Al Qaeda Aviation Threat: What the FBI-DHS-TSA Warning Means for US Air Travel

Airliner schematic with targeting rings, headed Al Qaeda Aviation Threat

CommandEleven Intelligence Desk // Counter-Terrorism Desk, status as of November 22, 2026

Bottom Line Up Front

On Thursday, November 19, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration told US airlines, air cargo carriers and airports that al Qaeda affiliates and supporters are praising September’s attempted hijacking of flydubai Flight FZ1073 and urging others to copy it. A law enforcement source told CNN there is no known specific, credible plot.

CommandEleven Intelligence assesses that the calls are real, repeated and escalating, and that the most likely form of any attempt is a single inspired individual with insider access to aircraft or airports, not a coordinated multi-aircraft plot. That is a warning about direction, not a forecast of a date. The window of greatest exposure is the Thanksgiving travel period, when about 6 million people are expected to fly in the United States between November 24 and November 30.

Key Judgments

  1. CONFIRMED. The FBI, DHS and TSA sent an informational report to the aviation industry on November 19 describing al Qaeda-linked messaging that praises the FZ1073 attack and encourages similar attacks against US, Israeli and Jewish interests. We have CNN’s account of the report. The report itself has not been published.
  2. CONFIRMED, as alleged by UAE prosecutors. The co-pilot of FZ1073 began carrying out a premeditated plot to seize the aircraft and crash it into the passenger terminal at Ben Gurion Airport, according to the UAE Attorney General. He told investigators he acted alone. Prosecutors are still checking that claim.
  3. CONFIRMED. Publications praising the attack and urging copies appeared repeatedly between early and late October, moving from a pro-al Qaeda supporter weekly to affiliate outlets and, according to one specialist’s record, to al Qaeda’s central media.
  4. ASSESSED. Al Qaeda is lowering the bar. The message to supporters is that one person and one aircraft is enough. That moves the risk from plots that security services can disrupt to individuals already inside the system.
  5. ASSESSED. There is no public evidence that the FZ1073 co-pilot was directed by any group. UAE prosecutors say he drew inspiration from the September 11 attacks. We therefore do not call him al Qaeda-inspired.
  6. ASSESSED. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State pursue different strategies. Al Qaeda aims for the spectacular, such as aircraft. ISIS aims for the highest body count, and the US case record since October 2025 shows ISIS-linked plots aimed at ordinary gathering places.
  7. ASSESSED. Islamic State’s al-Naba newsletter also urged supporters to carry out similar attacks, about two days after the FZ1073 attempt. This rests on CommandEleven Intelligence’s monitoring of ISIS propaganda channels. We do not hold an issue number.
  8. ASSESSED. The public warning is itself being recycled as propaganda. According to Dr. Sara Harmouch, an al Qaeda-aligned outlet, Fursan al-Aqidah, republished CNN’s report of the warning in Arabic within about a day, under a “Breaking” banner and a photograph of the September 11 attacks.

What the Joint Report Says

According to CNN, which obtained a copy, the FBI, DHS and TSA jointly sent an informational report to commercial airlines, air cargo carriers and airports. This was an industry notice, not a public alert. Its main points:

  • Al Qaeda affiliates and supporters “have released multiple messages praising the attempted hijacking” and encouraging similar attacks against perceived US, Israeli and Jewish interests.
  • The messaging “reiterates longstanding AQ narratives” that urge supporters to exploit aviation access, evade security and use commercial aircraft in attacks. Several messages held up the FZ1073 attempt as a model for bypassing security.
  • People inspired by foreign terrorist organizations have historically not mobilized in direct response to such calls, but they have shown they can mobilize rapidly with little or no warning.
  • Ongoing hostilities in the Middle East could worsen existing grievances against the United States.
  • Industry staff are asked to watch for four indicators and to contact law enforcement promptly (listed under Warning Signs below).

CommandEleven Intelligence has not seen the report itself. We cite CNN’s reporting of it and will update this assessment if the report is published.

Flydubai FZ1073: What Prosecutors Allege

On September 30, flydubai Flight FZ1073, a Boeing 737 MAX 8 flying from Dubai to Tel Aviv with roughly 180 people aboard, was diverted to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, after an assault in the cockpit.

