This is Part 7 of Running to Disaster, CommandEleven’s eight-part study of how Pakistan’s radicalization and terrorism problem was built, from the Soviet-Afghan war to today.
Zia’s Response and the Rise of Al-Zulfiqar
Interestingly, all the Soviet active measures had no effect on Zia’s policy.
The Afghan refugee camps quickly became recruitment centers for the mujahideen.
The ISI channeled the recruits into seven Islamic resistance groups, all with bases in Pakistan, which directed operations across the Afghan border. The Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most important of the mujahideen groups, had very close ties with the Zia regime. In 1978, to increase support for his regime, Zia had taken five members of the Pakistani wing of Hizb-i-Islami into his government. With Zia’s support, the ISI replaced the Foreign Ministry as the main policy-making body on Afghanistan.
General Zia-ul-Haq was well-aware of the Soviet active measures being taken against him. Though the details of the Soviet operations remain classified, from an early stage, Zia was receiving intelligence from the CIA, as well as the ISI.
Yet, the Soviets could not have imagined Zia’s response.
In August and September 1980, Pakistan carried out the biggest expulsion of Soviet intelligence and other personnel since Britain had excluded 105 KGB and GRU officers in 1971. Kryuchkov reacted to the expulsion and the problems it created by establishing an interdepartmental working group, chaired by V. A. Chukhrov, to devise ways of working with Pakistani opposition forces to destabilize and overthrow the Zia regime.
The most vocal, and violent, opponent of Zia was Murtaza Bhutto, elder son of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who founded a small terrorist group, claiming it to be the armed wing of the PPP, to avenge his father’s death.
While in jail, Bhutto had once said:
“My sons are not my sons if they do not drink the blood of those who dare to shed my blood today.”
In May 1979, a month after his father’s execution, Murtaza visited Kabul to seek the help of the Taraki government in setting up a base in Afghanistan, where they could launch attacks against the Zia regime.
Murtaza was allowed to receive a large arms shipment from Yasir Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and to house a small band of guerrillas in a building called “Dracula House.”
Murtaza’s first attempt to smuggle arms into Pakistan failed because his carrier was a Pakistani agent. Murtaza was reduced to scanning newspapers and attributing various accidents and fires in Pakistan to the work of his guerrillas.
After the Soviet invasion, Murtaza developed a very close relationship with Muhammad Najibullah, head of KHAD, the newly founded Afghan intelligence service. Najibullah, as a gesture of good will, paid the costs of Murtaza’s wedding to a young Afghan woman.
Murtaza and Najibullah had detailed discussions on joint covert operations against Pakistan. Since KHAD was operating under KGB direction, there was no doubt that the Politburo and the Kremlin had approved these discussions. Murtaza may not have known KHAD was a surrogate for the KGB.
His first successful operations inside Pakistan, approved by Najibullah, were a bomb attack on the Sindh High Court and the destruction of a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) DC-10 aircraft at Karachi Airport in January 1981. He also plotted to disrupt the visit of Pope John Paul II to Pakistan in February by exploding a bomb during the Pontiff’s address at a Karachi stadium, but the bomb went off prematurely at the entrance to the stadium, killing the bomber and a policeman. The bombs were supplied by KHAD.
Operation ALAMGIR
Murtaza Bhutto and Najibullah then decided on Operation ALAMGIR (Swordbearer), where a PIA flight would be hijacked over Pakistan and diverted to Damascus or Tripoli. The three novice hijackers made the mistake of choosing a domestic flight with insufficient fuel to reach either Damascus or Tripoli. Salamullah Tipu, the lead hijacker, ordered the pilot to land in Kabul. As the plane landed, Tipu informed the control tower that he was a member of the armed wing of the PPP, and wished to speak to ‘Dr. Salahuddin,’ Najibullah’s codename in Kabul. Murtaza Bhutto, who chose to rename his terrorist group al-Zulfiqar (The Sword) after this hijacking, came to meet Tipu at the bottom of the aircraft steps, along with Najibullah, disguised in the clothes of an airport maintenance worker. The KGB had fully advised Najibullah on the best measures of using the hijacking to discredit Zia’s regime.
