four union ministers) whose election campaigns were subsidized by the KGB.
- In 1978, the KGB ran over 30 agents in India, 10 of whom were Indian intelligence officers.
- CPI was funded in many ways, including the transfer of money through car windows on Delhi roads.
- In 1959, CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh agreed on a plan to found an import-export business for trade with the Soviet bloc. Over the past decade, its annual profits have grown to over Rs 3 million.
- In 1975, a total of 10.6 million rubles were spent on active measures in India designed to strengthen support for Mrs. Gandhi and undermine her political opponents.
- V. Krishna Menon, as defence minister, was persuaded to buy Soviet MiGs and not British Lightnings. His 1962 and 1967 election campaigns were funded by the KGB.
- By 1973, the KGB had ten Indian newspapers on its payroll and a press agency. In 1975, the KGB planted 5,510 articles in the Indian newspapers.
- [Promode Dasgupta](#), the communist stalwart, was identified by the KGB as an Intelligence Bureau (IB) informant in the Indian communist movement.

In the first volume of this series, CommandEleven detailed the US government’s role in the radicalization of Pakistanis and Afghans during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with a religiously motivated agenda.

## A CommandEleven Briefing Paper

In this volume, CommandEleven details the punitive measures taken by the Soviet Union against Pakistan for its support of the Afghan people and the United States.

## THE PAWNS, THE KNIGHTS, AND THE KINGS

For any war chessboard to be translate to victory, it relies on the effective and efficient use of the pieces. In this case, it was on the chessboard of Afghanistan, where the pawns and knights could be sacrificed, the kings are protected until the very end.

In the end, however, one king must fall.

In the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the pawns were the first in play.

Strategically moved around the chessboard until they could achieve maximum damage before sacrifice. And, unlike the normal chessboard, where the number of pieces is limited, on the global warfare chessboard, the pieces are endless and can be bought for more effective results. The pawns are sacrificed, which is what happened with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Next came the knights, riding in from behind the smoke. The knights are the foreign governments and intelligence agencies. Their job to survey the board and re-position pieces to make another assault on the king. The knights are rarely sacrificed, as they never emerge from the smoke screen.

Lastly, and most importantly, are the kings, as this battle is a showcase of their knowledge and strategic ability to conquer their enemy. The kings are continuously moving around the board with security close by to defend in case of attack. The kings are Russia, who invaded Afghanistan, and the United States, who was fighting by proxy through Pakistan and the Afghan mujahideen.

In the research process, it became clear that significant work on active measures was done well-before the invasion by the KGB in Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Most of the work against Pakistan was to rebuke them for supporting the Afghan mujahideen, with the United States, against the Soviet Union.

We will give a broad stroke understanding into the active measures that have respectively been used in each country that would later be involved in the Soviet occupation, with specific focus on Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Those are detailed in the Afghanistan, and Pakistan sections, and in Appendix A, which is the KGB document on their active measures in southeast Asia.



## AFGHANISTAN (1978–1979)

While Afghanistan was the battlefield for the military conflict, there was a significant amount of work completed prior to Soviet invasion to establish a pro-communism government. It could be believed that the Soviets manufactured Afghanistan's political instability, but it's also clear that Soviet decisions, in terms of leadership, pushed Afghanistan closer to an Islamic revolution much faster than expected.

Known as "[The Great Saur Revolution](#)," communism began in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978 with a bloody military coup led by KGB assets, [Major General Sayed Muhammad Gulbazyov](#) and Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Rafi, [Major Muhammad Aslam Watanjar](#), and Major Sherjan Mazduryar, with the support of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) party leader, [Nur Muhammad Taraki](#), seized control of the Presidential Palace and executed [President Muhammad Daoud Khan](#) and his entire family.

Taraki had been a KGB asset for almost 30 years. Taraki, while President, was removed from the agent network, but continued to maintain close contact directly with the KGB, assisting with intelligence gathering, talent-spotting, and assisted in operations against the US and Chinese embassies in Kabul and other targets. When the KGB began to have disagreements with a "*painfully vain*" Taraki, a full vetting was ordered by the KGB Station in Kabul.

The vetting revealed he was responsible for a growing split within the PDPA between his own Pashtun-speaking *Khalq* (masses) and the predominantly urban Persian-speaking Parcham (banner), led by [Babrak Karmal](#).

The KGB believed a working relationship with Karmal would be significantly better than Taraki. Karmal was better educated, naturally sociable, and more flexible.

There was no love lost between Taraki and Karmal, each having made numerous complaints to the KGB against the other. The accusations reached such a tenor the KGB instructed Kabul in 1974:

*"In the course of regular meetings with Karmal and Taraki, you must carefully, in the form of friendly advice and without referring to instructions from Moscow, tell them not to take any steps, without prior agreement by us, which could be used by their enemies as a pretext for striking a blow at their groups, or compromising them. Karmal and Taraki should also be warned that they must desist from attacking each other and accusing each other of anti-republican activities, as this plays into the hands of the reactionary forces and will lead to the collapse of the democratic (Communist) movement in Afghanistan."*

On April 30, 1974, Taraki became both President and Prime Minister of a government that included Babrak Karmal and [Hafizullah Amin](#), a leading member of Taraki's Khalq faction, as Vice-President and Deputy Prime Minister, respectively. After the signing of the [Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation](#) on December 5, 1978, between Leonid Brezhnev and Taraki, the friction between the two leaders began to emerge.

When asked to release KGB agents and confidential contacts who had been jailed during Daoud's regime, Taraki, who had taken personal charge of the Afghan security apparatus, responded:

*"Some Soviet specialists, particularly those who worked for many years in Afghanistan under the old regime and have now returned, often have a dated*

*view of the country and do not see, in an objective light, what is happening in the country."*

*Taraki also showed he had little understanding of the problems establishing Communist rule over a staunchly Muslim country.*

*Taraki also began an assault on traditional Islamic authority, disguised as an attempt to "clean Islam... of the ballast and dirt of bad traditions, superstition, and erroneous belief."*

The 320,000 traditionally minded mullahs were treated as an obstacle to "the progressive movement of our homeland."

Those religious leaders who resisted the "cleansing" process were tortured and shot, or buried alive.<sup>1</sup> Taraki also gave orders for members of the Muslim Brotherhood and followers of Khomeini to be immediately eliminated wherever they were found.<sup>2</sup>

### **Islam became the unifying bond of opposition to the PDPA and its Soviet backers.**

*Afghan resistance to the regime was transformed into a jihad in defense of Islam, whose significance was grossly underestimated by the KGB, as there were no reports from the Kabul Station of the threat of an Afghan jihad.*

The KGB was more concerned with the massive power struggle that had emerged between the Khalq and Parcham factions within the PDPA. Taraki, in his arrogance, turned a deaf ear to the pleas from the Soviet embassy, the Kabul Station, and the KGB Liaison Mission, which had arrived in May 1979, to help reorganize the Afghan security services, which led to the Kabul Station sending this communication to the KGB in July:

*"Only the leadership of the CPSU can influence wild (Khalq) opportunists and force them to change their attitude towards the Parcham group."*

The "opportunists" didn't listen, sending large numbers of Parcham followers to jail, and sending their leader, Babrak Karmal, into exile as the Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

Taraki had uncovered twenty-seven supposed conspiracies to topple his regime in the four months since the April Revolution, most of the theories were probably based on his and his inner circles' paranoid tendencies.

Among the supposed ringleaders arrested in August of a plot to assassinate Taraki and Amin were Major General Abdul Qadir, Armed Forces Minister, Major General Shapur Ahmadzai, Chief of the General Staff. He claimed the plot also implicated China, the United States, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Taraki understood, having purged most of the senior officials of the Daoud administration, as well as other "anti-revolutionary, anti-democratic elements," real and imagined, his regime was now completely dependent on Soviet advisers.

The advice of the advisers did create one deeply embarrassing debacle in Kabul.

On February 14, 1979, US Ambassador Adolph Dubs was kidnapped in broad daylight by four Maoist 'guerrillas' and taken at gunpoint to the Hotel Kabul, where they demanded the release of some of their imprisoned comrades. On the advice of KGB advisers, Amin

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<sup>1</sup> *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, Henry St. Amant Bradsher, 1999

<sup>2</sup> *The KGB in Afghanistan, Vol. 1, Chap. 2*, Vasili Mitrokhin

ordered an Afghan assault group to storm the hotel. In the shootout that followed, Ambassador Dubs and two of his kidnappers were killed, one kidnapper injured and the fourth escaped.

The KGB covered up their role in the operation and refused to allow American embassy security personnel access to evidence and bullet casings. Though the guerrillas had only been armed with a total of three pistols, a gun of unknown origin, like a Kalashnikov, was planted in the room to suggest it was the murder weapon. To keep the Americans from speaking to any of the guerrillas, the KGB produced the bodies of 3 guerrillas and a bogus one. Pictures were published in Afghan newspapers to further the cover-up.

The Taraki regime was also very critical of the Soviet military advisers during the initial months of operations against the mujahideen. After Afghan security forces were defeated in Kamdesh gorge in 1978, the following was communicated from Kabul:

*"The Afghan troops led by Adviser Bryaskin have long since shown themselves incapable of eliminating the anti-government bands. We gave your advisers wide powers in the leadership of Afghan troops. We punish (our) troops severely for any failure to accept the advice of your commanders. This suggests to us that not all your advisers are sufficiently competent. We need experienced generals of whom we know there are many in the USSR. They must increase the fighting capability of the Afghan army and teach it to fight and use the experience of the Soviet army during the war."<sup>3</sup>*

Kabul's tone changed after a [major rebellion in Herat on March 15, 1979](#), which was joined by the 17<sup>th</sup> Division of the Afghan army. Frenzied, vengeful mobs hunted down Afghan government officials, Soviet advisers, and their families, and skinned some of them alive. Body parts of Soviet advisers, their wives and their children were triumphantly paraded through the streets. A panicked Taraki phoned Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin to appeal for Soviet troops to be sent to Afghanistan to save the revolution. He flew to Moscow to again appeal, only to be sent back emptyhanded.

On April 1, 1979, the Soviet Politburo decided the Taraki regime's political inflexibility and inexperience was compounded by its reluctance to take Soviet advice, made it impossible to use Soviet troops to repress an Afghan counter-revolution because it would reveal the weaknesses of the Taraki government and widen the scope of counter-revolution both domestic and internationally, as well as seriously damage the international authority of the USSR.

The Politburo also formed a commission to formulate proposals and coordinate action on Afghanistan (*Afghanistan Commission*) comprised of [Yuri Andropov](#), [Andrei Gromyko](#), Defense Minister [Dmitry Ustinov](#), and [Boris Ponomarev](#), the head of the Central Committee's International Department. It was this commission that made all policy decisions for Afghanistan during the months prior to the Soviet invasion.

The Afghanistan Commission, like the Politburo, did not believe that a Soviet military intervention was the solution, but it did increase the number of military advisers and aid to help the stabilize the Afghan regime. It also sent six generals for an inspection of the Afghan army, who reported back the low morale, low level of political training, extreme religiousness, and downtrodden nature of the masses of soldiers.

Over the next two months, as rebel attacks escalated, mutinies and desertions began within government forces. After violent demonstrations in the center of Kabul, the

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<sup>3</sup> *The KGB in Afghanistan, Vol. 1, Chap. 2, Mitrokhin*

Afghanistan Commission reported to the Politburo that measures taken by the Afghan government have not been effective and recommended to send the parachute battalion disguised as aircraft maintenance personnel to protect Soviet air squadrons at Bagram Air Base, and a KGB detachment of 125–150 men to defend the Soviet embassy.

Neither the Politburo, nor the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), understood the real nature of the Afghan problem – *the impossibility of imposing, on a staunchly Muslim and fiercely patriotic country, the rule of a Communist regime with little popular support and unreliable armed forces.*

Instead, the Commission placed all the blame on the inadequacies of the Taraki government.

*“In the Party and the government... all power in fact is concentrated in the hands of N. M. Taraki and H. Amin, who none too rarely make mistakes and commit violations of legality.”*

On March 27, 1979, profiting from Taraki’s loss of nerve after the defeat in Herat, Amin replaced him as Prime Minister, with Taraki maintaining his title of President. While taking over as Prime Minister, Amin also announced himself as Defense Minister, gaining direct control of the Afghan armed forces.

While the KGB believed Taraki to be vain and incompetent, it had significantly graver doubts about Amin, who unlike Taraki and Karmal, was never recruited as a KGB agent. The Kabul Station reported to the KGB in July that Amin had asked his Soviet financial adviser, P. Y. Dragulis, to find a way in which he could access the US\$ 400 million of Afghan government funds in foreign banks. Amin complained that withdrawals from these accounts require three Afghan official signatures, and asked Dragulis to arrange some way so that he could sign and get the money. Dragulis also told the KGB that if Amin was successful in getting the money, he would eliminate all those who had evidence of his embezzlement.

Far more worrying for the KGB were the rumors that Amin had sympathies for the United States. Though fluent in English, he never learned Russian, and as a teacher in Kabul, 20 years earlier, he had won a scholarship to study his Master’s Degree in Educational Administration from Columbia University.

- A KGB investigation also determined that Amin was friends with Nemattula Pazhwak, later Afghanistan Minister of Education, and anti-Communist. On his return from New York, Amin stayed in Bonn with the Afghan ambassador, Ali Ahmad Popal, who the KGB believed was a Western agent.
- Early in his political career, Amin received financial backing from the chairman of the Spinzer joint-stock company, Sarwari Nasher, who was believed to maintain contacts with the exiled King of Afghanistan and the Americans.
- After the April Revolution, Amin released Nasher from prison and supplied him with a car and driver. The KGB’s belief was that Amin was a smooth-talking fascist, who was secretly pro-West.

On September 1, 1979, a memorandum from Moscow to the Politburo declared Amin personally responsible for the general failure of Afghan government policy and unjustified mass repression. The Politburo looked for ways to remove Amin from power, persuade Taraki to form a more broad-based government, including the Parcham faction, “patriotically inclined” clergy, tribal leaders, and intellectuals.

On September 16, 1979, Kabul Radio announced that the PDPA Central Committee had granted a request from Taraki that he *"be relieved of his party and government positions due to health reasons and physical incapacity, which makes it unable to continue work, and had elected Amin to succeed him as Party leader."*

The Central Committee also circulated a secret resolution to party members denouncing the 'terrorist actions and unprincipled behavior' of Taraki and his chief supporters from the PDPA, and announced their expulsion from the party.<sup>4</sup>

From September to December 1979, tensions between the Amin government and the Soviet Union grew exponential, as reports of Amin meeting with US diplomats and a supposed meeting with the extreme Muslim opposition, where the KGB believed the possibility of the complete expulsion of Soviet officials, release of imprisoned Muslim rebels and ending the civil war were discussed.<sup>5</sup>

This raised a concern that Afghanistan could potentially come under an Islamic government and the only way to keep Afghanistan in the Soviet sphere of influence was with a full military invasion.