On October 9, the UAE Attorney General, Dr. Hamad Saif Al Shamsi, announced the findings of the Public Prosecution’s investigation. As reported by the state news agency WAM:

  • The co-pilot, a 29-year-old Omani national identified in media reports as Hamam al-Hammami, had begun a premeditated plot to seize the aircraft and use it in a suicide attack on the Ben Gurion Airport passenger terminal.
  • He allegedly used two earlier flights to Tel Aviv to familiarize himself with the route and the airport, and began carrying out the plan on his third.
  • Signs of extremism appeared in 2017, while he was studying in Australia. He drew inspiration from the September 11 attacks, and the idea of a similar operation became tied to his decision to pursue an aviation career.
  • He worked for Oman Air from 2020 to 2024, Royal Air Maroc in early 2025, and flydubai from January 2026.
  • He allegedly attacked the captain with an emergency axe. A pilot assigned to the return flight, who was aboard, noticed the cockpit door opening and closing unusually, entered, and with a cabin crew member and passengers restrained him. The return-flight crew landed the aircraft at Tabuk.
  • In a confession given with his lawyer present, he said he acted alone. Investigators are verifying that, and examining possible accomplices.
  • The prosecution alleges that, in Melbourne, he regularly attended a mosque affiliated with a local university and met people connected to a center that, according to his statement, received support from an association linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. This is the UAE’s allegation, based on his own account, and has not been independently verified.

Where accounts differ. The Washington Post reports that the captain himself opened the cockpit door, which allowed passengers in. The UAE account has the return-flight pilot entering with the access code. Reports also differ on his history at Oman Air: ABC News reported he was found with extremist material in 2024 and moved to an administrative role, while another person familiar with the matter told the Post he was blocked from flying because of radical views. Both are attributed to unnamed sources.

What no source has established. The AP reported that investigators have found no connection to a militant group so far. Israeli security officials, according to Ynet, believe he radicalized and acted on his own. Israel’s prime minister has said Israel is investigating whether he was sent by others.

The Calls to Copy It

Between early and late October, a series of publications praised the FZ1073 attack. The dates below come from specialist Dr. Sara Harmouch’s published record. Only the first item is independently reported by news outlets; we have not reviewed the others ourselves.

Date (2026)OutletType
Oct 2-3al-BayanPro-al Qaeda supporter weekly, launched in July
Oct 8al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Affiliate
Oct 11Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Saad al-AwlakiAffiliate leader
Oct 13al-ShabaabAffiliate
Oct 20AQAP, Ibrahim al-QosiAffiliate
Oct 26Al Qaeda central media, Awab al-HasaniCore organization

Al-Bayan is a supporter publication, not an official al Qaeda outlet. The issue linked September 11, 2001 with September 30, 2026, and warned that aircraft carrying Americans and Israelis could still be struck. It was reported removed the next day. We do not reproduce its imagery.

Dr. Harmouch’s reading is that the messaging climbed from a supporter weekly to al Qaeda’s central media in 26 days, and that the October 26 piece told readers to copy the pilot and “consult no one” and argued that a single plane is enough. We credit her analysis by name as one source among several and have not verified the central-media text ourselves.

The warning itself has become propaganda. On November 21, Dr. Harmouch reported that Fursan al-Aqidah, an al Qaeda-aligned outlet, republished CNN’s account of the joint report in Arabic within about a day. By her description, the post carried a “Breaking” banner and a photograph of the September 11 attacks, and told readers that US agencies had warned airlines and airports of al Qaeda calls to target American, Israeli and Jewish interests, with about six million people expected to fly over the holiday. We have not independently reviewed the post and do not reproduce it. CommandEleven Intelligence assesses that the warning is now being used as an amplifier: it lets supporters present the US government’s alarm as proof that the calls are working, and ties them to September 11 imagery. That is a reason to expect the warning to circulate in these channels. It is not evidence that a plot is under way.