On March 4, Anahita Ratebzad, President of the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Association and Minister for Education, who was a confidential KGB contact, arrived at the airport surrounded by TV cameras, to express support for the ‘just demands’ of the hijackers and to ask that all women and children on the aircraft be released to mark International Women’s Day.
In a pre-arranged gesture, Tipu announced that he was happy to honor Ratebzad’s demands.
On March 5, Babrak Karmal, the Afghan leader and long-standing KGB asset, having just returned from Moscow, held a live phone conversation with Tipu from the control tower. Like Ratebzad, Karmal also gave strong backing to Tipu’s ‘just demands.’
Among the hijackers’ demands was the release of fifty political prisoners from Pakistan’s jails. When Zia refused, one of the passengers was beaten, shot, and thrown on the tarmac. This act persuaded the KGB it was time to move the aircraft away from Kabul.
Before the plane was refueled for Syria, the Soviet Union’s closest major ally in the Middle East, arms were smuggled aboard, unseen by TV cameras. The three hijackers, who arrived in Kabul with only pistols, left with Kalashnikovs, grenades, explosives, a timing device and US$ 4,500.
After the aircraft landed in Damascus, Zia continued to refuse to release the political prisoners, but on pressure from Washington to save American lives, Zia agreed. Murtaza hailed the release of the fifty-four PPP members from Pakistani jails as a triumph for al-Zulfiqar, which was echoed by both KHAD and the KGB. Al-Zulfiqar’s base was moved from ‘Dracula House’ to a palatial headquarters, which received a steady stream of refugees from Zia’s regime anxious to become guerrillas and fight for his overthrow.
As well as supporting al-Zulfiqar, KHAD was also used by the KGB to supply arms to separatists and dissident groups in the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh.
At the end of 1980, the leader of the Baluchi separatist group based in Afghanistan held secret talks with Najibullah, who promised to provide the separatists with arms, 400 military instructors and three training camps. After talks between another Baluchi leader and the Afghan President, Babrak Karmal, in April 1982, KHAD opened two more camps to train Baluchi guerrillas to fight the Pakistani and Iranian regimes.
The huge influx of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, eventually reaching 3.5 million, offered numerous opportunities for agent infiltration. Since agents were usually Afghan, the KGB used KHAD to recruit.
According to FCD files, in the early 1980s, KHAD’s foreign intelligence directorate had 107 agents and 115 ‘trainee’ agents operating inside Pakistan, mostly within the Afghan community.
As Chukhrov had wanted penetration into the mujahideen groups, twenty-six KHAD agents were believed to have access to the headquarters of the rival mujahideen groups; fifteen were members of the Pakistani armed forces, intelligence community and official bureaucracy.
Their main achievement was to increase the existing discord and mistrust between the rival groups. Though the achievement didn’t change the result of the war, the KGB believes that it dramatically decreased the effectiveness of mujahideen operations.
The Politburo also attempted to disrupt the links between Zia and the mujahideen groups in Pakistan by branding him as a traitor to Islam. An English translation of one of the leaflets prepared and distributed appears at the end of this part, as original copies are impossible to find.
On April 18, 1981, Kryuchkov submitted to Andropov Operation ZAKHIR, a new disinformation measure designed to cause deterioration in Pakistani-Iranian relations and to inflame the political situation in Pakistan:
- Leaflets were written by a fictitious opposition group calling for the overthrow of the Zia regime and an Islamic Revolution in Pakistan. These were developed and distributed across Pakistan.
- Other leaflets were developed that were clearly written by writers under the strong influence of Khomeini, quoting Khomeini’s criticisms of Zia and the regime in Pakistan. These leaflets were distributed by the embassy, consulate, and Afghan friends.