On December 12, 1979, gathering in Brezhnev's office before a Politburo meeting, the members of the Afghanistan Commission obtained the General Secretary's support for Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The Politburo authorized the Commission to oversee the implementation of the decision.

On December 13, 1979, Babrak Karmal and members of his future government were secretly flown to Bagram Air Base, ready to take over once Amin was neutralized.

On the 17<sup>th</sup>, Amin's nephew fell very ill from food-poisoning, possibly a plate prepared for Hafizullah Amin himself. With the food poisoning incident, Amin was very careful with changing his food and drink, as if he expected to be poisoned. The Soviets decided, after the failed poisoning, [shooting Amin at the beginning of the Soviet military intervention](#) was the only option.

On December 23, 1979, the KGB Station in Kabul reported that Amin's suspicions had been aroused by both Western reports of Soviet troop movements and frequent flights into Bagram Air Base.

The invasion began at 3 pm, Kabul time on December 25, 1979.

Two days later, 700 members of the KGB Alpha and Zenith special forces, dressed in Afghan uniforms and traveling in military vehicles with Afghan markings, stormed Darulaman Palace. As the sound of gunfire echoed from the outskirts of Kabul, frightened PDPA members at Kabul Radio hid their party cards or flushed them down the toilets believing that Amin's government was under attack from anti-Communist mujahideen.

At 8:45 pm, on December 25, 1979, a Red Army radio station in Termez, using the callsign Kabul Radio, announced that Babrak Kamal had assumed power and requested Soviet military assistance. Fifteen minutes later, Soviet paratroopers arrived at the actual Kabul Radio station and told the staff – they had come to save the revolution.

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<sup>4</sup> *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, Henry St. Amant Bradsher, 1999

<sup>5</sup> *The KGB in Afghanistan, Vol. 1, Chap. 4*, Mitrokhin

## PAKISTAN

The KGB's read on Pakistan was that its own relationship with India drastically limited the Soviet Union's influence on Pakistan. The Soviets also believed that Pakistan was fully pro-West since 1947. The KGB also saw the authoritarian military regimes more difficult to penetrate than India's Congress Party.

While the communist influence in Pakistan was largely limited to certain parts of Sindh, with full KGB support and Soviet contracts to supporters to earn millions.

**For the KGB, the main role of Soviet active measures in Pakistan, both during and after the Ayub Khan era was to spread suspicion of the United States.** When the US suspended military assistance after the September 1965 war with India, the KGB leveraged the bitterness felt at American abandonment in Pakistan's hour of need.

The main target of the KGB influence operations was Ayub Khan's foreign minister, [Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto](#).

Four years earlier, Bhutto had invited Mikhail Stepanovich Kapitsa, the Soviet ambassador, and his wife to his family estate, where he made it clear that he saw himself as the future foreign minister (Bhutto was Minister for Natural Resources) and his ultimate ambition was to become the Prime Minister and President. [Leonid Shebarshin](#), Kapitsa's translator and former KGB head in India, found Bhutto's conversation 'desperately bold and even reckless.'

Bhutto wanted Soviet assistance to end American influence in Pakistan.<sup>6</sup>

Operation **REBUS** launched in the spring of 1966 was principally designed to reinforce Bhutto's hostility to the United States by passing forged documents to the Pakistani government supposedly showing Walter McConaughy, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, plotting to overthrow Ayub Khan, Bhutto, and other ministers.<sup>7</sup> The operation achieved its influence on Bhutto, who fully believed, he was removed from his ministry in June 1966 because of US pressure.

After REBUS, Operation **SPIDER** was launched to convince Ayub Khan the United States was using the West German [Tarantel](#) press agency to attack his government and its close links with China. As part of the operation, a bogus agency report, including an anti-Ayub cartoon, on genuine Tarantel stationery was distributed in Karachi to newspapers and opposition figures. Additionally, forged letters from outraged Pakistanis were sent to the Police Chiefs of Lahore and Karachi, with the agency report attached.

In late 1967, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took the initiative in founding the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) under the populist slogan:

*"Islam is our faith, democracy is our polity, socialism is our economic policy: all power to the people."*

During the winter of 1968–69, the PPP coordinated a wave of popular protests, which in March 1969 brought Ayub Khan's government to an end. Ayub submitted his resignation to the Commander-in-Chief, a constitutional violation, General Yahya Khan, who quickly abrogated the constitution and declared martial law.

<sup>6</sup> *Ruka Moskvyy*, Shebarshin, pp. 34–6

<sup>7</sup> *Internal Soviet document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chapter 7, pp. 55–6*

The KGB launched active measures to make Yahya Khan suspicious of both China and the United States.

Operation **RAVI** sent forged documents supposedly from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the Chinese Charge d'affaires in India and the Chinese Foreign Ministry. These documents outlined plans to turn Kashmir into a pro-Chinese independent state. On June 28<sup>th</sup>, both forgeries were sent to the Pakistani ambassadors in Delhi and Washington, hoping the contents would be reported to Yahya Khan.

Simultaneously, the KGB also launched Operation **ZUBR** to spread reports that Americans had lost faith in Yahya Khan's ability to hold on to power and were afraid that he would be replaced by a left-wing government, which would nationalize banks and confiscate their deposits. The US embassy had supposedly reported to Washington that Yahya Khan's government was extremely corrupt and would squander any foreign aid given to it.

Operation **PADMA** was designed to persuade the Yahya Khan regime that the Chinese were inciting rebellion in East Pakistan. The KGB fabricated a Chinese appeal to Bengali revolutionaries urging them to take up arms against the Punjabi landowners and the reactionary regime of Yahya Khan. A copy was sent to the Indian ambassador, under the full understanding that Pakistani intelligence would open it on arrival. Another copy was sent to the US ambassador with the hope that he would show it to the Pakistanis. All of this while KGB agents in Kabul warned Pakistani diplomats of Chinese subversion in East Pakistan.

By late 1960, the Kremlin decided that separation of the eastern and western wings of Pakistan would be in Soviet and Indian interests.

The KGB approached [Sheikh Mujib Rahman](#), which the KGB claims was successful in persuading him that his arrest in January 1968 was the work of the US, when he was charged for the '*Agartala conspiracy*.'

The [Agartala conspiracy](#) was related to a series of meetings held with Indian officials in Agartala to bring about the secession of East Pakistan with Indian help. Mujib was told in September 1969 that the names of all the conspirators had been personally passed to Ayub Khan by the US ambassador. The KGB believes this recruitment was extremely successful because Mujib had completely believed the disinformation.

The '*Agartala conspiracy*' trial turned into a public relations disaster for Ayub Khan, when evidence emerged that Pakistani police had tortured the alleged conspirators, and one of the defendants was murdered in custody. The trial was never completed and charges were dropped as a precondition for meetings between opposition leaders and Ayub in early 1969.<sup>8</sup>

In late 1969, Yahya Khan announced that while martial law would remain in effect, party politics would be allowed to resume on January 1, 1970 in preparations for election at the end of the year. The Kremlin's strategy was to ensure the victory of Bhutto's PPP in the West and Mujib's Awami League in the East.

In June 1970, V.I. Startsev, head of FCD South Asian Department devised an active measure to discredit all the main opponents of the PPP and Awami League.

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<sup>8</sup> *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century*, Ziring, pp. 310-11

- [Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan](#), President of the Pakistan Muslim League – Qayyum faction, was to be discredited with speeches he allegedly made before 1947 opposing the creation of Pakistan.
- [Sayyid Abul A'la al-Maududi](#), founder and leader of Jamaat-i-Islami, was to be exposed as a reactionary and a CIA agent
- [Mian Mumtaz Daultana](#), head of the Council Muslim League, was to be unmasked as a veteran British agent and accomplice in political murders.
- [Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry](#), leader of the Convention Muslim League, was to also be implicated in past political murders, as well as plans to murder Bhutto.
- [Nurul Amin](#), President of the Pakistan Democratic Party, was to be unmasked as a leading figure in the Agartala Conspiracy.

Though the 1970 elections delivered the result the Kremlin desired, they were unable to determine if their specific active measures had any significant effect.

The PPP won 81 of 163 seats in West Pakistan, while Mujib's Awami League carried a sweeping victory in East Pakistan, winning 160 out of 162 seats. Though Awami League did not contest a single seat in West Pakistan, his overall majority in the National Assembly entitled Mujib the Prime Minister's chair. Bhutto colluded with Ayub and the army to refuse Mujib taking power.

In March 1971, Mujib was arrested and a brutal military oppression campaign was started in East Pakistan.

The Kremlin reported to the Central Committee that *the end of Pakistani unity was imminent*,<sup>9</sup> while Bhutto declared "*Pakistan has been saved.*"

Bengal was engulfed in bloodshed that could only be compared to the intercommunal violence during the 1947 independence. India provided safe haven to Bengali rebels, and in November civil war converted into an Indo-Pak war.

On December 16, 1971, Dhaka fell to Indian troops and an independent Bangladesh was declared.

The transformation suited Soviet interests. The Indo-Soviet relationship had been enhanced, Indira Gandhi's personal prestige rose to an all-time high and Pakistan was dramatically weakened by the loss of East Pakistan. Additionally, Moscow's preferred candidates were in power in Islamabad and Dhaka.

After the defeat to India, Yahya Khan resigned power over to Bhutto as President.

In January 1972, Mujib was released from prison and returned to a hero's welcome.

The KGB believed that Mujib's Awami League would win a five-year term and its main opposition would come from the pro-Chinese left. A series of KGB forgeries were used to influence Mujib and the Bangladeshi media that the Chinese were conspiring with left-wing opposition. The real threat to Mujib was not from the Maoists, but opponents within his own armed forces.

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<sup>9</sup> *Kak Pakistan raskololsia na dva gosudarstva*, Kolbenev, p. 79



On August 15, 1975, Mujib and a significant portion of his family were murdered by a group of army officers.

The KGB immediately started an active measure to inspire newspaper articles, in various countries, that the coup was the work of the CIA.

Within 24 hours of Mujib's murder, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was the first to recognize the military government under General Ziaur Rehman.

Bhutto later lamented his enthusiasm as it became clear that Dhaka would be closer with Delhi than Islamabad. He also became concerned that the Dhaka military coup might set a bad example to the Pakistani military.<sup>10</sup>

During the mid-1970s, the KGB significantly increased its influence in the Pakistani media.

- 1973 – placed 33 articles, little more than 1% of the number in India
- 1977 – placed 440 articles and acquired direct control of one periodical<sup>11</sup>

**The main objective of the active measures was to increase Pakistan's distrust of the United States.**

Disinformation passed to the Bhutto government claimed the US considered Pakistan too unreliable an ally to deserve substantial military aid. Washington was, allegedly, increasingly distrustful of Bhutto's government and regarded the Shah of Iran as its main regional ally. He was also reported to be scornful of Bhutto's failure to deal with unrest in Baluchistan and was willing to send in Iranian troops if the situation worsened.<sup>12</sup>

Despite the success of the disinformation on Bhutto, Moscow continued to see him as a loose cannon. Rafi Raza, one of Bhutto's ministers and closest adviser, claimed "*neither superpower considered him reliable.*"

Among the initiatives of Bhutto that infuriated the Kremlin was his campaign for a 'new economic order to redress the grave injustice to poorer nations of the world.' Pakistan was kept out of [Non-Aligned Movement](#) (NAM) by an Indian veto and Bhutto challenged its authority. On the evening in August 1976, before the start of the NAM Summit in Colombo, Bhutto published an article called "[Third World – New Direction](#)," calling for a third world summit in Islamabad in the spring of 1976 to discuss global economic reform.

The Kremlin feared that bringing non-NAM nations together under Bhutto's chairmanship, such a summit would damage the prestige of NAM, which was an important active measure. After the Politburo condemned Bhutto's proposal, the Kremlin launched a massive active measure, using KGB agents to inform the chairman of NAM, [Sirimavo Bandaranaike](#), and other Sri Lankan politicians that Bhutto's aim was to undermine her authority, divide NAM nations, and weaken the movement's commitment to anti-Imperialism. Similar disinformation, designed to discredit Bhutto's initiative, was forwarded to Somalia, Nigeria, Ghana, Cyprus, Yemen, Mexico, Venezuela, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nepal.

On July 5, 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a military coup.

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<sup>10</sup> Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan, Rafi Raza, p. 226

<sup>11</sup> Internal Soviet intelligence document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chap. 5, para 109

<sup>12</sup> Internal Soviet intelligence document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chap. 5, para 111

On September 3, Bhutto was charged with conspiracy to murder the father of a PPP politician. The popular sentiment that had swept Bhutto to power had been dissipated by his autocratic manner and the corruption of his regime. One of Bhutto's most fervent supporters commented:

*"It was painful to see that while Bhutto stood trial for murder in Lahore, the people of the city were showing greater interest in the test match being played there."<sup>13</sup>*

Bhutto was sentenced to death on March 18, 1979 and executed on April 4, 1979.

KGB active measures and disinformation blamed Bhutto's overthrow and execution, like Mujib's, on a CIA conspiracy.

For the Kremlin, neither General Ziaur Rahman in Dhaka or General Zia-ul-Haq in Islamabad were favorably regarded by the Kremlin, both, in their analysis, were more supportive of Washington than Moscow.

All the active measures used against East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and West Pakistan, now Pakistan, lost all their value when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

Until the invasion, General Zia-ul-Haq had been widely underestimated in both the East and the West. *The Economist*, in the summer of 1978, dismissed him as a "well-intentioned but increasingly maladroit military ruler," when *The Guardian* declared that, "Zia's name has a death-rattle sound these days. There's a feeling he can't last much longer."

Once the war in Afghanistan began, General Khalid Mahmud Arif, Zia's Chief of Army Staff said:

*"All eyes were focused on Pakistan. Would she buckle under pressure and acquiesce in superpower aggression? The Western countries quickly changed their tune. The arch critics of the autocratic military rulers began to woo him. They suddenly discovered Zia's hitherto unknown 'sterling qualities' and the special importance of Pakistan in the changed circumstances."<sup>14</sup>*

Zia began pressing the Carter administration to provide arms and assistance to the mujahideen insurgents against the Communist regime even before the Soviet invasion. President Carter had given support for covert non-military support started in July 1979.<sup>15</sup> Pakistan's ISI also made several approaches to the CIA.

In February 1980, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, [Zbigniew Brzezinski](#), visited Pakistan to agree with Zia US covert assistance to the Afghan mujahideen across the Pakistan border.<sup>16</sup> The meeting, between Zia and Brzezinski, inaugurated a secret US-Pakistan alliance for a covert intervention in Afghanistan that lasted until the Soviet withdrawal.

