Pakistan’s security situation has long evolved as a consequence of the complex intersection of multiple factors, including geopolitical dilemmas, internal dissension, and history. The recently suggested notion of Pakistan being a hard state—one that prioritises security over other aspects of governance and socio-economic development—is being widely debated in drawing rooms, a select few editorials and op-eds, and YouTube vlogs. The notion came from Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, General Asim Munir, in a parliamentary meeting following the terrorist incident in Balochistan that shook the nation to its core. He said Pakistan had to become a “hard state” to fight militancy and asked how long countless lives would be sacrificed in a soft state and how long governance gaps would be filled by the blood of soldiers and martyrs, as per a Dawn report.
Understanding the Hard State Concept
A hard state relies on hard power and coercion to maintain control and solve security issues, often at the expense of civil liberties and a democratic governance model. In a recent article by Ashraf Jehangir Qazi in Dawn, he explains how Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal introduced the concept of a soft state in his 1968 book Asian Drama. The book states that a soft state is one with weak governance, ineffective law enforcement, and a general lack of discipline in politics and society. This does require the addition of two more facets to a soft (read: failed) state—its crippled justice system and the lack of national support for the government on critical issues, which paves the way for mass-level dissension.
If you read Myrdal’s definition, it resonates strongly with Pakistan’s current situation. Qazi makes a compelling argument that using force to address political challenges is not a sign of strength or a hard state. Rather, it reveals fragility, cleavages in the social fabric, and a plethora of underlying causes. It shows that the state is evading the real issues by resorting to coercion, which should have been a last resort.
Historical Context of Pakistan’s Security Challenges
Pakistan’s security problems stem from its history. The country was born out of a long political struggle that eventually turned into a violent and painful episode, leaving many unresolved problems for a newborn nation. Subsequent conflicts in Kashmir, the 1965 war, and the fall of Dhaka in 1971 further reinforced our reliance on coercive mechanisms to deal with issues—some of which could have been avoided, or perhaps not, but we didn’t try as hard as we could have.
In his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Husain Haqqani notes that the fall of Dhaka heightened our fears of territorial disintegration and further solidified the military’s role in several affairs of the state.
The subsequent conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role as a frontline ally of the US—first against the USSR and later against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda—created numerous problems, the effects of which we are still dealing with today. One does wonder, had we pursued a better and more prudent policy in the 1980s, 1990s, or even later in the war on terror, could this current wave of terrorism have been avoided? But there are so many ifs and buts here.
You cannot ignore that strategic compulsions played a huge role in some of Pakistan’s problematic but fundamental decisions—siding with the West against the USSR and later adopting the role of a frontline ally against terrorism in Afghanistan. But one cannot resist the urge to say that Pakistan has been wrong in many of its decisions, so much so that we cannot rid ourselves of their consequences.
In his book Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Ahmed Rashid states,
“The use of militant proxies for strategic depth has backfired, leading to internal instability.”
The desire to have strategic depth was not inherently flawed, but its implementation miserably failed, ignoring several factors, including the societal norms of Afghanistan.
Contemporary Security Threats
Terrorism and Extremism
Pakistan has faced a persistent wave of terrorism since the early 2000s, following its adoption of the role of the US’s frontline ally in the War on Terror. The irony of this situation is evident in the fact that we provided the US and the West with unprecedented access to our resources and territory, offering extensive assistance and support against the very group we helped build in Afghanistan. That group initially provided us, for the first time, with significant influence in the country. We cultivated them, we nurtured them—but we couldn’t control them. Then 9/11 happened, breaking the back of the strategic depth doctrine.
They turned their weapons against our citizens, law enforcement, mosques, schools, markets, and military. And here we are. During the War on Terror, we failed to limit Indian involvement in Afghanistan, where it played an assistive role for the US and the West. This gave India greater access to Afghan society and anti-Pakistan factions (which have always existed). It allowed India to breed a fresh wave of insurgency in KPK and Balochistan. Our repeated protests against the activities of numerous Indian consulates and establishments fell on deaf ears, and India continued to enjoy immunity for its actions against Pakistan. With the Kashmir front growing cold, India found further breathing space to direct all its attention toward Balochistan. Somehow, the Pakistani establishment felt betrayed by the Americans, and as our paths diverged, the US launched propaganda accusing Pakistan of playing a double game. But what choice did they leave us with? Pakistan began strategizing for a post-US exit from Afghanistan.
During the War on Terror, the Lal Masjid incident triggered a fresh but brutal wave of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged with Indian support, while the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) intensified its activities with constant backing from Indian actors based in Afghanistan and Iran. Pakistan has provided irrefutable evidence of Indian involvement in terrorism against Pakistan, both directly to the Indian Prime Minister at Sharm el-Sheik, Egypt, and to the international community through diplomatic channels.