Why Aviation, and Why Now

Aviation has been al Qaeda’s signature target for more than 30 years. The 1995 Bojinka plot, planned against airliners over the Pacific by a network that included the future architect of 9/11, was derailed before it could be carried out. The September 11 attacks followed after roughly five years of planning, from concept to execution. NCTC’s own review of post-9/11 aviation plots lists the December 2001 shoe-bomb attempt, the 2006 liquid-explosives plot against transatlantic flights, the 2009 underwear-bomb attempt and the 2010 printer-cartridge cargo plot.

What has changed is the model. Large, patient, centrally commanded plots demand infrastructure that has been under sustained pressure. A single insider with a pilot’s license, or with access to aircraft, uniforms or ramp areas, needs almost none. FZ1073 gave supporters a worked example, with a dramatic near-miss and a pilot profile that passed a standard background check. The calls that followed are an attempt to turn that example into a template. This is the strategic logic, not a prediction of method or date.

It also helps to keep the difficulty in view. A successful aircraft attack remains hard to achieve. The FZ1073 attempt failed because a crew member and passengers intervened.

Al Qaeda and ISIS: Two Strategies, One Threat Picture

Al Qaeda has always favored the spectacular: fewer, larger, symbolic attacks, with aviation at the top of the list. The Islamic State has historically pursued body count, and has shown it can strike ordinary places in many countries.

In CommandEleven Intelligence’s reporting through 2025 and 2026, including our Soft Targets America and Survival Dispatch coverage, we tracked a coordinated, command-directed attack design and then a visible shift toward smaller, local attacks on soft targets. The public case record since October 2025 is consistent with that shift:

  • Dearborn, Michigan (October 31, 2025). The FBI announced arrests over a Halloween-weekend plot. Two men were first charged with firearms offenses tied to terrorism. On November 5, 2025, an amended complaint charged all three defendants, including a third man arrested that day, with conspiring to provide material support to ISIS. A federal grand jury then indicted all three in mid-November 2025 on two counts: conspiracy to provide material support to ISIS, and conspiracy to receive and transfer firearms and ammunition knowing they would be used in a federal crime of terrorism. The charges are allegations. We found no public report of a verdict.
  • Minnesota (October 6-7, 2026). An 18-year-old was arrested and charged after a complaint alleged he planned a mass shooting at the Mall of America and pledged allegiance to ISIS in a video. According to the US Attorney’s Office, an undercover FBI employee supplied a rifle the FBI had rendered inert. This is also an allegation.

An assessed indicator in public rhetoric. We also note, as one indicator and nothing more, circulated remarks by US-based imams advocating a long-term, non-violent “strategic jihad” in place of violent jihad in America. CommandEleven Intelligence terms this soft jihad. Rhetoric is not operations. We do not claim these speakers are directed by, or connected to, either plot. We cite the remarks because a shift in operational method and a shift in public language can reflect the same underlying calculation that violence on US soil is counterproductive. One example, circulated in September 2026 and described in our post on X of September 14, had an imam at the Islamic Center of Brushy Creek in Austin, Texas, argue that violent jihad in America would harm the Muslim community and advocate a long-term, nonviolent “strategic jihad.” We cite it according to the circulated remarks and have not independently verified the full context.

The Insider and Vetting Gap

The FZ1073 case turns on screening. The UAE says the co-pilot met flydubai’s professional and security requirements, with nothing in the checks showing extremist views or intent. A Gulf diplomat told the Associated Press the checks appeared to focus on criminal convictions. Israeli officials told Ynet that data on crew arriving on foreign flights had not been retrieved or checked for about two years.

The lesson is general. Checks that look for criminal records do not look for radicalization, and the joint report’s four indicators are all behaviors that a record check cannot see. Aviation employers, contractors and vendors are the first line of detection.

What US Counterterrorism Officials Have Said

Two dated public items bear on this threat. We note the sequence and draw no conclusion from it.

  • NCTC/JCAT product (2025). Al-Qa’ida’s Recent Calls to Conduct Attacks in the US Highlights Its Enduring Threat to Public Safety is an unclassified Spotlight in NCTC’s Counterterrorism Digest, provided by the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT). It is undated but references events through July 2025. It reviews al Qaeda’s post-9/11 aviation plots, says recent target themes match them, and recommends monitoring those themes, while also noting that current calls did not specifically target aviation. NCTC describes JCAT products as developed by fellows working alongside intelligence analysts from NCTC, DHS and the FBI.
  • Congressional testimony (December 2025). At the House Homeland Security Committee’s Worldwide Threats hearing, then-NCTC Director Joe Kent said there were “18,000 known and suspected terrorists in the country right now.” The figure was not broken down between known and suspected, and we have not independently verified it.