After Brzezinski's departure, Andrei Gromyko declared that Pakistan was putting its own security at risk by acting as a 'springboard for further aggression against Afghanistan.'<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> *The Terrorist Prince, Anwar*, p. 27

<sup>14</sup> *Working with Zia*, Arif, pp. 313-14, 412

<sup>15</sup> *From the Shadows*, Gates, pp. 146-8

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 246-8

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, p. 315

Yuri Andropov simultaneously approved an elaborate series of active measures designed to deter Zia from providing, or allowing the Americans or Chinese to, aid the mujahideen. Pakistan's intelligence station chief in Moscow as told that *"if Pakistan was used as a base for 'armed struggle against Afghanistan,' the Oriental Institute, headed by Yevgeni Primakov, would be asked to devise ways of assisting Baluchi and Pashtun separatist movements on the North-West Frontier in order to seal off the Afghan border."*<sup>18</sup>

The CIA also believed there was a serious possibility of large-scale Soviet aid to the Baluchi.

KGB active measures included:

- Operation **SARDAR** sought to persuade Zia that some of his own senior officers, who opposed his Afghan policy, were plotting against him.
- Leaflets were prepared in English and Urdu and distributed in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Karachi from February 28 to March 1, 1980. The leaflets caused Pakistani intelligence concern, who immediately opened an investigation and wrongly incriminated Lieutenant-General Muhammad Iqbal Khan. Iqbal launched a failed coup against Zia on March 5<sup>th</sup>, which led to the removal or retirement of a series of senior officers and the expulsion of two members of the US consulate in Lahore, who had been in contact with them.
- On March 25<sup>th</sup>, Andropov was informed the operation has led the Zia regime to believe that the United States was conspiring with dissidents in the Pakistan Army. Andropov approved continuing the operation and several similar leaflets were distributed over the next year.
- Letters were fabricated with the names of various informants and bogus conspirators and sent to American organizations and others in Pakistan who were known to have their mail read before delivery, as well as the Pakistani ambassador in Washington, in order to spread the impression of a CIA plot to overthrow the Zia regime. Additional disinformation was planted on the Pakistani ambassador to Bangkok reported that the State Department regarded the regime as an unpopular, incompetent dictatorship which should be replaced as soon as possible.<sup>19</sup>
- Attempts were made to convince the Pakistanis that the CIA was plotting with separatists in Baluchistan, promising to support their campaign for autonomy in return for help in conducting cross-border operations against the Khomeini (Iran) regime.
- Simultaneously, the KGB orchestrated a massive campaign in the Pakistani and foreign press attacking Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan.<sup>20</sup> During the first eight months of the war, the KGB claimed to have planted 527 articles in Pakistani newspapers.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> *Internal Soviet intelligence document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chap. 5, para 127*

<sup>19</sup> *Internal Soviet intelligence document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chap. 5, para 127–45*

<sup>20</sup> *Internal Soviet intelligence document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chap. 5, para 127*

<sup>21</sup> *Internal Soviet intelligence document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chap. 5, para 144*

The Politburo also went to elaborate lengths to exacerbate popular resentment against the Afghan refugees flooding across the border by planting agents in their midst with a mission to discredit them.<sup>22</sup>

Interestingly, all the Soviet active measures had no effect on Zia's policy.

The Afghan refugee camps quickly became recruitment centers for the mujahideen.

The ISI channeled the recruits into seven Islamic resistance groups, all with bases in Pakistan, which directed operations across the Afghan border. The [Hizb-i-Islami](#) (Islamic Party), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most important of the mujahideen groups, had very close ties with the Zia regime. In 1978, to increase support for his regime, Zia had taken five members of the Pakistani wing of Hizb-i-Islami into his government. With Zia's support, the ISI replaced the Foreign Ministry as the main policy-making body on Afghanistan.<sup>23</sup>

General Zia-ul-Haq was well-aware of the Soviet active measures being taken against him. Though the details of the Soviet operations remain classified, from an early stage, Zia was receiving intelligence from the CIA, as well as the ISI.

Yet, the Soviets could not have imagined Zia's response.

In August and September 1980, Pakistan carried out the biggest expulsion of Soviet intelligence and other personnel since Britain had excluded 105 KGB and GRU officers in 1971. Kryuchkov reacted to the expulsion and the problems created by the dramatic expulsion by creating an interdepartmental working group, chaired by V. A. Chukhrov, to devise ways of working with Pakistani opposition forces to destabilize and overthrow the Zia regime.<sup>24</sup>

The most vocal, and violent, opponent of Zia was [Murtaza Bhutto](#), elder son of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who founded a small terrorist group, claiming it to be the armed wing of the PPP, to avenge his father's death.

While in jail, Bhutto had once said:

*"My sons are not my sons if they do not drink the blood of those who dare to shed my blood today."*

In May 1979, a month after his father's execution, Murtaza visited Kabul to seek the help of the Taraki government in setting up a base in Afghanistan, where they could launch attacks against the Zia regime.<sup>25</sup>

Murtaza was allowed to receive a large arms shipment from Yasir Arafat, the leader of the [Palestine Liberation Organization](#), and to house a small band of guerrillas in a building called "Dracula House."

Murtaza's first attempt to smuggle arms into Pakistan failed because his carrier was a Pakistani agent. Murtaza was reduced to scanning newspapers and attributing various accidents and fires in Pakistan to be the work of his guerrillas.

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<sup>22</sup> *Internal Soviet intelligence document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chap. 5, para 129*

<sup>23</sup> *Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention*, Bradsher, pp. 181–4

<sup>24</sup> *Internal Soviet intelligence document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chap. 5, para 128*

<sup>25</sup> *The KGB in Afghanistan, Vol. 1, Chap. 7*, Mitrokhin, p. 140

After the Soviet invasion, Murtaza developed a very close relationship with [Muhammad Najibullah](#), head of [KHAD](#), the newly founded Afghan intelligence service. Najibullah, as a gesture of good will, paid the costs of Murtaza's wedding to a young Afghan woman.<sup>26</sup>

Murtaza and Najibullah had detailed discussions on joint covert operations against Pakistan. Since KHAD was operating under KGB direction, there was no doubt that the Politburo and the Kremlin had approved these discussions. Murtaza may not have known KHAD was a surrogate for the KGB.

His first successful operations inside Pakistan, approved by Najibullah, was a bomb attack on the Sindh High Court and the destruction of a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) DC-10 aircraft at Karachi Airport in January 1981. He also plotted to disrupt the visit of Pope John Paul II to Pakistan in February by exploding a bomb during the Pontiff's address at a Karachi stadium, but the bomb went off prematurely at the entrance to the stadium, killing the bomber and a policeman. The bombs were supplied by KHAD.<sup>27</sup>

In December, Murtaza Bhutto and Najibullah decided on Operation **ALAMGIR** (Swordbearer), where a PIA flight would be hijacked over Pakistan and diverted to Damascus or Tripoli. The three novice hijackers made the mistake of choosing a domestic flight with insufficient fuel to reach either Damascus or Tripoli. Salamullah Tipu, the lead hijacker, ordered the pilot to land in Kabul. As the plane landed, Tipu informed the control tower that he was a member of the armed wing of the PPP, and wished to speak to 'Dr. Salahuddin,' Najibullah's codename in Kabul. Murtaza Bhutto, who chose to rename his terrorist group as al-Zulfiqar (The Sword) due to this hijacking, came to meet Tipu at the bottom of the aircraft steps, along with Najibullah, disguised in the clothes of an airport maintenance worker. The KGB had fully advised Najibullah on the best measures of using the hijacking to discredit Zia's regime.

On March 4, [Anahita Ratebzad](#), President of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Association and Minister for Education, who was a confidential KGB contact, arrived at the airport surrounded by TV cameras, to express support for the 'just demands' of the hijackers and to release all women and children on the aircraft to mark International Women's Day.

In a pre-arranged gesture, Tipu announced that he was happy to honor Ratebzad's demands.

On March 5, Babrak Karmal, the Afghan leader and long-standing KGB asset, having just returned from Moscow, held a live phone conversation with Tipu from the control tower. Like Ratebzad, Karmal also gave strong backing to Tipu's 'just demands.'

Among the hijackers' demands was the release of fifty political prisoners from Pakistan's jails. When Zia refused, one of the passengers was beaten, shot, and thrown on the tarmac. This act persuaded the KGB it was time to move away from Kabul.

Before the plane was refueled for Syria, the Soviet Union's closest major ally in the Middle East, arms were smuggled aboard, unseen by TV cameras. The three hijackers, who arrived in Kabul with only pistols, left with Kalashnikovs, grenades, explosives, a timing device and US\$ 4,500.<sup>28</sup>

After the aircraft landed in Damascus, Zia continued to refuse to release the political prisoners, but on pressure from Washington to save American lives, Zia agreed. Murtaza

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<sup>26</sup> *The Terrorist Prince*, Anwar, pp. 43-5, 63-4

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 87-8

<sup>28</sup> *The KGB in Afghanistan, Vol. 1, Chap. 7*, Mitrokhin, p. 140

hailed the release of the fifty-four PPP members from Pakistani jails as a triumph for al-Zulfiqar, which was echoed by both KHAD and the KGB. al-Zulfiqar's base was moved from 'Dracula House' to a palatial headquarters, which received a steady stream of refugees from Zia's regime anxious to become guerrillas and fight for his overthrow.<sup>29</sup>

As well as supporting al-Zulfiqar, KHAD was also used by the KGB to supply arms to separatists and dissident groups in the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh.

At the end of 1980, the leader of the Baluchi separatist group based in Afghanistan, held secret talks with Najibullah, who promised to provide the separatists with arms, 400 military instructors and three training camps. After talks between another Baluchi leader and the Afghan President, Babrak Kamal, in April 1982, KHAD opened two more camps to train Baluchi guerrillas to fight the Pakistani and Irani regimes.<sup>30</sup>

The huge influx of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, eventually reaching 3.5 million, offered numerous opportunities for agent infiltration. Since agents were usually Afghan, the KGB used KHAD to recruit.

According to FCD files, in the early 1980s, KHAD's foreign intelligence directorate had 107 agents and 115 'trainee' agents operating inside Pakistan, mostly within the Afghan community.<sup>31</sup>

As Chukhrov had wanted penetration into the mujahideen groups, twenty-six KHAD agents were believed to have access to the headquarters of the rival mujahideen groups; fifteen were members of the Pakistani armed forces, intelligence community and official bureaucracy.

Their main achievement was to increase the existing discord and mistrust between the rival groups. Though the achievement didn't change the result of the war, the KGB believes that it dramatically decreased the effectiveness of mujahideen operations.

The Politburo also attempted to disrupt the links between Zia and the mujahideen groups in Pakistan by branding him as a traitor to Islam, a sample of the leaflet prepared and distributed can be found in Appendix B. The leaflet is translated to English, as original copies are impossible to find.

On April 18, 1981, [Kryuchkov](#) submitted to Andropov, Operation **ZAKHIR**, a new disinformation measure designed to cause deterioration in Pakistani-Irani relations and to inflame the political situation in Pakistan.

- leaflets were written by a fictitious opposition group calling for the overthrow of the Zia regime and an Islamic Revolution in Pakistan. These were developed and distributed across Pakistan.
- other leaflets were developed that were clearly written by writers under the strong influence of Khomeini. It should quote Khomeini's criticisms of Zia and the present regime in Pakistan. The leaflet was distributed by the embassy, consulate, and Afghan friends.

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<sup>29</sup> The Terrorist Prince, Anwar, pp. 112–16.

<sup>30</sup> *The KGB in Afghanistan, Vol. 1, Chap. 7*, Mitrokhin, p. 145

<sup>31</sup> *The KGB in Afghanistan, Vol. 1, Chap. 7*, Mitrokhin, p. 143

- Bangladesh and India must get their press to publish articles about a powerful opposition group in Pakistan, which was set up by the Iranian special services, and is actively working to overthrow Zia-ul-Haq.
- additional leaflets that supposedly came from dissident Islamic officers, condemning Zia as a hypocritical traitor who, while professing friendship with Iran, was secretly plotting with the Americans to bring down the Islamic Republic. The leaflets contained a threat of assassination saying – “Next time, you will pay for it as Sadat did.”<sup>32</sup>

Murtaza Bhutto, with the assistance of Najibullah, was preparing a real plot to assassinate Zia.

Though the evidence comes from al-Zulfiqar sources, it appears Zia narrowly escaped two assassination attempts in early 1982. The weapon in both cases was a Soviet SAM-7 (surface-to-air missile).

- In January 1982, two al-Zulfiqar terrorists carried a SAM missile in the trunk of their car to a deserted hillside near Islamabad Airport, waiting for Zia’s plane to return from his trip to Saudi Arabia. The poorly trained terrorist did not wait for the SAM to switch from red to green (locked on target) before firing.
- On February 7, 1982, the Pakistani press reported that Zia would be arriving in Lahore aboard his personal plane. Again, al-Zulfiqar terrorists drove to a public park beneath Zia’s flight path with another SAM, waited for the plane to come into view and fired. This time the terrorist who fired the missile waited for green, but failed to keep watching the aircraft in the viewfinder until it was hit.
- After this, Zia imposed strict censorship preventing them from mentioning the assassination attempt appearing in the newspapers.
- two more SAM missiles were smuggled into Pakistan later that year for another attempt on Zia’s life, but those missiles were seized by the police.

Murtaza’s own paranoia became more pronounced and he started to believe that there was a plot between the Afghan regime and Zia to exchange him for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and moved to New Delhi.

After a series of abysmally planned, unsuccessful operations in 1984, none with KHAD support, and with most of his al-Zulfiqar members in jail, Murtaza announced its dissolution in the following year.

With all the failed attempts and no realistic plan to bring Zia’s regime down, the Politburo and the Kremlin were left with publicizing imaginary plots against him, most significant in their strategy was a supposedly secret Islamic opposition from within the Pakistan armed forces.

In 1983, the Delhi *Patriot* published a letter allegedly prepared by a clandestine cell calling itself the Muslim Army Brotherhood (**Fauji Biradiri**), which denounced Zia’s regime as *a despicable gang of corrupt generals... more interested in lining their own pockets than in defending the nation, who had betrayed the ideas of Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and were leading the country to ruin.*

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<sup>32</sup> Internal Soviet intelligence document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chap. 5, para 143

Nothing resembling the Muslim Army Brotherhood ever materialized during the more than ten years that Zia remained at the helm of state affairs.

KGB disinformation was heavy with the theme of Zia's corruption, claiming he had a Swiss bank account where 10% commission from American arms manufacturers was paid. It also claimed that Zia had a special plane in continual readiness, in case he and his family had to flee the country.