After the US exit, Pakistan started working on its strategy to create a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan, primarily consisting of the Taliban. This was a success, but we failed to remind ourselves that the current generation of the Taliban is different from the old guard. Moreover, they have their own set of challenges, particularly the growing threat of ISKP, which has deterred Kabul’s Taliban administration from taking decisive action against the TTP. They fear that cracking down on Pakistani Taliban factions could push their personnel and resources toward ISKP.
Then came Pakistan’s then-Prime Minister Imran Khan’s populist but disastrous “absolutely not” jibe, rejecting American bases on Pakistani soil against ISKP and other terrorist factions. This forced the US to seek alternative strategies, including providing direct financial support to Kabul and securing a military presence in Afghanistan. Imagine this— the US now operates a base in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and provides them with hundreds of millions of dollars in support. Meanwhile, India has developed reasonable contact with the Taliban, and China seems to be growing closer to them at a time when Pakistan finds itself increasingly isolated in dealing with Afghanistan and its terrorism problem.
Pakistan’s India Problem
The British left the subcontinent with numerous landmines following their withdrawal from India. One of them was the issue of Kashmir. The last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, enjoyed a close relationship with Jawaharlal Nehru, while his wife had an affair with Nehru. On the other hand, Mountbatten described Jinnah as very cold. As evident from historical records, Jinnah meant only business and did not respond warmly to Mountbatten’s overtures of friendship. The boundary commission clearly favoured India, and in the first war on the Kashmir front, Pakistan’s British forces commander refused to attack Kashmir, leaving us with no option but to arm tribal fighters, who secured some territory for Pakistan.
Subsequent wars, one of which led to half of the country being dismembered and declaring independence, further deepened the animosity between the countries. The early 90s Kashmir liberation movement led to relations becoming almost non-existent today. This compelled Pakistan to overextend its defence expenses, keeping the economy constantly on edge.
Bhutto’s nationalisation broke the backbone of our flourishing private-sector-led economy. Zia’s cultivation of opportunist politicians and the rampant corruption that ensued following the entry of the Sharif clan into politics crippled the economy during the 90s. This was the decade when India and China were opening up their economies to foreign investors, while we kept ours under state control through over-regulation. Now think about this: Zia brought the Sharifs as an antithesis to Bhutto’s socialist economic doctrine, but privatization remained minimal, and state-owned enterprises started bleeding money as PPP and PML-N’s musical chairs of power in the 90s led to mass political appointments in these enterprises. The degradation of Pakistan’s administrative services also stems from this era. The Sharifs, in particular, mastered the art of ruining state institutions—to such an extent that the Pakistani people even accepted a simpleton but politically immature cricketer as a messiah.
You may think that I went off track while talking about Pakistan’s India problem. But to me, the context of our economic deterioration lies at the heart of our problems today.
Fast forward to today—India is part of the G20 and even the G7. It has become the world’s fourth-largest economy, surpassing the UK. It exercises great influence not only over the West (which was relatively close to Pakistan in the past) but, more painfully, also enjoys strong relationships with the Gulf.
All that we are left with is our nuclear deterrence against any Indian attack through conventional means. Meanwhile, India has opened a brutal battleground in asymmetric warfare against Pakistan—and guess what its fuel is? It understands Pakistan’s problems, especially the deprivations of Pakistani youth stemming from our economic situation.
Internal Political Instability
Today, Pakistan’s internal problems stem from the dissension of its youth with the establishment, especially after the extremely unpopular Vote of No Confidence (VONC) and the establishment’s alleged role in it. The success of all-out and soft coups through influence over civilian governments—first through Imran Khan and now the current regime—has further fueled this divide. The situation deteriorated further with the recent crackdown on political dissent and the press, complicating an already fragile security landscape.
Economic and Cybersecurity Concerns
Pakistan’s economic instability has exacerbated its numerous security challenges. Rampant inflation, dwindling foreign exchange reserves, and constant reliance on IMF programs and bilateral grants have severely impacted national economic stability. This has weakened our sovereignty and limited long-term economic planning. In the current environment, misinformation campaigns from hostile actors, mainly India, add yet another layer of trouble.
The Hard State Paradox: Strength or Weakness?
Pakistan’s hard-state approach may ensure a strong defense posture, but will it solve our deeply complicated problems? The prioritization of coercive measures over political and social solutions has already led to significant underinvestment in education, health, and economic reforms. The overbloated federal and provincial governments consume a major portion of the budget every year.
According to the UNDP, Pakistan spends only 2.5% of its GDP on education, significantly lower than its regional counterparts.
As Dr. Maleeha Lodhi emphasizes the importance of good governance:
“The major difference between successful states and struggling states was governance.”
What Pakistan needs most is governance that earns the trust of its people—not heavy-handed coercion by the state. The suppression of civil liberties and the lack of democratic evolution create serious governance challenges. This makes it imperative for Pakistan to reassess its hard-state approach.
