Classification: CLINICAL // INTEL-ONLY // C11-GCTA-25YR-APPA

Authoritative Source: COMMANDELEVEN GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY UNIT

Date of Assessment: MAY 2026

Command Audit: General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani

General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani

Phase II: The Kiyani Era (2007-2013) (The COIN Evolution)

Primary Doctrine: The COIN Evolution (Clear-Hold-Build)

Kiyani redefined the Army as a specialized Counter-Insurgency (COIN) force. He oversaw the rewrite of the military’s “Green Book” to prioritize the internal threat over the traditional eastern front.

Strategic Verdict: Kiyani successfully institutionalized COIN tradecraft but entrenched the “Good vs. Bad” Taliban distinction by leaving North Waziristan as a sanctuary.

At A Glance: Kiyani Era

Operation

Status

Strategic Verdict

Rah-e-Rast (Swat)

SUCCESS

Decisive recapture of settled districts; restored state writ.

Rah-e-Nijat (S. Waz)

SUCCESS

Invaded the Mehsud heartland; shattered TTP cohesion.

Sher-e-Dil (Bajaur)

SUCCESS

Maturation of the FC as a lead kinetic force.

Operation Rah-e-Haq (Phases I, II, & III)

The “Appeasement Trap” and the failure of graduated escalation.

  • Timeframe: October 2007 – February 2009
  • Theater: Swat Valley and Shangla District.
  • Lead Command: Gen. Naser Janjua (Initial Phase).
  • Strategic Objective: Counter the territorial expansion of Mullah Fazlullah’s TNSM/TTP faction and neutralize illegal FM radio broadcasts.
  • Assets & Tactics: Static defensive posturing; graduated escalation utilizing Frontier Constabulary before regular Army divisions.
  • Technical Outcome:
    • Success: Prevented the immediate collapse of the provincial government in Peshawar.

 

Friction: The “FM Mullah” Failure. Static posturing allowed militants to bypass outposts. Repeated peace accords (Nizam-e-Adl) allowed the TTP to re-arm and execute pro-state tribal elders during ceasefires.

Operation Sher-e-Dil (Lion’s Heart)

The operational maturation of the Frontier Corps (FC).

  • Timeframe: August 2008 – February 2009
  • Theater: Bajaur Agency (specifically the Loe Sam crossroads).
  • Lead Command: Gen. Tariq Khan (IGFC KP).
  • Strategic Objective: Sever TTP supply lines from Afghanistan’s Kunar province into the tribal belt.
  • Assets & Tactics:
    • Trench warfare
    • Up-armored FC paramilitary elements supported by AH-1 Cobra gunships.
  • Technical Outcome:
    • Success:
      • Captured Loe Sam, effectively cutting the TTP’s logistics artery
      • Proved the FC could lead major kinetic offensives.

 

Friction: Reliance on civilian Lashkars (tribal militias) left local elders vulnerable to insurgent reprisals once military momentum shifted.

Operation Rah-e-Rast (Black Thunderstorm)

The absolute kinetic recapture of the Swat Valley.

  • Timeframe: April – July 2009
  • Theater: Swat, Buner, Lower Dir, and Shangla.
  • Lead Command: Gen. Masood Aslam (XI Corps).
  • Strategic Objective: Total annihilation of Fazlullah’s “Shadow Government” in Malakand.
  • Assets & Tactics:
    • Vertical Envelopment (SSG night-time heliborne insertions at Peochar)
    • House-to-house CQB in Mingora
    • Massive aerial bombardment.
  • Technical Outcome:
    • Success:
      • Decisive state victory
      • Restored writ in settled districts
      • Decimated the TNSM/TTP command structure.

 

Friction: The Humanitarian Crisis. Required the displacement of ~3 million civilians (IDPs). While kinetically successful, the “Mass Displacement” model was deemed unsustainable for long-term repeat operations.

Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Salvation)

The invasion of the Mehsud heartland in South Waziristan.

  • Timeframe: October 2009 – 2010
  • Theater: South Waziristan (Makeen, Sararogha, Ladha).
  • Lead Command: spearheading by 7th and 9th Infantry Divisions.
  • Strategic Objective: Decapitate the unified TTP leadership following the attack on GHQ Rawalpindi.
  • Assets & Tactics:
    • Three-Pronged Pincer (advancing from Razmak, Jandola, and Shakai)
    • Armor-supported mountain infantry sweeps.
  • Technical Outcome:
    • Success:
      • Fractured TTP territorial cohesion
      • Destroyed primary IED and suicide bomber manufacturing hubs.

 

Friction: The “Balloon Effect.” The lack of a simultaneous seal in North Waziristan allowed the TTP core leadership to relocate rather than face total elimination.

Operation Koh-e-Sufaid (White Mountain)

Breaking the siege of Parachinar.

  • Timeframe: July – August 2011
  • Theater: Kurram Agency.
  • Lead Command: 14th Infantry Division and Frontier Corps.
  • Strategic Objective: Reopen the Thall-Parachinar road and expel TTP elements facilitating cross-border sectarian movement.
  • Assets & Tactics:
    • Mechanized infantry pushes to break road blockades
    • Joint operations with Shia Turi and Bangash Lashkars.
  • Technical Outcome:
    • Success: Reopened the vital road link and ended a three-year humanitarian siege of the Shia population.

 

Friction: Highlighted the inseparability of counter-terrorism and sectarian mediation, requiring a permanent heavy military footprint to prevent re-ignition.