Operation **TARAKANY** ('Cockroaches') centered around the claim that American specialists in the field of biological and chemical warfare, had established a base in the US bacteriological laboratory at the Lahore Medical Center, which was experimenting on Pakistani citizens. Outbreaks of bowel diseases in the districts of Lishin, Surkhab, and neighboring areas of Afghanistan, as well as epidemics and cattle deaths in Punjab, Haryana, Jammu, Kashmir, and Rajasthan in Western India, were alleged to be the result of the movement across the Pakistani border of people and cattle infected by American germ-warfare specialists.

On February 11, 1982, the Karachi *Daily News* reported that Dr. Nellin, the American head of the research group, had been expelled by the Pakistani authorities.

On February 23, 1982, the Pakistani newspaper, *Dawn*, reported:

*"Following the expulsion from Pakistan of Dr. Nellin for dangerous experiments on the spread of infectious diseases, an American delegation of doctors is paying an urgent visit to Islamabad. Their aim is to hush up the scandal over the work of the Lahore Medical Center and to put pressure on Pakistan not to make known the work which was carried out at the Center . . . The fact that a group of American doctors has made such an urgent visit to Pakistan confirms that Washington is frightened that the dangerous experiments on new substances for weapons of mass destruction might be revealed. It supports the conclusion that Pakistan intends to allow the Americans to continue to carry out dangerous experiments, probably because these new weapons could be used against India, Iran and Afghanistan."*

In May 1982, the KGB succeeded in taking the story a stage further by planting reports in the Indian press, allegedly based on sources in Islamabad, that the United States had stockpiled chemical and bacteriological weapons in Pakistan.

Interestingly, anti-American propaganda failed to disrupt the increasing cooperation between Zia and Washington. Though Zia had spurned the offer in 1980 of a US\$ 400 million economic and military aid package from the Carter administration as peanuts, in 1981, he accepted an offer from the incoming Reagan administration of US\$ 3.2 billion spread over 6 years.<sup>33</sup>

During the war in Afghanistan, the CIA channeled US\$ 2 billion of covert assistance to the mujahideen through Pakistan's ISI.

The KGB active measures, both before and during the Soviet invasion, had no discernable effect on General Zia-ul-Haq or the ISI support for the mujahideen.

Many will be wondering why such detail of the activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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<sup>33</sup> *Pakistan*, Talbot, pp. 249–50



## A CommandEleven Briefing Paper

All the problems today in Afghanistan and Pakistan originated, or were planted, during this time.

From the Baluchi separatist groups operating from Afghan soil to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Afghanistan has been carved out as a base of operations against Pakistan, whether by the Soviet Union, India, the United States, and/or terrorist groups.

## HOW DID PAKISTAN AND THE US GET INVOLVED

Towards the end of the 1970s, Moscow was widely thought to be in the prime of its powers and aspirations. In 1975, North Vietnam accomplished its victory over South Vietnam undermining American interests. With Vietnam in the communist camp, Laos and Cambodia followed quickly. The USSR expanded its military footing in Angola and Mozambique with pro-Soviet regimes coming to power. Historian J.L. Gaddis wrote in his book, *Cold War*,

*“that these developments, alongside ignominious American withdrawal from Vietnam, made it seem as though Washington was on the defensive everywhere, and Moscow was on a roll.”*

The Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty of December 1978 increased American suspicion about Moscow's Afghanistan plans. The murder of the American Ambassador Adolf Dubs in Kabul in February 1979 forced the US. The US began providing aid to Afghan insurgents against the Soviets in July 1979, but that aid was for propaganda warfare. When the CIA approached Riyadh and Islamabad, both fearful of further Soviet aggression, there was still no formal forward plan.

The Soviet Red Army invasion of Afghanistan gave the US the opportunity to get revenge for their defeat in Vietnam. US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski convinced President Jimmy Carter that Afghanistan could become the USSR's Vietnam, but that would not happen without external support to the Afghan insurgents who, unlike the North Vietnamese, [“have no sanctuary, no organized army, and no central government.”](#)

Throughout the Cold War, Pakistan was perceived by America as a treasured strategic asset, whether used as a military springboard against the USSR and the new China in the 1950s or to usher in a US-China rapprochement in the 1970s. Afghanistan's turmoil necessitated Pakistan's attention because of the potential Soviet invasion of Pakistan's Baluchistan, where Afghan communists had stoked ethno-nationalist sentiments for decades. Not to mention, Babrak Karmal, leader of the Soviet-backed ruling Communist Party, was “eager to repudiate and erase the Durand Line.” Baluchi groups in Afghanistan re-initiated contact with Pakistani separatists through KHAD, Afghanistan's intelligence agency.

Two additional reasons forced President Carter:

- control over Afghanistan and promotion of a separate Baluchistan would give the Soviet's [a major step toward overland access to the Indian Ocean and domination of the Indian sub-continent](#)
- The US-Pakistan Security Agreement of 1959 puts an obligation on Washington to take appropriate action, even the use of armed forces, [in case of aggression against Pakistan](#)

On December 29, 1979, President Carter signed a presidential finding permitting the CIA to work with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to send lethal assistance covertly to the mujahideen. To avoid the burden of logistics, America delegated the responsibility of channeling all aid, the first of which reached the mujahideen two weeks after the invasion. The presidential document stated that “harassing the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan” was the objective of the US administration.

The specialists helped Pakistani trainers [establish schools for the mujahideen](#) in secure communications, guerrilla warfare, urban sabotage, and heavy weapons.

Since the US did not want to blatantly confront the Soviets and risk retaliation, the CIA, using the *Doctrine of Plausible Deniability*, only provided weapons from the Soviet Union or their allied Eastern European nations.

By the mid-1980, Saudis agreed to match US funding for the operation. More importantly, the Royal House of Saud, along with other Gulf States, mobilized volunteers to fight alongside the mujahideen, as they legitimized a jihad against "*the atheist USSR occupation of largely Muslim Afghanistan.*"

Pakistan was the launching ground for training the mujahideen, where the [Gulf States spent billions annually to fund the madrassas in northern Pakistan.](#)

President Ronald Reagan, who inherited the covert program in 1981, did not expand the scope initially. Due to congressional pressure, in 1985, covert aid that had started at US\$ 30 million annually since 1979, was increased to US\$ 250 million annually.

In March 1985, President Ronald Reagan signed the [National Security Decision Directive 166](#), which is detailed in bold language to authorize stepped-up covert military aid to the mujahideen, and made it clear that the secret Afghan war would have a new goal – *to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan and encourage Soviet withdrawal.* This meant that advanced intelligence and sophisticated weaponry, such as plastic explosives and high-power sniper rifles, were delivered to the mujahideen.

In 1986, the US supplied the mujahideen with American hand-held anti-aircraft Stinger missiles to shoot down Soviet helicopters. USSR President [Mikhail Gorbachev](#), a moderate leader, coupled with the war-weariness of the Soviet Red Army, convinced the Americans that the Red Army would not respond to American arms supplies with any offensive against the US-ally – Pakistan.

Two months after the Stinger missile changed the battlefield, Soviet Politburo decided on a deadline for its troop withdrawal. The Soviets claim Gorbachev's view was the Afghan war was unyielding and continued occupation was a major hindrance to his goal of domestic economic restructuring and political reform.

On May 15, 1988, the Soviet Red Army began its withdrawal from Afghanistan under the leadership of Colonel-General Boris Gromov, with the last soldier leaving on February 15, 1989.

Gorbachev was President of the USSR until 1991, when it disintegrated.

While the US may have successfully ended the Cold War through the proxy war waged in Afghanistan, the long-lasting effect has spread worldwide in the form of radicalization and terrorism.

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) oversaw the funneling of aid, giving most of the weaponry to Afghan fundamentalist factions such as [Gulbuddin Hekmatyar](#), also known as "[The Butcher of Kabul](#)," Hezb-e-Islami.

Islamabad, in the opinion of Western analysts, privately strengthened the strategic depth in Kabul by supporting such groups, but these factions were clearly interested in establishing an anti-American regime once the last Soviet soldier was gone.

The ensuing power vacuum spawned a scorpion's nest of warlords, who fought a bloody civil war, that caused the rise of the Taliban.

## UNDERSTANDING THE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING PROCESS

Very few people understand the process that recruits transition through to become terrorists. Since the training camps were developed and managed by the CIA and ISI, it is not surprising that the enlistment process is very similar to joining the national military.

Seling Harrison, from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, said at the [Terrorism and Regional Security: Managing the Challenges in Asia](#) conference, in London (March 2000):

*“The CIA made a historic mistake in encouraging Islamic groups from all over the world to come to Afghanistan. The US provided US\$ 3 billion for building up these Islamic groups, and it accepted Pakistan’s demand that they should decide how this money should be spent.”*

### RECRUITMENT/ENLISTMENT CENTERS

During the Soviet invasion, there were two methods for enlisting individuals into the mujahideen.

The first, and most effective, method was through the madrassas, in which individuals were used to quickly identify and select potential recruits. These recruits were given additionally attention by recruiters and other new recruits to develop relationships prior to moving on to training camps along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border.

The second method was through regular enlistment, much like a volunteer, who wished to fulfil their Islamic duty, would go to a US Army recruiter and signup. Those who wished to directly volunteer for jihad sent to recruiters in villages and cities, who would provide a full briefing and explanation before enlisting them as recruits and adding them to the group that would come through the madrassas.

Groups were sent to the training camps every fortnight, so a steady stream of new recruits were being pumped into the war machine.

These methods, implemented during the Soviet invasion with great deft to deliver the best recruits to the battlefield, was advanced and spread across Pakistan after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.

There are two types of training camps:

- the camp for the soldiers and commanders
- the camp for suicide bombers

Skilled resources, such as doctors, mechanics, and other labor, were selected from society, based on their motivation to help the mujahideen. Some of these resources were also gleaned from those who enlisted to fight, but were found ineligible due to fitness or other grounds.

## BOOT CAMP (TRAINING CAMP)

Those fighters who enlist and pass the initial tests of psychological, religious and attitude, they are moved to the boot camps. At the boot camp, recruits are put through an indoctrination process that achieves two things:

- it weeds out those who are not truly motivated to join the jihad as a fighter, and another ancillary role is found for them
- it helps to determine who will fill what role in the fighting force

Outside the psychological testing and the emotional evaluations, recruits follow a training process like the one described below:

- STEP 1:** The training process begins with a 21-day religious course given to all recruits. The religious course teaches three additional books along with the Holy Quran and a tafsir (explanation). The three additional books were 'Taaleem-ul-Islam,' 'Taaleem-ul-Jihad,' and 'Tarikh-e-Islam.'
- STEP 2:** After the completion of the religious course, the recruits are put through a 21-day combat weapons training course. The daily course regiment includes prayer and religious teaching breaks, as well as time for leisure activities and sports. More than half of the training day is spent on weapons and fieldcraft, so that the recruits understand how to operate in a live battlefield.
- STEP 3:** Those who successfully complete the combat weapons training course are moved to a three-month training camp, where recruits are trained to dismantle and assemble assault weapons, use maps, compasses, GPS, and guerrilla tactics.
- They are trained in how to operate on the live battlefield, learning how to perform raids and ambushes, how to hide weapons in the field and surviving without food and water for 55 hours.
- STEP 5:** Those who successfully complete the previous rounds are moved to an explosives training course, where they are trained in bomb-making, IED manufacturing, and suicide vest building.
- STEP 6:** Training on ways to collect intelligence, agent handling, sabotage, recruitment, surveillance, interrogation tactics (soft and hard), overt propaganda, and the use of alcohol, women, and money to elicit information.
- STEP 7:** Pass arms firing test and training is completed.

This is the training process started after the individual has been radicalized.

It should be noted that this process is a repetitive one, which provides more advanced training on each repetition.

For those recruits, able to reach levels ten to fifteen, they are imparted with specialized training in GPS tools, map reading, making, and planting Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and they are given internet access. To reach levels ten to fifteen, the recruit would need to complete 4 months each at levels I, II and III.

## SUICIDE (FIDAYEEN) BOMBER CAMP

Suicide bombers fall into three categories:

**Motivated** (mostly used on civilian targets) – those who have gone through the fidayeen training. These are the suicide vests, car bombs, suicide bombers with ball bearings mixed in the explosives.

**Political** (used to achieve a political statement) – political suicide attacks are typically targeted at government institutions and officials. They will try not to harm a civilian.

**Controlled** (the most dehumanising) – controlled suicide attacks are exactly that – controlled by someone else. The attacker is typically a drug addict who has had a suicide vest attached to him. They think they have the detonation button, but the actual button is with someone else outside the blast radius, watching live.

There is one additional training, which lasts between eight months and a year, given only to suicide (*fidayeen*) bombers.

Only one person from a batch of 200 fighters selected to become a suicide bomber. Many recruits feel great honor in being selected as a suicide bomber.

**STEP 1:** The suicide bomber recruit goes through a special indoctrination course called *sufa*, which mentally hardens the recruit for what is asked of him. They are taught with three books – *Taaleem-ul-Islam* (Islamic Studies), *Taaleem-ul-Jihad* (Jihad Studies), and *Tarikh-e-Islam* (History of Islam).

Promotion to the next stage in training was heavily based on the recruit's success in the first step.

**STEP 2:** This stage of training last from 40–60 days, where recruits are given training in weapons handling, mountain survival, covert communication techniques, GPS, and map reading. They are also a mandatory physical fitness training to assure they will be able to reach their objectives.

**STEP 2B:** The final stage of this training, which can last over forty days, includes various advanced weaponry, including assault rifles, LMG, sniper rifles, grenades, rocket, and grenade launchers, and Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL), something heavily used by the Indian Army.

**STEP 3:** The last stage of training divides the recruits into sub-groups, providing each sub-group with wireless communication sets, and dispatched in different directions to practice communications.

What we have defined above began after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and was a tactic imported from the Palestinian conflict, when al-Qaeda began operations in Afghanistan. In our research, we were unable to find instances of suicide bombers during the Soviet invasion.

As we said previously, the Soviet invasion was the *plantation of a seed*, suicide bombers/car bombs were a *mutation* that developed to combat the firepower the opponent possessed.

Then, there was another *mutation, brought by the Islamic State* – the controlled suicide bomber.

The controlled suicide bomber was the most dehumanized of all the fighters, developed for two reasons.

First, there were some suicide bombers who were able to reach their target, but were shot before they were able to achieve their objective. Second, some suicide bombers would reach their target and lose their nerve, not detonating their vests.

The controlled suicide bomber opened new opportunities for the terrorists. Since the detonator was in another person's hands, the terrorists were able to target more innocent civilians or soldiers.