- Bangladesh and India were to get their press to publish articles about a powerful opposition group in Pakistan, supposedly set up by the Iranian special services and actively working to overthrow Zia-ul-Haq.
- Additional leaflets supposedly came from dissident Islamic officers, condemning Zia as a hypocritical traitor who, while professing friendship with Iran, was secretly plotting with the Americans to bring down the Islamic Republic. The leaflets contained a threat of assassination saying – “Next time, you will pay for it as Sadat did.”
Murtaza Bhutto, with the assistance of Najibullah, was preparing a real plot to assassinate Zia.
Though the evidence comes from al-Zulfiqar sources, it appears Zia narrowly escaped two assassination attempts in early 1982. The weapon in both cases was a Soviet SAM-7 (surface-to-air missile).
- In January 1982, two al-Zulfiqar terrorists carried a SAM missile in the trunk of their car to a deserted hillside near Islamabad Airport, waiting for Zia’s plane to return from his trip to Saudi Arabia. The poorly trained terrorist did not wait for the SAM to switch from red to green (locked on target) before firing.
- On February 7, 1982, the Pakistani press reported that Zia would be arriving in Lahore aboard his personal plane. Again, al-Zulfiqar terrorists drove to a public park beneath Zia’s flight path with another SAM, waited for the plane to come into view and fired. This time the terrorist who fired the missile waited for green, but failed to keep watching the aircraft in the viewfinder until it was hit.
- After this, Zia imposed strict censorship preventing newspapers from mentioning the assassination attempt.
- Two more SAM missiles were smuggled into Pakistan later that year for another attempt on Zia’s life, but those missiles were seized by the police.
Murtaza’s own paranoia became more pronounced and he started to believe that there was a plot between the Afghan regime and Zia to exchange him for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and moved to New Delhi.
After a series of abysmally planned, unsuccessful operations in 1984, none with KHAD support, and with most of his al-Zulfiqar members in jail, Murtaza announced its dissolution in the following year.
Imaginary Plots and Operation TARAKANY
With all the failed attempts and no realistic plan to bring Zia’s regime down, the Politburo and the Kremlin were left with publicizing imaginary plots against him, most significant in their strategy was a supposedly secret Islamic opposition from within the Pakistan armed forces.
In 1983, the Delhi Patriot published a letter allegedly prepared by a clandestine cell calling itself the Muslim Army Brotherhood (Fauji Biradiri), which denounced Zia’s regime as a despicable gang of corrupt generals… more interested in lining their own pockets than in defending the nation, who had betrayed the ideas of Pakistan’s founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and were leading the country to ruin.
Nothing resembling the Muslim Army Brotherhood ever materialized during the more than ten years that Zia remained at the helm of state affairs.
KGB disinformation was heavy with the theme of Zia’s corruption, claiming he had a Swiss bank account where 10% commission from American arms manufacturers was paid. It also claimed that Zia had a special plane in continual readiness, in case he and his family had to flee the country.
Operation TARAKANY (‘Cockroaches’) centered around the claim that American specialists in the field of biological and chemical warfare had established a base in the US bacteriological laboratory at the Lahore Medical Center, which was experimenting on Pakistani citizens. Outbreaks of bowel diseases in the districts of Lishin, Surkhab, and neighboring areas of Afghanistan, as well as epidemics and cattle deaths in Punjab, Haryana, Jammu, Kashmir, and Rajasthan in Western India, were alleged to be the result of the movement across the Pakistani border of people and cattle infected by American germ-warfare specialists.
On February 11, 1982, the Karachi Daily News reported that Dr. Nellin, the American head of the research group, had been expelled by the Pakistani authorities.