Warning Signs to Watch For

These are general indicators drawn from the FBI/DHS/TSA report, CommandEleven Intelligence’s May 2025 threat assessment, and our Survival Dispatch and Soft Targets America coverage. No single item is evidence of a plot. Report concerns to local law enforcement, the airline or TSA.

Aviation (FBI/DHS/TSA report)

  1. Someone trying to test or avoid security procedures.
  2. Someone with no business reason asking for detailed flight-operations or security information.
  3. Someone insisting on handling specific bags without help.
  4. Unexplained loss of airline radios, access badges or uniforms.

Pre-attack surveillance

  1. The same non-employee near a building, repeatedly photographing or filming it.
  2. Drone flights over a site, especially at odd hours.
  3. Visits that look like testing the response, not ordinary use.

Radicalization

  1. Public endorsement of violence, especially online.
  2. Sudden withdrawal from social circles.
  3. Sudden extreme rhetoric or new associations with extremist groups.

Insider and access

  1. Contractors, vendors or new hires who need closer vetting.
  2. Someone out of place who won’t introduce themselves, or who breaches access to secure areas.
  3. Modified or unfamiliar uniforms and credentials.
  4. Recent work in building systems that nobody has verified.
  5. Unmonitored entry points (emergency rooms, loading docks, parking structures) used without alerting security.
  6. Unfamiliar vehicles reaching restricted access points without screening.

Soft-target posture

  1. Greeters or staff at entrances who notice people reacting oddly to being greeted.
  2. For responders: treat staging areas and approach routes as targets in their own right.
Reference card listing 18 warning signs for aviation workers, building staff and first responders

What To Watch

  • Further publications from al Qaeda affiliates or central media invoking aviation, especially any that move from praise to instruction.
  • Any UAE announcement on accomplices or the claim that the co-pilot acted alone.
  • Whether the joint report is published, or whether TSA or DHS change their public posture.
  • Reports of lost or stolen airline badges, radios or uniforms.
  • Copycat attempts anywhere, including failed ones. Each shows whether the call is converting into action.
  • Further reuse of the US warning in jihadist channels, and whether it is paired with new calls.

What This Assessment Does and Doesn’t Establish

It establishes that federal agencies have warned the aviation industry, that al Qaeda-linked outlets have repeatedly urged copies of the FZ1073 attack, and that the public record shows ISIS-linked plots against ordinary gathering places.

It does not establish that any plot against US aviation exists. Officials say there is no known specific, credible threat. It does not establish that the FZ1073 co-pilot was directed by any group, that the Muslim Brotherhood-linked association alleged by the UAE played any operational role, or that the imam remarks above are connected to any attack. It does not establish the accuracy of the 18,000 figure. And it does not predict that supporters will act on the calls. The joint report itself notes that inspired individuals have historically not acted directly on such calls.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the FBI, DHS and TSA warn about?

They told the aviation industry that al Qaeda affiliates and supporters are praising the FZ1073 attempt and urging similar attacks, and they listed behavioral indicators for staff.

Is there a specific plot against US flights?

Not that officials have publicly identified. A law enforcement source told CNN there are no known specific and credible threats.

Was the flydubai attack an al Qaeda operation?

No public evidence says so. UAE prosecutors say the co-pilot acted alone, inspired by the September 11 attacks, and are verifying that claim.

Why is al Qaeda calling for aviation attacks now?

FZ1073 gave supporters a recent, dramatic example. The calls aim to turn it into a template that needs one person, not a large network.

How do al Qaeda and ISIS strategies differ?

Al Qaeda favors spectacular attacks such as aircraft. ISIS has pursued high body counts and, in the recent US case record, ordinary gathering places.

What should I do if I see something?

Report it to TSA, airline staff, airport police or local law enforcement. Use the warning signs above as a guide, and remember that a single sign is not proof of anything.

Sources

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