Some groups began using heroin addicts to carry out controlled attacks. The groups that adopted these methods were not respected for this decision, but their objective was not jihad but massively loss of life.

While terrorism itself is a human rights violation, specifically the use of heroin addicts is an unbelievable extreme that was not expected.

We have learned that groups like the Islamic State have begun to create their own heroin addict bombs to be used in the field of battle.

What does that mean?

The Islamic State, and their affiliated groups, would look for people in society that could be easily manipulated, and below the age of 15. We will call them targets, rather than recruits.

These targets were first indoctrinated into the world of radicalization through a madrassa, but purposely paired with people who were already using hashish or cannabis, that could slowly convince them to start using with them. When they were high on drugs, their circle of friends would "inspiring" them with the tales of the glory of jihad and becoming a martyr for Islam. They would go straight to heaven, they were told.

*Planting a new seed.*

Once the target started using drugs, promoting them to harder, more dangerous drugs was very easy.

Once they started using heroin, the job was complete. A heroin addict is only interested in one thing – where will their next "fix" come from.

The heroin addict in Pakistan is common sight. They can be found in every city and village, begging people for money. That's the advantage the terrorists leveraged. The addict can reach places without raising suspicion.

We have been told by those who escaped the suicide camps that targets were injected throughout the day with heroin to keep them from thinking about anything else. When the time came to use them as a weapon, they were:

- injected with enough heroin to knock them out
- loaded into a van
- by the time they reached their target location, the heroin had started to wear off so they injected them with heroin again
- pushed from the van into a crowded square, roundabout or police barricade
- remotely detonated by another person watching outside the blast radius.

For those who did not become drug addicts, their suicide vests looked just like all the others, with its own detonation button, but, for operational efficiency, all vests were also fitted with a remote system that would allow another person to detonate, if the target lost their nerve and couldn't detonate.



## THE JIHAD IS OVER

In 1979, the jihad was over, the Soviet Red Army had withdrawn, but the jihadis and their camps still existed, were functional, and were still receiving funding from Gulf States and high-net-worth individuals.

All those who had come from the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, and other Muslim countries were still in Afghanistan, heavily armed, and well-trained, but with no one to fight anymore.

Osama bin Laden, a graduate of King Abdul Aziz University in civil engineering, saw an opportunity to organize and unite all the ex-mujahideen and other supporters. al-Qaeda were the first Islamic terrorist group in the world and emerged from the war with the Soviets.

bin Laden's role in the mujahideen was initially on the Pakistan side of the border raising funds and providing logistic and humanitarian aid from 1980-86. From to 1986-89, according to sources within the mujahideen, bin Laden participated in numerous battles against the Soviets as a guerrilla commander, including the Battle of Jalalabad, which led to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Although many rumors claimed that the CIA funded Osama bin Laden and other Arab volunteers, who came to support the mujahideen. They, bin Laden, and Arabs, were funded by charities and mosques in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and were frequently viewed with suspicion by the Afghan mujahideen.

When the Afghanistan War ended in 1989, Hezbollah (Lebanon 1982) and Hamas (Gaza Strip 1987), political movements against the oppressive policies of the State of Israel, had already emerged in guerrilla warfare.

al-Qaeda (AQ), whose goals were mostly political, would carry out well-planned attacks on Western targets in the Middle East. al-Qaeda was a very structured organization with all plans and decisions made by originally by Osama bin Laden and then by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second emir of al-Qaeda, from June 16, 2011.

al-Qaeda was a slow methodical war machine. They were not like today's terror groups, with indiscriminate violence and brutalities. al-Qaeda targets were typically US military installations in the Middle East until 9/11.

AQ battle operations were kept secure because of specialized measures in counter-intelligence and secure communications learned from the CIA, ISI, and many other "friendly" intelligence agencies. Messages, very rarely written, were carried by couriers, responses were delivered face-to-face in that operation's chain of command. Messages were coded with historical references, that only members would know, making code breaking exponentially more difficult.

Additionally, AQ attacks were planned, practiced and preparation implemented years before the attack took place. Since all the training had come directly from intelligence agencies, they were especially well-versed in Cold War espionage tactics, which are still used today.

The global terrorism picture changed again when the US invaded Iraq. Prior to the Iraq invasion, Islamic terrorism was quite well understood, with various combatants being well known.

The invasion of Iraq brought forward a new terrorist group that was more interested in brutality and the massive loss of life.

In April 2013, the world watched as the US created another monster in Iraq called [The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant](#), best known by two names – *Daesh* and *The Islamic State*. The Islamic State is [a transnational militant terrorist group](#) and quasi-state that follows the Salafi jihadi brand of Sunni Islam.

The Islamic State took jihad to a level that al-Qaeda had never envisioned with their use of technology and social media. Their promotional and recruitment videos were as clean as commercial TV. Their publications were also tailored to the audience it was geared too. Their brutality was beyond what the world had seen in the past.

These materials were available to anyone interested via their Internet connection, a computer, and/or a mobile phone, which could not be stopped by any technology or government.

Their materials forced the other jihadi groups, domestic and global, to up their game to compete with The Islamic State for volunteers.

What the West was able to do through television, movies, and mainstream media, The Islamic State was able to supersede it with its social media presence.

Unlike al-Qaeda, The Islamic State didn't promote only organized warfare, but they coined the concept of "Lone Wolf" attacks.

A Lone Wolf attack occurs when an individual, overly motivated by Islamic State videos, takes a knife or gets behind the wheel of their car and looks for any target. It brought radicalization and terrorism to everyone's doorstep outside the Middle East, where it was away from view or discussion.

Terrorism and its brutality have exponentially increased worldwide since the birth of The Islamic State.

Terrorism is no longer a problem that can be controlled, identified, and recognized before the where, how, or who will carry it out.

After four decades, which began as a mismanaged, geopolitical proxy war, has pushed radicalization, whether religiously or politically motivated, to reach every household in the world. Radicalization then morphed into political, social and/or cultural movements. All based on different levels of acceptance of violence, and has achieved the ability to wage war against organized law enforcement, militaries, and innocent civilians.

After four decades, while terrorism has increased, new methods employed, new territories set ablaze, and new lives have been destroyed; the other side has yet to figure out any feasible methods to stop further radicalization or enlistment with terrorist and insurgent groups. They have been unable to stop the financing and armaments that continue to flow into terrorist and insurgent groups.

If we continue to fight terrorism in this manner, what will the next decade bring?

## CONCLUSION

While its very simple to put the blame at the feet of the military alone, the objective of this volume was to demonstrate how destructive things, other than terrorism, were being initiated against Pakistan to punish it for supporting both the mujahideen and the United States.

The Soviets used numerous active measures to attempt to recruit politicians, seed discord among the people and the refugees, fabricate plots to damage relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, China, and the United States, and sponsor, train, and arm insurgent groups, including giving them training camps on Afghanistan soil.

While many saw Pakistan at war against the Soviet Union, they did not realize Pakistan was also fighting a disinformation war designed to create unrest in Pakistan and force foreign capitals and allies to question their own relationships with the Zia regime.

These measures and disinformation did not affect the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, but assuredly, it left considerable questions between governments.

In order to present a proper chessboard, it was a requirement to share the history of Soviet active measures before and during the Soviet invasion against the governments of both countries. Even though the Soviet invasion was their military's role, the Kremlin and the KGB had their own objectives to achieve that would provide results well after the war was over.

Today, Afghanistan's soil is still used by terrorist and insurgent groups for training, medical care, and safe haven.

The next volume of the **Running to Disaster** series will focus specifically on the spillover and fallout in Pakistan, post-Soviet withdrawal, and the rise of terrorism in 2001 from the region.

As said in previous volumes, this series is not about placing blame.

There is enough blame for all institutions and governments, whether Pakistan's own or foreign countries. Running to Disaster is an in-depth look into terrorism in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region and how it can be first limited and then eliminated.

Part of the rationale behind providing an understanding is to assist in understanding that none of these problems were created domestically, but once the problem was created the international community was no longer interested in what was left behind or how it was left behind, which is why this seems like an impossibility.

They have thought about what will be required of the nation, its citizens, its institutions, and its government, but are not ready to sacrifice to achieve a domestic objective that will change Pakistan's global position.

## APPENDIX A: KGB ACTIVE MEASURES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA IN 1980–82

**Note:**

While we are re-publishing this document in its entirety, CommandEleven has made modifications to the formatting to **better highlight specific items that directly relate to actions taken to degrade, persuade and fabricate information against Pakistan's interests by the then Soviet Union.**

The intervention of Soviet forces in Afghanistan in December 1979 provoked sharp protests from the world community.

**The KGB took various measures, including some involving disinformation, to neutralize the negative response and distract attention from the activities of the USSR and its forces in Afghanistan.**

The KGB devised a doctrine according to which the choice of means to combat the adversary did not depend on the KGB but was dictated by necessity, by the adversary's conduct; therefore any KGB activities were supposedly legitimate and justified.

**Disinformation is regarded as one of the instruments of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) policy;** it is an integral, indispensable and secret element of intelligence work.

It not only serves the interests of our own people but also those of working people throughout the world:

*it represents one of the forms of international assistance to progressive mankind and is radically different in essence from the disinformation to which Western agencies resort in order to deceive public opinion.*

KGB disinformation operations are progressive

- they are designed to mislead, not the working people but their enemies – the ruling circles of capitalism, in order to induce them to act in a certain way, or abstain from actions contrary to the interests of the USSR
- they promote peace and social progress
- they serve international détente
- they are humane, creating the conditions for the noble struggle for humanity's bright future

The main value of all Active Measures lies in the fact that it is difficult to check the veracity of the information conveyed and to identify the real source. Their effectiveness is expressed as a coefficient of utility, when minimum expenditure and effort achieves maximum end results.

**Forms of disinformation basically fall into three groups—documentary (written); non-documentary (oral); demonstrative.**

In KGB Residencies, the Residents are personally responsible for work relating to Active Measures. In large residencies, Active Measures constitute an autonomous direction of intelligence work; specialists in this kind of work are assigned to it.

## A Command Eleven Briefing Paper

The KGB Chairman's Order No 0066 of 12 April 1982 required all First Chief Directorate (FCD) departments and personnel to participate in devising and carrying out Active Measures; young officers were to be given a taste for such work.

Active Measures were to be regarded as one of the basic forms of intelligence activity.

Officers of Service A were to display initiative and ability to act independently when solving both simple and complex questions.

Anyone who had to be told day by day what he was to do was unsuitable for this kind of work.

**In February 1980, Andropov approved a KGB plan of action relating to Pakistan which specified the following:**

1. Through KGB Second Chief Directorate (SCD) assets, **a warning is to be conveyed to the Pakistan Mission in Moscow to the effect that if a sensible line does not prevail in [Pakistani leader] Zia-ul Haq's political course, and Pakistan agrees under pressure from the US and China to turn its territory into a base for permanent armed struggle against Afghanistan,**
  - a. the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences will be instructed to study ways of **exploiting the Baluchi<sup>34</sup> and Pushtun<sup>35</sup> movements in Pakistan,** as well as **internal opposition to the country's military regime,** in the interests of the security of the frontiers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
  - b. **Using operational–technical means, 500 copies of leaflets produced at the Center are to be disseminated in Islamabad and Karachi;** some of these, issued in the name of a group of Pakistani Army officers, sharply criticize the government's internal and external policy, which is leading to a constant deterioration of the country's material situation.
  - c. **300 leaflets codenamed 'SARDAR' are to be produced, demonstrating to the administration that there is extreme dissatisfaction with its policy in public and military circles.**
  - d. **Information is to be planted in the local press in Pakistan to the effect that the ruling regime is artificially whipping up the atmosphere relating to events in Afghanistan with the object of building up the Pakistani Army,** further increasing its influence in the country, and maintaining the ban on the activities of political parties and organisation for an indefinite period.
2. In Bangkok,
  - a. **information is to be conveyed to the Pakistan Mission to the effect that within the Carter Administration there are doubts about the utility of further increases in military assistance to Pakistan, given the Zia-ul Haq regime's unpopularity in the country.** [US] Secretary of State [Cyrus] Vance and his assistants consider that, in order to avert another major failure of US foreign policy, it is imperative to seek to replace the dictatorship with another regime which would guarantee stability in Pakistan.
3. In India,
  - a. **information is to be conveyed to Prime Minister Gandhi to the effect that Pakistan is not satisfied with the insignificant scope of American military assistance and the condition imposed on it to abstain from exploding a nuclear device while the American assistance program is in force.** *The leaders of Pakistan intend to continue to whip up hysteria over*

<sup>34</sup> Baluchi, also spelled Balochi or Beluchi, group of tribes speaking the Baluchi language and estimated at about 4,800,000 inhabitants in the province of Baluchistan in Pakistan and also neighboring areas of Iran, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Punjab (India). See "Balochi," Encyclopædia Britannica (2004), <http://www.britannica.com>.

<sup>35</sup> Pushtun, or Pakhtun, Hindustani Pathan, Persian Afghan Pashto-speaking people of southeastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan. See "Pushtun," Encyclopædia Britannica (2004), <http://www.britannica.com>.

*the events in Afghanistan in order to obtain a significant increase in military assistance from the US and the lifting of restrictions on the development of the nuclear program.*

4. Through the UN leadership, information is to be conveyed to representatives of Iran
  - a. **in return for growing military assistance to Pakistan, the US is seeking to be granted military bases on Pakistani territory, including in Baluchistan**, in close proximity to the Iranian frontier. The leaders of Pakistan are inclined to make concessions to the Americans on this issue.
5. In various circles in member countries of the Non-aligned Movement
  - a. steps are to be taken to **discredit Pakistan's foreign policy, emphasizing that it has breached the basic principles of the Non-aligned Movement**, as the leaders of Pakistan have allowed the US and China, two of the great powers, to turn the country into an instrument of their policy in Asia.
6. In India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia, Jordan, Italy and France
  - a. there is to be **continued publication of materials about the direct involvement of the Pakistani special services and military servicemen in organizing armed interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.**

On 2 September 1980, KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov approved an extension of the above plan.

A Working Group was set up under the Deputy Head of the KGB FCD, V.A. Chukhrov, with representatives from Directorates K and RT, Service 1 and Service A, and Departments 8, 17 and 20. The Group was tasked to devise complex agent measures, coordinate the joint actions of all FCD Sections, and monitor implementation.

The Head of the Third Department of Service A, Colonel Yu. V Rykhlov, coordinated and concerted the implementation of Active Measures, as a member of the Chukhrov Working Group.