On February 23, 1982, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported:
“Following the expulsion from Pakistan of Dr. Nellin for dangerous experiments on the spread of infectious diseases, an American delegation of doctors is paying an urgent visit to Islamabad. Their aim is to hush up the scandal over the work of the Lahore Medical Center and to put pressure on Pakistan not to make known the work which was carried out at the Center… The fact that a group of American doctors has made such an urgent visit to Pakistan confirms that Washington is frightened that the dangerous experiments on new substances for weapons of mass destruction might be revealed. It supports the conclusion that Pakistan intends to allow the Americans to continue to carry out dangerous experiments, probably because these new weapons could be used against India, Iran and Afghanistan.”
In May 1982, the KGB succeeded in taking the story a stage further by planting reports in the Indian press, allegedly based on sources in Islamabad, that the United States had stockpiled chemical and bacteriological weapons in Pakistan.
Interestingly, anti-American propaganda failed to disrupt the increasing cooperation between Zia and Washington. Though Zia had spurned the offer in 1980 of a US$ 400 million economic and military aid package from the Carter administration as peanuts, in 1981, he accepted an offer from the incoming Reagan administration of US$ 3.2 billion spread over 6 years.
During the war in Afghanistan, the CIA channeled US$ 2 billion of covert assistance to the mujahideen through Pakistan’s ISI.
The KGB active measures, both before and during the Soviet invasion, had no discernible effect on General Zia-ul-Haq or the ISI support for the mujahideen.
Many will be wondering why such detail of the activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
All the problems today in Afghanistan and Pakistan originated, or were planted, during this time.
From the Baluchi separatist groups operating from Afghan soil to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Afghanistan has been carved out as a base of operations against Pakistan, whether by the Soviet Union, India, the United States, and/or terrorist groups.
How Did Pakistan and the US Get Involved?
Towards the end of the 1970s, Moscow was widely thought to be in the prime of its powers and aspirations. In 1975, North Vietnam accomplished its victory over South Vietnam undermining American interests. With Vietnam in the communist camp, Laos and Cambodia followed quickly. The USSR expanded its military footing in Angola and Mozambique with pro-Soviet regimes coming to power. Historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote in his book, The Cold War,
“that these developments, alongside ignominious American withdrawal from Vietnam, made it seem as though Washington was on the defensive everywhere, and Moscow was on a roll.”
The Afghan-Soviet Friendship Treaty of December 1978 increased American suspicion about Moscow’s Afghanistan plans. The murder of the American Ambassador Adolph Dubs in Kabul in February 1979 hardened Washington’s position. The US began providing aid to Afghan insurgents against the Soviets in July 1979, but that aid was for propaganda warfare. When the CIA approached Riyadh and Islamabad, both fearful of further Soviet aggression, there was still no formal forward plan.
The Soviet Red Army invasion of Afghanistan gave the US the opportunity to get revenge for their defeat in Vietnam. US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski convinced President Jimmy Carter that Afghanistan could become the USSR’s Vietnam, but that would not happen without external support to the Afghan insurgents who, unlike the North Vietnamese, “have no sanctuary, no organized army, and no central government.”
Throughout the Cold War, Pakistan was perceived by America as a treasured strategic asset, whether used as a military springboard against the USSR and the new China in the 1950s or to usher in a US-China rapprochement in the 1970s. Afghanistan’s turmoil necessitated Pakistan’s attention because of the potential Soviet invasion of Pakistan’s Baluchistan, where Afghan communists had stoked ethno-nationalist sentiments for decades. Not to mention, Babrak Karmal, leader of the Soviet-backed ruling Communist Party, was “eager to repudiate and erase the Durand Line.” Baluchi groups in Afghanistan re-initiated contact with Pakistani separatists through KHAD, Afghanistan’s intelligence agency.
Two additional reasons forced President Carter’s hand:
- Control over Afghanistan and promotion of a separate Baluchistan would give the Soviets a major step toward overland access to the Indian Ocean and domination of the Indian sub-continent
- The US-Pakistan Security Agreement of 1959 puts an obligation on Washington to take appropriate action, even the use of armed forces, in case of aggression against Pakistan
On December 29, 1979, President Carter signed a presidential finding permitting the CIA to work with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to send lethal assistance covertly to the mujahideen. To avoid the burden of logistics, America delegated the responsibility of channeling all aid, the first of which reached the mujahideen two weeks after the invasion. The presidential document stated that “harassing the Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan” was the objective of the US administration.
