Home » Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Operations Since GWOT (2001-2026) » Appendix A: Military Operation Briefs » General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani
Kiyani redefined the Army as a specialized Counter-Insurgency (COIN) force. He oversaw the rewrite of the military’s “Green Book” to prioritize the internal threat over the traditional eastern front.
Strategic Verdict: Kiyani successfully institutionalized COIN tradecraft but entrenched the “Good vs. Bad” Taliban distinction by leaving North Waziristan as a sanctuary.
Operation | Status | Strategic Verdict |
Rah-e-Rast (Swat) | SUCCESS | Decisive recapture of settled districts; restored state writ. |
Rah-e-Nijat (S. Waz) | SUCCESS | Invaded the Mehsud heartland; shattered TTP cohesion. |
Sher-e-Dil (Bajaur) | SUCCESS | Maturation of the FC as a lead kinetic force. |
The “Appeasement Trap” and the failure of graduated escalation.
Friction: The “FM Mullah” Failure. Static posturing allowed militants to bypass outposts. Repeated peace accords (Nizam-e-Adl) allowed the TTP to re-arm and execute pro-state tribal elders during ceasefires.
The operational maturation of the Frontier Corps (FC).
Friction: Reliance on civilian Lashkars (tribal militias) left local elders vulnerable to insurgent reprisals once military momentum shifted.
The absolute kinetic recapture of the Swat Valley.
Friction: The Humanitarian Crisis. Required the displacement of ~3 million civilians (IDPs). While kinetically successful, the “Mass Displacement” model was deemed unsustainable for long-term repeat operations.
The invasion of the Mehsud heartland in South Waziristan.
Friction: The “Balloon Effect.” The lack of a simultaneous seal in North Waziristan allowed the TTP core leadership to relocate rather than face total elimination.
Breaking the siege of Parachinar.
Friction: Highlighted the inseparability of counter-terrorism and sectarian mediation, requiring a permanent heavy military footprint to prevent re-ignition.