**In February 1981, the Working Group devised a wide-ranging operational plan code-named 'TORKHAM.'**

This was to be carried out in various countries, in accordance with individual plans which included the following elements:

- compromise the Zia-ul Haq regime
- weaken the positions of the US and China in Pakistan
- exacerbate relations with Iran
- intensify and deepen disagreements between India and Pakistan on existing disputed issues
- inspire new irritants in Indo-Pakistan relations
- reinforce the antipathy and suspicion felt by Indira Gandhi and other Indian leaders towards Zia-ul Haq personally
- compromise him in the eyes of the Muslims of India and other countries in the world
- induce the government of India to seek to secure the end of Pakistan's support for the Afghan rebels
- step up the activities of Pakistani émigrés and of the nationalist movement, particularly in Baluchistan
- disrupt Afghan émigré organizations
- intensify the local population's hostility towards Afghan refugees



Information was to be **conveyed to India and Iran to the effect that by building up its military potential Pakistan was in fact preparing for aggression not only against Afghanistan, but also against India and Iran.**

- India was to be told that Zia-ul Haq was giving Afghan refugees an anti-Indian outlook and using Afghan emissaries to conduct activities favorable to Pakistan in India.
  - The plan also provided for intensified anti-Pakistan propaganda directed at India and other countries abroad, and the setting up of a Committee for the return to India of the Pakistan-occupied part of Kashmir.
- Disinformation was to be conveyed to Gandhi on joint operations by the US, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China to destabilize the situation in Jammu and Kashmir.

In Bangladesh, the aim was to **impede actions by the Zia-ur Rakhman regime in support of the Afghan counter-revolution**, and to **intensify disagreements between Bangladesh and Pakistan on such disputed issues** as the repatriation of Pakistani citizens, the division of banking assets and so on, and the **responsibility of Pakistan's ruling circles for the economic backwardness of Bangladesh.**

*The aim was to impede the activities of the US, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China relating to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.*

In 1981–82, the following Active Measures were envisaged within the framework of the 'TORKHAM' operation:

- **Produce a leaflet in Urdu sharply criticizing the Pakistan regime and its cooperation with the US, from the standpoint of local religious (Shiite) circles.**
  - Implicate the Iranian authorities in the production of the leaflet by including in the text appropriate comments by Khomeini about Zia-ul Haq.
  - Implementation: posting the leaflet to various establishments, newspapers and foreign missions in Islamabad, and scattering copies in Karachi.
- In the name of a fictitious grouping in the Pakistani armed forces
  - disseminate leaflets (in English, as part of the 'SARDAR' series) from which it could be concluded that there is **growing dissatisfaction among the military about Zia-ul Haq's policy of redirecting Pakistan towards conflict with the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and India, and subordinating the country to foreign interests— those of the US and China.**
  - These leaflets to be disseminated in Islamabad and Karachi.
- Using available models,
  - produce a 'personal letter' from Pakistan's Home Affairs Minister, Mahmud Harun, who represents the Shiite minority in the government, to the Iranian leader, Imam Khomeini.
  - **Indicate in the letter that Zia-ul Haq intends to take severe new measures to restrict the activity of Shiites in Pakistan, and that they [the Shiites] appeal to their Iranian brethren for help to avert this threat.**

- Send a photocopy of the letter, with a covering note from 'a well wisher' to one of the leaders of Pakistan's military special service.
- Complete the elaboration of proposals for **exploiting the separatist movement of Pakistani Baluchis and Pakistani opposition forces located in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.**
- Place **compromising material in the press of various countries.**
- **Promote by all means an intensification of the Pakistani population's hostility towards Afghan refugees and the disruption of the Afghan emigration in Pakistan.**
- **Disseminate disinformation in the Pakistani community to the effect that in reality the Zia-ul Haq regime is not seeking to solve the Afghan refugee problem and would like to turn it into a permanent feature.**
  - The presence of refugees from the DRA gives the government the possibility of obtaining substantial material assistance, isolating the Baluchi and Pushtun nationalist movement and increasing the severity of the central authorities' control in districts where they mainly located.
- **Convey information to Pakistani government and journalistic circles to the effect that some leaders of the Afghan emigration, such as Hizb-i-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and N. Mohammad, who seek to keep Pushtun tribes under their influence, are promising to help them to set up an independent Pushtunistan on the territory of Pakistan and Afghanistan.**
- **Convey information to the Pakistani special services to the effect that a significant portion of the weapons reaching the Afghan refugees is sold on to activists and officials of opposition political parties who have established permanent undeclared contact with leading personalities within the Afghan counter-revolutionary emigration in Pakistan.**
- Through the country's press,
  - **disseminate information about growing disagreements among the leaders of Afghan emigration in Pakistan**
  - **their dissatisfaction with the Zia-ul Haq administration**
  - **their attempts to develop cooperation with the special services of the US, the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, out of the Pakistani authorities' control.**
- **To disrupt the Afghan emigration, make use of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]'s special services, with the help of the Afghans themselves.**
- **Carry out Active Measures to expose cooperation between Washington, Peking and the Zia-ul Haq regime in connection with the development of Pakistan's own atomic weapon.**
- **Convey information to India, Bangladesh and other countries with the object of inducing them to take actions favorable to the USSR. Some measures [are] to be carried out jointly with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.**

- Convey information to the press of Asian countries, in Dhaka, Delhi, Colombo and to Pakistani missions in these places, to the effect that the **expansion of military cooperation between Pakistan and the US will inevitably**
  - **entail the establishment of US military bases on Pakistan territory**
  - **the influx of military advisers**
  - **the arrival of American ships in Pakistan harbors**
    - **all of which can undermine Pakistan's relations with Islamic and non-aligned countries and further incline the USSR, India and Iraq against Pakistan, and these can give active support to forces opposed to the Zia-ul Haq regime.**
  
- Through the possibilities of India and of the UN Secretary General, **convey information to the US to the effect that the Reagan administration's plans to expand military and other assistance to Pakistan will provoke an extremely negative reaction within the democratic opposition to the Zia-ul Haq regime.**
  - If the precarious Zia-ul Haq dictatorship is overthrown, the US would be faced with rising anti-American feelings in that country on the same scale as in Iran.
  
- Through the Hungarians,
  - **convey information to NATO ruling circles about the weakness of the Zia-ul Haq regime, the growing strength of the opposition, including in the Pakistan Army, and the instability of the situation in the country.**
  
- In Dhaka,
  - **inspire parliamentary questions and speeches, declarations by public and political personalities and leaders of the main opposition parties, urging the government to display caution when solving the problem of 'Bihari' repatriation and to facilitate the dispatch of a UN mediation commission to Bangladesh with the object persuading Pakistan to repatriate Pakistani citizens most urgently and getting the Zia-ul Haq administration to use the funds provided by Saudi Arabia for the proper purpose, and not for backing the Afghan counter-revolution.**
  
- In Delhi
  - **convey information to the effect that the US and NATO have plans to set up an anti-Indian alliance in South Asia in which Pakistan would plan a key role.**
    - Western countries are not only strengthening Pakistan's military might but also encouraging its subversive activity against India and inciting it to inflame disputes between Hindus and Muslims, as well as the Sikh aspiration to set up an independent Khalsalistan.
  
- In Dhaka
  - **convey slanted information to Indian diplomats about the Pakistani leadership's aggressive intentions against India, the junta's strategic plans, aroused by the practical actions of the US and the People's Republic of China which aim to weaken India's positions in the**

**subcontinent in every way and rapidly build up Pakistan's military potential.**

- In Tehran
  - **regularly supply the Iranian leadership with disinformation about Pakistan's use of Afghan émigrés to pass arms to Baluchistan and Arab separatists in Iran and to instigate mass disorders and anti-government incidents in the provinces of Khuzestan (Southwestern Iran), Sistan (Eastern Iran) and Baluchistan.**

**In March 1981, in addition to the above 'TORKHAM' plan of action, a plan code-named 'GVADAR' [Gwadar] was devised with the object of exploiting the Baluchi problem to influence the policy of Pakistan.**

The Deputy Head of Service A of the FCD, Colonel M. A. Krapivin, was responsible for carrying out this plan.

'GVADAR' specified the following:

- Through the KGB Residencies in Islamabad and Karachi and the Afghan special services
  - **supply slanted information to Baluchi leaders about the Pakistani authorities' intention to legalize the presence of Afghan refugees on the territory of Baluchistan, giving them the right to erect permanent dwellings and to use the pasture lands to put out their animals to graze.**
  - **Prompt some Baluchi groups to engage in armed clashes with Afghan armed detachments.**
  - **Examine the expediency of making and maintaining contacts with representatives of the Baluchi emigration to Europe, in order to ascertain the situation within the Baluchi movement, exerting influence on it, and giving the impression that the USSR intends to give broad assistance to this movement.**
  - **Consider the expediency and technical possibility of setting up a radio station in Afghanistan which, in the name of the Baluchis, would call on the population of Baluchistan to fight for the establishment of an autonomous state.**
- Through the Afghans
  - **carry out a series of leaflet operations designed to exacerbate relations between the population of Baluchistan and the Afghan refugees.**
- **Convey slanted information to Pakistani leaders about the US's intentions and specific actions to exploit the Baluchi problem to put pressure on the Zia-ul Haq government in order to secure the further use of Pakistan as a stronghold for organizing the undeclared war against Afghanistan.**
- **Carry out disinformation operations about the CIA's contacts with individual Baluchi leaders, including some who had emigrated, either directly or through political figures such as [probably Former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur] Bakhtiar and [Former Iranian General Gholam Ali] Oveisi [Oveissi].**
  - For the sake of credibility, compile and send out letters ostensibly from Baluchis to the Pakistan Embassy in the US and some countries in Asia, containing threats against Zia-ul Haq and other military and state personalities in Pakistan.
  - It would be clear from this that the Baluchi leaders are receiving support and financial assistance from the American authorities and special services in pursuit of the idea of establishing an independent Baluchistan.
- **Convey slanted information to the Iranian leadership on the Americans' intentions and specific actions, including those of agents recruited by the**

**Americans through SAVAK [the Iranian Intelligence Agency], designed to detach Iranian Baluchistan from Iran and, by arrangement with the Pakistani authorities, set up an autonomous united Baluchistan within Pakistan.**

- **Convey information to Pakistani diplomats in Colombo, citing the Libyan leadership, to the effect that the leaders of the Pakistani Baluchis have asked Libya for assistance in the struggle to set up an autonomous state, and that senior Libyan officials are studying the request.**
  - A Baluchi armed action against the central government of Pakistan can only be averted by democratization of the country's life and repatriation of the Afghan refugees in Baluchistan.
- **Consider jointly with the Afghans how to incite the Baluchis to engage in antigovernment actions, and what assistance should be given.**
- Convey information to Palestinian Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat and to the press of various countries to the effect **that the US uses Pakistan to deflect the Muslim countries' anger at Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and to undermine their unity on this issue.**
  - If an emergency Conference of Islamic States were convened, the Americans have given Pakistan the task of again drawing the Conference's attention to the Afghan question, thereby wrecking the adoption of resolutions on Jerusalem that are unwelcome to the US and Israel.

**The Chukhrov Working Group also considered the question of creating a new irritant—the problem of setting up an Azad–Kashmir independent of Pakistan and India, and the notional formation of a Free Baluchistan government–in–exile in Afghanistan. But in view of the extreme complexity and uncertainty of many aspects of the situation, this question was postponed indefinitely.**

Many other measures of this kind were devised and the conditions were created for strengthening and consolidating Pakistan's democratic forces.

**Work was in hand with representatives of the People's Party of Pakistan, Tekhrik–i–Istikhlal Party, all factions of the Muslim League, the Mussavat Party, the National Democracy Party, the Pakistan National Party and other national–patriotic forces in the country.**

The possibilities of all KGB elements and Residencies, and of the KGBs of Kirgizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Azerbaijan were mobilized to conduct Active Measures.

Many Active Measure pieces on various themes were placed in the periodical **NIVA**, published in Islamabad, which was controlled by the KGB Residency.

- 1980 – 239 articles based on Service A themes were placed
- first half of 1981 – 216 articles

When commenting on the situation in Afghanistan and on Pakistani–Afghan relations, the periodical occasionally slipped into anti–Soviet and anti–Afghan criticism.

- Issue No 10, quoting the press of the US, included Zia–ul Haq's statement that the USSR was seeking to break through to the Persian Gulf and to twist Pakistan's arm.
- Issue No. 46 reprinted a 'Novai Vakt' article which criticized people who regard the Soviet Army as a friend and liberator, and scared them and all left–wingers with the idea that the Soviet Army would spare neither them nor their families.

In 1981, much of the material in the periodical dealt with the Conference of the Non–aligned Countries and the UN on Afghanistan.

In 1980, the KR line in Pakistan carried out 12 Active Measures, including some to compromise 'LEO' and some involving the distribution of posters about the CIA.

- **Use was made of a journey to Baluchistan by a US State Department official, the Consul in Karachi, and 'LEO,' where they supposedly had meetings with pro–separatist political leaders of that province.** It was from there that the Americans organized the struggle against revolutionary reforms in neighboring Iran, promising in return to help that province to achieve autonomy.

**A brief item in a local newspaper reporting that a policeman had stopped the motorcar of a member of the American Embassy was transformed by Chekist scribes into an incident of smuggling by the Americans and confirmation of their link with Pushtunist separatists.**

At that time also, a scheme was devised to carry out an Active Measure through the 'loss' of a wallet belonging to a Secretary in the Political Section of the American Embassy. The

wallet contained 'documents' of an anti-Pakistan nature. It was supposedly 'found' by a Pakistani in a public place and handed to a policeman.

**On 5 April 1980**, the KGB-controlled 'Patriot' newspaper in Delhi published an article under the heading: 'The American cloak and dagger agency's war against Zia-ul Haq.' This mentioned the CIA's involvement in an anti-government officers plot.

**On 4 April 1981**, the same newspaper published an item headed 'Mutiny in Pakistani units: 7 executed'. This described disorders in regular Pakistani forces stationed in Rawalpindi, Peshawar and Karachi barracks. Contrary to the expectations of Service A of the KGB FCD, no news agency apart from TASS reacted to this disinformation.

**On 6 July 1981**, a Soviet scholar and orientalist who was a KGB agent had a meeting with the Pakistani Chargé d'Affaires in the USSR. In a confidential conversation, he passed on the views of the competent agencies about the reaction of ruling and academic circles to the visit of Aga Shah, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to the US. Particular emphasis was given to the theme that the US assisted the Afghan rebels with arms sent through Pakistan; these arms were used not only to kill Afghans but also to kill Soviet citizens; the USSR would be forced, not to reduce, but instead to increase the scale of its military assistance. If Pakistan continued to act as an accomplice of American plans, particularly relating to the situation in Asia, the Soviet side would be unable to stand by idly in the face of such developments. The Charge defended the actions of his government, citing the impossibility of controlling the situation and activities in the Pushtun tribal areas.

