Summary

The article published by Sebastian Rotella from ProPublica is nothing more than a breakdown of the massive intelligence failure prior to Mumbai in 2008. What Rotella presents is nothing more than an attempt to draw connections based on information gathered from various media outlets, unnamed sources in the US intelligence community, and the interrogation/testimony of David Coleman Headley to connect him directly with the ISI in the Mumbai attack and another attack planned for Denmark against the newspaper that published the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

Bullet Point Analysis:

  • Massive intelligence failure by the US, UK and India
  • Knew of Headley (multiple reports since 2001) and the Mumbai plot (multiple alerts from CIA & FBI) but no one acted and no one connected information
  • Numerous names of “ISI” and “Pakistan Army” officers included in the report for effect to connect the Mumbai plot to an overreaching attempt by the Pakistan Army and ISI to derail the relationship between India and Pakistan, even if it resulted in war
  • Headley’s entire story from Hasanabdal Cadet College to the suburbs of Chicago seems very far-fetched. If you were crafting a cover identity for an operative, this would not be it. Even the police forces in the cities of the United States don’t trust drug addicts for honest testimony because they can be impeached on the stand, yet somehow the DEA used Headley for some time as an informant, while he was still actively addicted to heroin.
  • The ease at which he meets Hafiz Saeed and Ilyas Kashmiri is too good to be true. He meets Saeed, as a relative unknown in LeT, and starts recruiting and fund raising for LeT in the US?
  • Multiple references to Major Iqbal and other members of Pakistan’s security establishment not being arrested even though they have been convicted in absentia in the US courts. They claim that this shows complicity of the ISI and Pakistan Army in the attacks.
  • Is nothing more than an attempt to malign the Pakistan Army and continue to connect the ISI with terrorist organizations attacking India
  • No explanation of how Headley was able to escape capture by CIA, GCHQ, FBI, MI6, or RAW with multiple reports and alerts about him before Mumbai

Potential Threat Assessment:

Understanding that this group has links to Democratic party representatives and Senators:

  • It would not be unthinkable to see this information cited to stop the sale of $1 billion in weapons to Pakistan in the US House of Representatives and Senate
  • It would not be unthinkable to see this information cited to put pressure on the government to “reign in the ‘rogue’ ISI”
  • It would not be unthinkable to see this information cited in the international media to further paint Pakistan as a terrorist state with its armed forces actively supporting terrorist organizations, using US taxpayer money
  • It would not be unthinkable that this information would be distributed to other allies of the United States to justify aid cutbacks to the government and military

Timing:

  • This “revised” report comes less than 2 weeks after the State Department approves a $1 billion arms sale to Pakistan
  • This past Sunday, The Wall Street Journal ran an op-ed article from Husain Haqqani stating similar points as a reason to not sell the arms to the Army because they will be used against India.
  • One week ago, on the same day the State Department announced the arms sale approval, the New York Times ran an editorial stating that Pakistan was a rogue state with an out of control nuclear weapons program and must be reigned in, whereas India was a peaceful nation that would never consider using nuclear weapons.

Who is ProPublica?

ProPublica, on their website, presents themselves as a non-profit organization dedicated to investigative journalism. Their founders are from The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times, both known for their anti-Pakistan military positions. In addition, they receive funding from The Sandler Foundation. The Sandler Foundation is known for it’s financial support to organizations like ProPublica, the Center for American Progress, the Center for Responsible Lending, Human Rights Watch, the American Civil Liberties Union and a number of research organization for diseases and basic science.

It should be noted that the Center for American Progress is a pro-Democratic party public policy and advocacy organization, a lobbyist organization. They are heavily left-leaning in their worldview.

This is pointed out to understand the biases and foundational interpretations in the article being analyzed.

Timeline:

  • American authorities and the intelligence community knew of David Headley well before the Mumbai attacks and are complicit in “misplacing him,” even though they were told on numerous occasions that he was a threat – “terrorist, drug dealer, spy” was the description given to the CT officials at the US Embassy in Islamabad
  • Zarrar Shah, named as Lashkar-e-Taiba’s technology chief, was being tracked by GCHQ in the UK from the fall of 2008. He was also being tracked by RAW because of his connection to LeT. The US intel community was unaware of these organizations monitoring.
  • GCHQ had a massive amount of data on Shah, but they claim not specific to detect the actual threat. RAW says the didn’t know even with all the alerts from the CIA & NSA
  • Apparently, Sajad Mir and Major Iqbal told Headley that his relationship with her would jeopardize his cover. In December 2007, she filed assault charges against him and he was arrested. Major Iqbal got him freed, according to a RAW report.
  • Headley was reported to the US embassy CT team (Dec ’07, Jan & Apr ’08) by his wife, Faiza Outalha, who called him a terrorist, drug dealer, and spy. She told the CT team of his connection to LeT and the trip to Taj Hotel in 2006-2007. US CT said her warnings weren’t specific enough and that angry spouses make bogus allegations. The allegations were reported to the CIA, FBI & DEA (the organization that originally used him as an asset).
  • US intel says that they (CIA & FBI) knew of the Mumbai plot and warned RAW several times (6 times) in the months prior to the attack. Urgent and specific warnings that the Taj hotel was the target.
  • “No one put together the whole picture,” said Shivshankar Menon, who was India’s foreign secretary at the time of the attacks and later became the national security adviser. “Not the Americans, not the Brits, not the Indians.”
  • It was only after the shooting started in Mumbai that all the pieces from the intel organizations were connected
  • US CT officials (unnamed) say that he was not a double agent, but had enough information to “become concerned, monitor him and pick up fragments of intelligence” that contributed to the warnings to India
  • According to ProPublica, Major Iqbal chose the target and wanted to ensure that Americans and Jews would die. They are key to point out “an officer in a military that has received billions of dollars from the United States.”
  • Attacks painted as an attempt by hard-line ISI officers and militants to torpedo attempts at rapprochement between India and Pakistan and “fortify the group’s (LeT) global image.” (this is a statement from Headley.)
  • US CT says the dimensions and duration of the plot make it hard to believe high-ranking ISI officials were not aware of it. Charles Faddis, former CIA CT Chief, said, “it’s going to be sanctioned at a pretty senior level.”
  • Mir sent Headley an SMS saying “turn on your television” on the night of 26 Nov, 2008. ProPublica says that the gunmen had never been to India and were guided by Headley’s videos, written reports, GPS coordinates and work with a Pakistan Navy frogman on the maritime approach.
  • Mir orchestrated the slaughter by phone from a command post in Karachi. Calls were intercepted by RAW and have been broadcast in international television reports.
  • Headley’s Pakistani wife, who had moved to Chicago in Sept. 08, sent him a “celebratory email.” She knew of the recon and praised him using coded language. “Congrats on your graduation” is the quote from the email.
  • Oct 08 Major Iqbal and Mir visited him at home because they wanted to take the holy war to Europe. They assigned him to scout the Jyllands-Posten newspaper in Denmark for publishing cartoons of the Prophet.
  • Headley traveled to Chicago in Dec ’08 to visit his family. He was made aware that another person had gone to the FBI to report his involvement with LeT. Tipster told FBI on Dec 01, ’08, that Headley’s mother had told her years earlier that Headley was fighting alongside militants in Pakistan. FBI found warnings dating back to 2001.
  • Dec 21, ’08, FBI interviews Farid Gilani, Headley’s cousin in Philadelphia. He told FBI Headley is in Pakistan and then immediately called Headley in Chicago to warn him. Headley then sent an email to a “militant” in Pakistan saying that the FBI interest was “just routine” because of what his 2nd wife had told the US CT team at the embassy
  • Headley went to Copenhagen, Denmark mid Jan ’09 to scout the Jyllands-Posten newspaper, before returning to Pakistan in March.
  • Headley had grown tired of LeT and shifted to al Qaeda with the help of a former Army major, Abderrehman Syed, who had left Lashkar.
  • Headley testified Abderrehman Syed said “They (LeT) was conducting ISI’s jihad and we should conduct God’s jihad.”
  • Abderrehman Syed retained his contacts with an ISI colonel who had been his handler. Syed became Headley’s last handler and introduced him to Ilyas Kasmiri, who took over sponsorship of the Denmark plot.
  • Kashmiri gave Headley the names of militants in Britain and Sweden who could help with funds and weapons. Said gunmen should carry about a Mumbai-style attack on the newspaper. He also wanted them to behead hostages and throw the heads out of the windows
  • Headley returned to Chicago summer ’09 to prepare for 2nd recon of Denmark
  • Headley communicated with 2 al Qaeda operatives in Britain referred by Kashmiri
  • July, 09, British intel notified the FBI of his upcoming visit to UK. 23 July, FBI notified US Customs and Border Patrol. Headley was able to leave the country again.
  • 26 July, Headley meets with Simon and Bash in Derby. They refuse to participate in the attack nor supply weapons. They give him $15,000 to finance the plot.
  • Headley traveled to Stockholm to meet Farid, a veteran militant. Farid shunned him because Swedish police had him (Headley) under tight surveillance.
  • 31 July, Headley traveled to Copenhagen where Danish intelligence took up the surveillance.
  • 5 Aug, returned to Chicago via Atlanta. Airport inspectors questioned him but released so FBI could continue surveillance.
  • 6 Oct, FBI arrests Headley at Chicago O’Hare headed for Pakistan with his videos of Denmark.
  • Headley spoke for 15 days to the FBI giving evidence on LeT, ISI, al Qaeda, plots, targets, leaders, and methods. Tried to lure Mir out of Pakistan for an arrest in Germany, but failed.
  • Headley turned on Rana, old class fellow from Hasanabdal Cadet College, revealing that he had used his immigration firm as over for Mumbai and Denmark.