US specialists helped Pakistani trainers establish schools for the mujahideen in secure communications, guerrilla warfare, urban sabotage, and heavy weapons.
Since the US did not want to blatantly confront the Soviets and risk retaliation, the CIA, using the Doctrine of Plausible Deniability, only provided weapons from the Soviet Union or their allied Eastern European nations.
By the mid-1980s, the Saudis agreed to match US funding for the operation. More importantly, the Royal House of Saud, along with other Gulf States, mobilized volunteers to fight alongside the mujahideen, as they legitimized a jihad against “the atheist USSR occupation of largely Muslim Afghanistan.”
Pakistan was the launching ground for training the mujahideen, where the Gulf States spent billions annually to fund the madrassas in northern Pakistan.
President Ronald Reagan, who inherited the covert program in 1981, did not expand the scope initially. Due to congressional pressure, in 1985, covert aid that had started at US$ 30 million annually since 1979, was increased to US$ 250 million annually.
In March 1985, President Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 166, which is detailed in bold language to authorize stepped-up covert military aid to the mujahideen, and made it clear that the secret Afghan war would have a new goal – to defeat Soviet troops in Afghanistan and encourage Soviet withdrawal. This meant that advanced intelligence and sophisticated weaponry, such as plastic explosives and high-power sniper rifles, were delivered to the mujahideen.
In 1986, the US supplied the mujahideen with American hand-held anti-aircraft Stinger missiles to shoot down Soviet helicopters. The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev, a moderate leader, coupled with the war-weariness of the Soviet Red Army, convinced the Americans that the Red Army would not respond to American arms supplies with any offensive against the US ally – Pakistan.
Two months after the Stinger missile changed the battlefield, the Soviet Politburo decided on a deadline for its troop withdrawal. The Soviets claim Gorbachev’s view was the Afghan war was unyielding and continued occupation was a major hindrance to his goal of domestic economic restructuring and political reform.
On May 15, 1988, the Soviet Red Army began its withdrawal from Afghanistan under the leadership of Colonel-General Boris Gromov, with the last soldier leaving on February 15, 1989.
Gorbachev led the USSR until 1991, when it disintegrated.
While the US may have successfully ended the Cold War through the proxy war waged in Afghanistan, the long-lasting effect has spread worldwide in the form of radicalization and terrorism.
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) oversaw the funneling of aid, giving most of the weaponry to Afghan fundamentalist factions such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami; Hekmatyar was later known as “The Butcher of Kabul.”
Islamabad, in the opinion of Western analysts, privately strengthened the strategic depth in Kabul by supporting such groups, but these factions were clearly interested in establishing an anti-American regime once the last Soviet soldier was gone.
The ensuing power vacuum spawned a scorpion’s nest of warlords, who fought a bloody civil war, that caused the rise of the Taliban.
The Operation ZAKHIR Leaflet
The following is the text of a leaflet used during Operation ZAKHIR, translated into English:
In the name of Allah, merciful and kind! Glory to Allah who made us Muslims and said in his Holy book: ‘Is there anyone better than the man who calls on Allah to do good and says that he is obedient to him?’ (S.41, A.33) Blessed is the prophet, his family and associates.
Brothers in faith!
Our enemies are not only those who openly oppose Islam, but also those who, under the cover of Islamism, do their dirty deeds. For it is written: ‘Do not be afraid of your enemies, but of the day when you turn your back on Islam and the mosques.’
Zia ul-Haq is a hypocrite like the former Shah of Iran. He also prayed with Muslims, went on a pilgrimage to the Holy places and knew how to talk about the Holy Quran.