*"What are we to do?" asked the Chargé.*

*"I am not authorized and I cannot take decisions for the government of Pakistan, but I should like to draw attention to the matter so that you might give serious thought to the substance of our talk" the agent replied.*

*"But this is escalation of tensions`!" the Chargé exclaimed.*

*"But is handing over American weapons to the bandits in order to kill Soviet citizens not escalation? Pakistan is being turned into the main base of bandit formations and the channel for the supply of arms! And the Soviet Union is to stand by quietly and watch this happen?" the agent objected.*

*The chargé concluded: "This information is important. Although I am reluctant to do so, I am compelled to report it to Islamabad."*

**When giving false information about Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan to the Iranian leadership, the Cheka<sup>36</sup> sought to convince the latter that if elements closely linked to the Americans came to power in Afghanistan, the Americans, in the course of their struggle with Khomeini, would actively use his own weapon – Islam – against him.** He should therefore pay attention to the subversive activities of the real enemies of the new regime, namely the West and neighboring Arab countries.

In order to **exacerbate Iranian-Pakistani relations and develop the Iranians' negative attitude towards Afghan emigration, use was made of information that, with the support and agreement of the local authorities, the CIA had set up special bases in Oman and in Pakistan to train armed formations and to send them into Iran to carry out counter-revolutionary and sabotage operations against the new regime.** The

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<sup>36</sup> Name of early Soviet secret police agency and a forerunner of the KGB.



training was conducted by CIA officers, former SAVAK agents and officers, and Afghan émigré organizations in Pakistan.

- On 10 November 1980, an Iranian Parliamentary Deputy from the town of Zahedan [in southeastern Iran], made a speech in Parliament exposing the hostile activities of Pakistan, Oman and 'other puppet states in the region' against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
- He referred to facts in his possession relating to 'the secret involvement of statesmen from so-called friendly Pakistan' in subversive actions against the Islamic regime.
- The deputy **used KGB briefing for his speech** and emphasized the part played by Afghan emigration in subversive activities from the territory of He urged the Iranian government to take steps to put a stop to such activities and to define the status of the Afghans on Iranian soil, as they are used for political purposes by forces hostile to Iran.

**An Active Measure, code-named 'TOKSIK' [TOXIC], was designed to compromise Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan. It put forward the idea that the Afghan partisans' main problem was lack of funds.** Therefore to balance their budget the refugees were extensively engaged in selling narcotics in the West.

**In Bangladesh, in January–February 1980 alone, 56 items were planted on the Afghan theme; 12 editorials tending to justify the incursion of Soviet forces in Afghanistan were published.** They pointed out that it was only in response to the undeclared war of imperialism against the 1979 Afghan Revolution that the USSR, bound by a friendship treaty with Afghanistan and responding to a request from its legitimate government, was compelled to take this step.

As these articles did not have the desired effect on public opinion and the majority condemned Soviet aggression, the Residency tried, **through agents of influence in the parties, to turn the public's attention away from condemnation of the occupation of Afghanistan and towards exposure of the reactionary nature of US and Bangladesh policy, and the US interference in the affairs of Bangladesh.**

If this also had no effect, then in the light of the situation and of the public mood, the idea was put forward that condemnation of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan had to be balanced with simultaneous criticism of the schemes of American imperialism.

Through agents, covert action was taken in the Central Committee of the RKB, the SARKER wing of the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) and the MOHI wing of the CPB to **dampen anti-Soviet attitudes among party members and to turn their attention towards the activities of the US and the People's Republic of China in the northeastern states of India and China's intention to create a buffer state between India and China out of the Chittagong Hill District, Tripura, Mizoram and Manipur.**

Another argument was deployed:

- the Americans seek to get young people to focus on the events in Afghanistan in order to distract them and student organizations from their dangerous schemes in Iran which are designed to crush the Iranian Revolution.
- Leaflets and appeals on this theme were sent out to public organizations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan.
- Articles were printed in 'Gonokongh,' 'Jonpod,' 'Sansbad,' 'Notun Bangla,' 'Democrat.'

The following is one of the FCD Service A articles designed to be placed in the Bangladesh press:

*"Despite their evident anti-Russian attitude, recently arrived refugees from Afghanistan say that the majority of the Afghan population is surprised by the correct behavior of the Soviet units, which in no way fits the conception of how the occupation forces of a foreign power must behave. The impression is that the Russians are determined to make use in Afghanistan of the experience which they gained in the 1920s, when the Soviet regime was being established in the Muslim republics of Central Asia.*

*The situation in Soviet Central Asia at that time reminds one of the situation which developed in Afghanistan after the April 1978 Revolution: trouble among the frontier tribes, fierce opposition from the large feudal landowners, strong clerical influence over the illiterate peasant masses, active support for the opposition forces from abroad (Iran, PRC) with the active involvement by Britain.*

*The Russians at times displayed extraordinary flexibility and the ability to combine military and political methods, indeed giving priority to the latter. The presence of Russian military units in Afghanistan has had little effect on daily life. As a rule, they are located in positions far from large centers of population and they do everything possible not to attract the attention of local inhabitants. Evidently, officers and soldiers are forbidden to take leave or go out of their deployment area, or to have any contacts with the Afghan population.*

*From the Afghan refugees, it has become known that, before being sent to Afghanistan, the Russians were specially instructed not to do anything which might offend the religious feelings of the Muslims or anything contrary to the traditions of various national groups living in the country. Notably, every Soviet serviceman has a special guidance note on the rules of behavior which are to be observed in Afghanistan. It is categorically forbidden to engage in any discussion about religion with the believers; it is recommended to recognize the rule observed by all Afghans on the performance of five daily prayers and not to disturb those at prayer. In the presence of Muslims, it is strictly not allowed to consume substances forbidden in the Koran, and so on. The refugees state that the commanders of Soviet units have been warned that they would be severely punished if the conduct of their subordinates gives rise to justified discontent among the local population or undesirable complications in relations with local inhabitants. On occasions when the Afghans are in contact with the Russians or have an opportunity to observe the life of Soviet troops in military garrisons, they are struck by the modest and undemanding mode of life, not only of the soldiers but also of the officers, their unruffled calm and their discipline."*

**In the framework of the 'TORKHAM' operation in 1981– 1982**, disinformation was regularly passed to the Iranian leadership about **Pakistan's use of Afghan émigrés to pass arms to Baluchi and Arab separatists and to stir up mass disorders and anti-government incidents in the provinces of Khuzestan, Sistan and Baluchistan.**

**A leaflet in support of Afghanistan was disseminated, notionally by the organization of Iranian People's Wrestlers, calling for an end to Iran's and Pakistan's provocations against Afghanistan.**

**In the second half of May 1982, the 'ZAKHAR' leaflet operation calling for the overthrow of Zia-ul Haq, was carried out in Pakistani Baluchistan.**

- Through agents of the Afghan special agency, SGI 990, leaflets were distributed.
  - An SGI agent among the leaders of one of the Baluchi tribes got some of his trusted people to throw out the leaflets along the railway line to Zahedan, in the area between Quetta and the Iranian frontier, paying them in Iranian rials.
  - The agent told those who were carrying out the task that he had been given the leaflets and the money by a 'friend' of his who was the leader of one of the Baluchi tribes in Iranian Sistan, warning them not to say anything of this to their Afghan friends.
  - Another SGI agent, the leader of a small Feda group codenamed 'Mohammad Khano,' sent two of his trusted people to throw out leaflets in the Quetta–Sukkurt area.
  - He gave Iranian rials for expenses and explained that he had taken this on 'at the request of an Iranian, in the clear expectation of earning further reward.'
  - In this way, the cover story for the operation was watertight, even if the executants were detained, as they in fact could not add anything to the fictitious information which they had been given.

**In 1980, the following numbers of KGB agents were involved in work against the Afghan emigration:** in Pakistan – 8; in Bangladesh –6; in India –12; in Afghanistan –12.

**In Britain, the KGB was engaged in tracking down one of the leaders of the Pakistani emigration, and in France it was looking for a leader of the Baluchi emigration, with a view to making operational contact with him.**

KGB Active Measures designed to **impede the improvement of Pakistan–India relations contributed to the failure of the Pakistani leadership's attempts to improve relations with India and to reduce tension on the borders with India.**

If this had been achieved, it would have enabled Pakistan to participate more freely in Afghan affairs and to carry out anti-Soviet actions on the international stage with regard to the USSR intervention in Afghan affairs. [Afghan Foreign Minister Mohammad] Dost's visit to Delhi in February 1981 [for the 9– 13 February Conference of the Non- Aligned Movement] ended in failure; [Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Nara Simha] Rao's visit to Islamabad in June of the same year did not yield any results.

**It was important to convince Indian politicians that Pakistan's desire to improve relations with India was only a tactical maneuver, an attempt to gain time in order to rearm and exploit the expected destabilization process in India, and solve the Kashmir issue.**

A document notionally entitled **The Haig Memorandum** was produced. Its main elements were as follows:

- The US considers that Pakistan must be a bastion of the free world on the borders of Iran, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean, in order to block India's ambitious claims to the leading role in the Indian Ocean.
- The US is ready to help Pakistan to build its Navy (lending it 1 or 2 aircraft carriers), naval bases at Gwadar, and extend anchorages in Karachi harbor.
- The Reagan administration welcomes Zia-ul Haq's attempts to create the appearance of good will towards India, but there can be no illusion about the fact that while Indira Gandhi remains in power, Delhi is bound to follow the Soviet political line.
- Consequently, there must be no let-up in joint efforts in the Washington-Peking-Islamabad triangle to destabilize the Indian government.
- The US is prepared to consider Pakistan's request for the supply of AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System] aircraft for use along the border with India, subject to the subsequent equitable sharing of the data acquired between the US, China and Pakistan.

The KGB Residency in Delhi noted that, **at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-aligned Movement in Delhi on 9–13 February 1981, the right wing of the Movement attempted to give the Conference an anti-Soviet slant, artificially whipping up the Afghan and Kampuchean issues.**

An attempt was made to **discredit the thesis that the countries of socialism are the natural allies of the Non-aligned Movement; a slogan proclaimed that the Non-aligned countries have no natural allies, but there are natural enemies – neo-colonization, racism, imperialism and hegemonism.** Yugoslavia and North Korea sided with the right wing. The only truly combative progressive forces in the Non-aligned Movement were Cuba and Vietnam.

The right wing managed to drag into the text of the Declaration a statement on the need to withdraw foreign forces from Afghanistan (admittedly, without referring to 'Soviet' forces). Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen were ill-prepared and did not display a combative spirit.

The KGB Resident in Delhi, Prokhorov<sup>37</sup> put forward proposals for Active Measures on his own initiative (in his telegram No 1669 of 5 May 1981).

These led to the following sinister conclusion – in order to keep the Babrak Karmal regime in power in Afghanistan, **a war between India and Pakistan would be advantageous for the Soviet Union, and they must be steered in that direction.**

The Department not only failed to rebuke its Resident for his levity, but instead asked Service A, Service 1, and the geographical departments of the KGB FCD and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their views on the Resident's proposals.

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<sup>37</sup> Prokhorov was the work name of Gennadiy Afanasyevich Vaumin, the Resident in Delhi, later head of the 17th Department of the FCD, with the rank of Major-General.

Any initiative by an operational officer relating to Active Measures was encouraged.

The Resident's approach to the subject was later reflected in requests sent out by the Center to its Residencies in Tehran and Islamabad. Service A asked for their views on the exacerbation of Iran–Pakistan relations.

- A telegram addressed to Shabrov in Tehran asked him to 'state his views on existing irritants in Iran–Pakistan relations which could be worked on to lead to an acute worsening of relation between Iran and Pakistan, even to the extent of causing open hostilities against each other.'
  - The telegram was signed by the Head of Department, Major–General M. K. Polonik.

On 12 January 1982, a similar request addressed to Islamabad was signed by the Head of the 17th Department, Major–General Nikishchov (workname: Mishin).

- This invited suggestions 'on sensitive points in relations between Pakistan and Iran which could be worked on to lead to an acute worsening of relations between them, even to the extent of causing open hostilities against each other, and which would contribute to achieving the aims of our Service in this region.'

Both telegrams were drafted by Aleksin, a Service A officer.

Through their agents, the KGB Residencies in Delhi and Colombo established channels for conveying FCD Service A information directly to highly–placed officials in India.

In Delhi, a reliable agent (codenamed 'VANO'), who was a journalist, passed information to the Prime Minister, I. Gandhi.

In September 1981, he was sent to Pakistan.

- Service A prepared themes on the Afghan issue for him, which he was to convey to representatives of the Pakistan administration, and, on his return, convey to the Indian leadership and publish in the Indian press.
- The Center allowed for the fact that the information might be amended and include some corrections in the light of the results of the agent's visit, but in any case it had to look like personal impressions and take account of the Indian leadership's loathing of the Pakistani administration, and of Zia–ul Haq in particular.
- In his published work, the agent was to stick to more careful and balanced formulations, in order not to rule out the possibility of visiting Pakistan again in the future.

On his return from Pakistan in October, the agent had a meeting with Gandhi and expounded to her the KGB themes on Afghanistan:

*"From what the Pakistani leadership says, one can see that the presence of the so-called Afghan refugees is useful to the Zia-ul Haq administration, as it enables it to seek additional material and military assistance from the US, China, Saudi Arabia and certain other countries. However, the Afghan refugees are also a source of additional tension for Islamabad, as the indigenous inhabitants of*

*Pakistan are certainly not indifferent to who uses their pasture lands, their water and their grain. In the view of some of the military, there will be continuing tension on the Pakistan– Afghan frontier until such time as Pakistan finally achieves the reorganization of its army and its complete rearmament. There are indications that as early as January 1982 the US will hand over to Islamabad the first batch of F–16 aircraft and patrol boats equipped with M–113 'Hawk' missiles. Thus one can suppose that the tempo and nature of rearmament are designed to speed up the militarization of the country and its conversion into an aggressive state, serving the interests of the US, China and reactionary Islamic regimes..."*

In Colombo, an agent of the Residency, among Sri Lankan journalists, had access to the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, T. Sri Abraham.

He passed on to Abraham, this information supplied by Service A of the FCD, and the latter expressed unfailing interest in this.

Thus, at a regular meeting on **10 January 1981, the agent passed on information on a US plan covering a 20–year period to establish its domination in the Indian Ocean to the detriment of India's interests.**

Abraham said that he would discuss this information with E. Gonsalvez, the Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was due to visit Sri Lanka on 12 January.

Conveying information in this manner is termed '**the method of special positive influence.**'

*It involves passing slanted information of various kinds and content, and disinformation, in conversations designed to influence governments, parties, individual political, public and state personalities, through agents, foreign confidential contacts, intelligence officers, and agents or cooptees of Soviet nationality.*

'Special positive influence' presupposes continuous work for the purpose, constant study of its results and of the reaction to the measures which are taken.

