Tactical Update: Musharraf-era Whiplash vs. Kiyani-era Surge
A comparative audit of Pakistan’s security doctrine transition, contrasting early kinetic whiplash with the conventional surges of Operation Rah-e-Rast.
Intelligence Assessments
The leaders, decisions, and turning points that shaped today’s conflicts, read through the lens of current security problems.
Back to the Operations CenterA comparative audit of Pakistan’s security doctrine transition, contrasting early kinetic whiplash with the conventional surges of Operation Rah-e-Rast.
A clinical audit of the Malakand conflict (2007–2009), analyzing how shadow logistics and utility interdiction neutralized conventional state sovereignty.
Kalosha 2004: how Pakistan’s conventional assault in South Waziristan failed against guerrilla networks and led to the Shakai accord.
Ours is not the only country in which the military has guns, but is certainly amongst those where the political power continues to flow through their barrel. If that’s what led some of our selectors go down the ladder to find an army chief who would spare their throne, it always backfired: not necessarily because of a bad choice
A retired officer revisits the Ayub era, 1965 and the loss of East Pakistan, and argues Musharraf’s NRO legitimised the corruption now crippling Pakistan.
How the ambitions of Mujib, Bhutto and Yahya Khan turned the 1970 election into civil war, and how India and Manekshaw exploited it to dismember Pakistan.
The political, military and corruption failures behind the US defeat in Afghanistan, why blaming Pakistan fails, and a case for US partnership in CPEC.
Part 1 of a study of Operation Black Thunderstorm: how close KP and FATA came to collapse before 2008, and the forces the Army and FC took into Dir.
Decorated with Hilal-e-Imtiaz, Hilal-e-Imtiaz (Mil), and Sitar-e-Jurat, Lieutenant General Masood Aslam (Retired) served for almost 40 years in the Pakistan Army. He was seriously wounded during the 1971 War with India and was awarded Imtiazi Sanad.
When DawnLeaks happened, the State handled the crisis as best as it could. No one says that it is to everyone’s satisfaction, nevertheless it was resolved with the best of intent. Our DG-ISPR was the messenger and unkind remarks about him are either out of ignorance or malice.