We are calling on the army and the people to rise up against the despot Zia ul-Haq, the servant of Satan – the United States of America – and to prepare him for the fate of the Shah. Satan is frightened that the Islamic Revolution, started in Iran, will spread to Pakistan. This is why Satan is generously supplying Zia ul-Haq with arms with which to kill believers. Zia ul-Haq has flooded our country with various unbelieving Americans and impure Chinese who are teaching him how to kill pure Muslims. He believes in their advice more than in the teachings of Allah. Zia ul-Haq is a mercenary dog who is living on Satan’s dollars. He has ordered Zia ul-Haq to establish a cruel and bloody regime and to crush the Muslim people who are now living with no rights.
At the same time corruption and hypocrisy are eating away at our society. Crime is increasing. The reason is not only a lack of true belief, but the increasing gap between the rich and poor. As All-powerful Allah teaches us: ‘A man will only receive when he is zealous.’ Our prophet Muhammad, may Allah bless him, called on us Muslims to work honestly and hard in respect of the Almighty. This means that a Muslim must only receive what he has earned by his own labours. But Zia ul-Haq and his clique are unlawfully making themselves rich from other people’s work. Even the Zekat [obligatory alms to the needy – one of the pillars of Islam] has become a thing of personal gain to them. Taking advantage of the fact that no one can control them, they award a large part of the Zekat. But the Most High ordered us that: ‘Charity is for the poor and beggars, for the deliverance of slaves, for those in debt, for actions in the name of Islam and for travellers as declared by Allah. He is knowing and wise.’ And our prophet Muhammad, and may He rest in peace, taught us that the Zekat must all be used for the needs of the poor, orphans and widows. Ask our poor people whether they have received much charity from the Zekat. Collecting the Zekat by force, Zia ul-Haq and his clique are not only insulting true Muslims. They are shamelessly ignoring the teachings of Islam. And they manage to hide their own money from the Zekat. All Muslims should know that Zia ul-Haq recently stole millions. He keeps his riches abroad as did the former Shah of Iran, knowing that sooner or later he will be forced to flee. He is hoping that Satan will protect him from the anger of the people. Meanwhile he is serving Satan faithfully by ensuring favourable conditions for the dominance of non-believers. He knows that this will lead to further theft from Muslims.
The clique of Zia ul-Haq has carried out a census of the population and its housing. This was also inspired by Satan as a way to introduce new taxes and labour conditions in contradiction of the teachings of Muhammad, may Allah bless him, for he said that anyone who oppresses a Muslim is not his follower.
Zia ul-Haq is leading the country to disaster. He wants to ride on the atomic devil and become a despot over all Muslims.
But Allah is great and just. Only dust remains from the enemies of Islam, but the warriors for the true faith are remembered for ever.
Everyone must join the fight in the name of Islam against the bloody dictator Zia ul-Haq.
Allah is great!
Sources
- Henry St. Amant Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, Oxford University Press, 1999
- Vasili Mitrokhin, The KGB in Afghanistan, Vol. 1, Chapter 7
- Internal Soviet intelligence documents, Vol. 3 – Pakistan, Chapter 5
- Raja Anwar, The Terrorist Prince: The Life and Death of Murtaza Bhutto
- Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History
- John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, Penguin, 2005
- KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82, Mitrokhin Archive, Wilson Center Digital Archive
Next: Part 8: Inside the Camps
Download the original report: Running to Disaster, Volume II: Operation Dinner Out (PDF). The 2024 report this part is drawn from, which covers Parts 3 to 8 of this series.
The Running to Disaster Series
- Part 1: Roots of Radicalization
- Part 2: The Alphabet of Jihad
- Part 3: Operation: Dinner Out
- Part 4: The KGB’s Active Measures
- Part 5: Afghanistan, 1978–1979
- Part 6: Pakistan in the KGB’s Crosshairs
- Part 7: Al-Zulfiqar and the Covert War (you are here)
- Part 8: Inside the Camps