The KGB carried out Active Measures jointly with the Hungarians, who were in operational contact with a prominent Indian journalist in Vienna; they supplied him with KGB disinformation materials, which he published in the press under his own name.

Another agent of the Hungarians, codenamed 'OTTO PALMA,' was used to convey slanted information to government circles of Western countries. Service A themes were sent to the Head of the Disinformation Department of Hungarian Intelligence, Josan, for action.

**KGB Residencies in Pakistan, India and Iran were instructed to react to any press reports of gastric diseases and to inform the Center with a view to discrediting the US as part of a complex Active Measure codenamed 'TARAKANY' (Cockroaches).**

This was designed to discredit the American bacteriological laboratory attached to the Lahore medical centre and its personnel, and was a continuation of the operation to compromise the US and NATO over chemical and bacteriological weapons.

**In 1980–82, items appeared from time to time in the press of India, Iran, Bangladesh and Lebanon, alleging that preparations were in hand in Pakistan for bacteriological warfare and subversion against Afghanistan, Iran and India, with the involvement of American specialists.** Cases of intestinal diseases in humans in the area of Pishin, Surkhab, Muslimbagh and adjacent districts of Afghanistan, and of cattle plague and infectious diseases in Western districts of India (in the states of Punjab, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, and Rajasthan) were caused by the migration from Pakistan of people and animals infected by American specialists.

Through the seasonal- and often encouraged - migration of cattle-raising tribes from Pakistan to Afghanistan, Iran and India, carriers of new types of mass infection could be infiltrated into these territories; this, according to the schemes of the Americans and Pakistanis, would promote anxiety, chaos and disorders in these countries.

In Iran, **a rumor was spread that in Pakistan the Americans were using fellow Shiites as guinea pigs to study the effects of new chemical and bacteriological products on humans, as a result of which many either died or were crippled.** The Pakistani regime's decision to allow the Americans to conduct such experiments on human subjects was *evidence that the Pakistani leadership was conscious of the danger which the local Shiites represented, and therefore decided to rid itself of a potential internal enemy.*

In these same countries, steps were taken to **inspire applications to the World Health Organization, urging it to set up a commission to investigate the activities of American specialists who had turned Pakistan into a testing ground for experiments on human subjects and animals, using products which were part of the chemical and bacteriological arsenal.**

In Kabul, there were **press, radio and television references to the exploitation of Pakistan's territory to conduct dangerous experiments to develop methods of bacteriological warfare against Afghanistan, Iran and India.**

In Dakha, a number of **newspaper articles demanded an investigation into the true nature of experiments conducted by American specialists in the country, under the aegis of the International Center for the Study of Intestinal diseases and in cholera hospitals in Dakha and other cities.**

The **KGB succeeded to mold public opinion against the American bacteriological services in these countries.** The head of the bacteriological laboratory was expelled from Pakistan. The Indian government cancelled a joint Indo-American commission on healthcare and an Asian conference on intestinal diseases which were to take place in India.

The Karachi 'Daily News' of 11 February 1982 printed a report from its Washington correspondent about the Pakistani authorities' expulsion of an American, Dr. David Nelin, the leader of a group of scientists from University of Maryland attached to the Lahore medical center. Nelin stated that his expulsion was the result of intrigues by his Pakistani

colleagues. The American said that his ill-wishers included Professor Aslam Khan and Brigadier M A Choudri.

The KGB instigated the dispatch of protest letters to World Health Organization headquarters ostensibly from Pakistani medical scholars, and anti-American articles with fierce condemnations were planted in many countries.

*In February 1982, the Soviet 'Litterary Gazette' published an article by I. Andropov under the heading: 'An incubator of death.' This replayed KGB disinformation materials about the Lahore research center.*

'Pravda' of 27 February 1982 reported that the Indian authorities had cancelled a meeting of the joint Indo-American commission on health care and the Asian conference on intestinal diseases. It linked this with facts about the activities of American specialists in Pakistan and Bangladesh who were studying the effects of new products and conducting experiments related to the development of biological weapons.

According to the 'Patriot' newspaper, **the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs intended to hold an investigation into the activities of American scientists and doctors in India.**

**The Bangladesh authorities were also thinking of examining what the so-called international research institutes**, such as the one headed by Dr. Nelin in Lahore, were up to in the country. (Note: 'Patriot', a weekly journal, was controlled by the KGB Residency in Delhi.)

The Pakistani newspaper 'Dawn' of **23 February 1982** reported a meeting between representatives of the US's National Health Institute, Paul Ahmed and Douglas William, and Pakistan's Minister of Health, Dr. Nasiruddin Jomezai.

This led to the production of the following press release:

*"In connection with the expulsion from Pakistan of Dr D. Nelin for conducting dangerous experiments on the spread of infectious diseases, an American medical delegation has gone urgently to Islamabad in order to hush up the scandal which has blown up unexpectedly over the Lahore medical research center and to put pressure on Pakistan not to disclose what researches are carried out by the Center. The American delegation is headed by Paul Ahmed and Douglas William. The sudden appearance in Pakistan of a group of American medical specialists provides confirmation that Washington fears that their dangerous experiments with new biological components of weapons of mass destruction will be exposed, and it confirms the conclusion that Pakistan intends to allow the Americans to continue their dangerous experiments, in view of the probable use of the new weapons against India, Iran and Afghanistan."*

**In May 1982, reports date-lined Islamabad appeared in the Indian press about the deployment of American chemical and bacteriological weapons in Pakistan.**

*"According to information obtained from local military sources, chemical reagents have recently been brought to Pakistan from American chemical weapon arsenals located on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean and in Japan; these are to be stored in areas close to Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Quetta and Peshawar. As for the characteristics of these reagents, according to the sources they are similar to those used previously by the Americans during the Vietnam war. According to the same sources, the build-up of US chemical and*



*bacteriological stocks in Pakistan is designed for potential use by American rapid deployment forces in the broad region of South and South-west Asia.*

*An understanding between Washington and Islamabad on the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons on the territory of Pakistan was reached as far back as August 1980, when the agreement on the activities of the American bacteriological service in Pakistan was officially extended. Item 2 of Article 5 of that agreement in particular gives the Americans the right, through the US's International Development Agency (USAID), to review the results of the work periodically and to put forward proposals for its modification. In practice, this means that the Americans exercise complete control over all aspects of research in Pakistan on the development of new types of chemical, bacteriological and biological weapons. This formulation gives the US the possibility of determining unilaterally that it is essential to stock up and use chemical reagents on Pakistan territory. Clear confirmation of this can be found in the widely known facts relating to the activities of the Lahore Medical Centre, where American specialists were engaged in developing new forms of bacteriological and chemical weapons."*

**Published items of this kind were picked up by TASS and reprinted in the Soviet press; the press cuttings were filed with the original disinformation material.** To some extent, *they eclipsed reports in the Western press about the Soviet Army's use of chemical weapons against the Afghan people.* The Soviet propaganda services denied such reports, attributed their publication to American pressure on the Western press, and blamed the Americans for the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan.

**The KGB Resident in Pakistan, Akim, was awarded a testimonial by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov for the 'TARAKANY' Active Measure.**

**The Active Measures work of the KGB Colombo Residency in 1977–81**, and that of the Resident, Grinevich, himself won a positive assessment: the Resident made skilful use of intelligence means and methods, the whole operational staff of the Residency was involved, and the output of agents was substantial. The 'Lanka Guardian' and 'Tribune,' periodicals controlled by the Residency, won high praise.

**In 1980**, the KGB leadership was told of 13 Active Measures carried out by the Residency.

A complex operation to strengthen the international standing of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan [DRA] and to develop a positive attitude to the work of Karmal within the Sri Lankan government and public won approval.

The operations helped to moderate criticism of the USSR by Sri Lankan representatives and by the press with regard to the incursion of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

**In 1980**, 5,000 leaflets were disseminated in Colombo in the name of a fictitious organization, the 'Union of Muslim Youth,' in support of the Karmal government and condemning the actions of the US and the PRC against the DRA. The same aim was pursued through meetings, seminars, resolutions and conversations of influence.

Through the possibilities of the 'Sutra' Agency, **a session of the Sri Lankan National Center of the Asian Buddhist Peace Congress (ABPC) was arranged to condemn the policy of China and Pakistan, and to press for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty.**

**Arrangements were made for sending letters of protest to the PRC Embassy, for an operation codenamed 'OMICRON' against the Chinese in Sri Lanka, for leaflets exacerbating the schism between Albania and China, for anti-American posters, and appeals in favor of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.**

With the help of agents, a *Sri Lanka-Afghanistan Solidarity Committee* was set up: this was **used to organize mass meetings in towns to condemn interference by the US, the PRC and Pakistan in the affairs of the DRA, and to support the revolutionary reforms in that country.** It also organized letters of protest to President Zia-ul Haq and to the Pakistan government's daily newspaper 'Dawn.' The letters condemned the CIA's activities in Pakistan and interference by the US and China in the affairs of Afghanistan.

*"In Colombo and Kandy, seminars were held to criticize interference by imperialist forces in Afghanistan; many slanted conversations were held in the entourage of President J.R. Jayewardene and Prime Minister Ranasinha Premadasa, in leading circles of the ruling Party and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the criminal activities of mercenary groups sent into Afghanistan from neighboring countries. Conversations of influence were held among political, state and public figures in Sri Lanka with the aim of influencing the position of Jayewardene towards Afghanistan and the surrounding area. Through agents, influence was exerted on trade union and religious organisations to induce them to adopt resolutions and declarations expressing support for the USSR's policy in Afghanistan. Favourable articles on the Afghan issue, based on briefing from Service A of the KGB FCD, were printed in the 'Tribune', the 'Lanka Guardian' and the bulletin of the Sri Lankan Centre of the Asian Buddhist Peace Congress."*

In **June 1980**, the following disinformation was conveyed to Pakistani diplomats in Colombo:

*"In the view of French diplomats, Zia-ul Haq's policy towards Afghanistan amounts to laying dangerously with fire. Further delay in establishing direct contacts with the new regime in Kabul will have tragic consequences in Islamabad. India views Zia-ul Haq's policy of playing a leading role in the Muslim world with suspicion, and will not put obstacles to a change of regime in Pakistan. The US no longer believes in the durability of the government and seeks to establish undeclared contacts with the opposition".*

At the same time, it was suggested to Pakistanis in Delhi that there was a real possibility of normalizing relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the so-called Durand line frontier, and that by delaying normalization Pakistan was missing a favorable opportunity.

Taken together, this all moderated the negative attitude of Sri Lankan representatives and the press towards the actions of the USSR and of its forces in Afghanistan; it helped to raise the interest of government and political circles in the country towards Soviet proposals for settling the situation in Afghanistan and the South-west region of Asia.

## APPENDIX B: LEAFLET

This is the text from the leaflet used during Operation **ZAKHIR**:

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In the name of Allah, merciful and kind! Glory to Allah who made us Muslims and said in his Holy book: *'Is there anyone better than the man who calls on Allah to do good and says that he is obedient to him?'* (S.41, A.33) Blessed is the prophet, his family and associates.

Brothers in faith!

Our enemies are not only those who openly oppose Islam, but also those who, under the cover of Islamism, do their dirty deeds. For it is written: *'Do not be afraid of your enemies, but of the day when you turn your back on Islam and the mosques.'*

Zia ul-Haq is a hypocrite like the former Shah of Iran. He also prayed with Muslims, went on a pilgrimage to the Holy places and knew how to talk about the Holy Quran.

We are calling on the army and the people to rise up against the despot Zia ul-Haq, the servant of Satan – the United States of America – and to prepare him for the fate of the Shah. Satan is frightened that the Islamic Revolution, started in Iran, will spread to Pakistan. This is why Satan is generously supplying Zia ul-Haq with arms with which to kill believers. Zia ul-Haq has flooded our country with various unbelieving Americans and impure Chinese who are teaching him how to kill pure Muslims. He believes in their advice more than in the teachings of Allah. Zia ul-Haq is a mercenary dog who is living on Satan's dollars. He has ordered Zia ul-Haq to establish a cruel and bloody regime and to crush the Muslim people who are now living with no rights.

At the same time corruption and hypocrisy are eating away at our society. Crime is increasing. The reason is not only a lack of true belief, but the increasing gap between the rich and poor. As All-powerful Allah teaches us: *'A*

*man will only receive when he is zealous.'* Our prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him, called on us Muslims to work honestly and hard in respect of the Almighty. This means that a Muslim must only receive what he has earned by his own labours. But Zia ul-Haq and his clique are unlawfully making themselves rich from other people's work. Even the Zekat [obligatory alms to the needy – one of the pillars of Islam] has become a thing of personal gain to them. Taking advantage of the fact that no one can control them, they award a large part of the Zekat. But the Most High ordered us that: *'Charity is for the poor and beggars, for the deliverance of slaves, for those in debt, for actions in the name of Islam and for travellers as declared by Allah. He is knowing and wise.'* And our prophet Muhammad, and may He rest in peace, taught us that the Zekat must all be used for the needs of the poor, orphans and widows. Ask our poor people whether they have received much charity from the Zekat. Collecting the Zekat by force, Zia ul-Haq and his clique are not only insulting true Muslims. They are shamelessly ignoring the teachings of Islam. And they manage to hide their own money from the Zekat. All Muslims should know that Zia ul-Haq recently stole millions. He keeps his riches abroad as did the former Shah of Iran, knowing that sooner or later he will be forced to flee. He is hoping that Satan will protect him from the anger of the people. Meanwhile he is serving Satan faithfully by ensuring favourable conditions for the dominance of non-believers.

He knows that this will lead to further theft from Muslims.

The clique of Zia ul-Haq has carried out a census of the population and its housing. This was also inspired by Satan as a way to introduce new taxes and labour conditions in contradiction of the teachings of Muhammad, may Allah bless him, for he said that anyone who oppresses a Muslim is not his follower.

Zia ul-Haq is leading the country to disaster. He wants to ride on the atomic devil and become a despot over all Muslims.

But Allah is great and just. Only dust remains from the enemies of Islam, but the warriors for the true faith are remembered for ever.

Everyone must join the fight in the name of Islam against the bloody dictator Zia ul-Haq.

Allah is great!<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> *Internal Soviet intelligence document – Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chap. 5, para 128*

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SECURING YOUR SIX

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

"Running to Disaster" was written and researched by Syed Khalid Muhammad, Director General – CommandEleven.

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## ABOUT COMMANDELEVEN

CommandEleven is a private intelligence firm, based in Pakistan, with assets, analysts, and researchers offering apolitical analysis on topics such as security, geopolitics, defense, and espionage. CommandEleven's intelligence includes Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir.

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