South Asian strategic environment is shaped by power struggle between India & Pakistan in lieu of People’s Republic of China. For Islamabad, Nuclear weapons are key aspect of attaining strategic stability against New Delhi. India’s quantitative edge in conventional forces is counter balanced by Pakistan’s qualitative approach related to development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Both states, under the pressure of achieving upper hand in South Asian strategic environment are engaged in conventional as well as nuclear arms race one way or another. Nuclear arms race in South Asia involves the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as advancement in their delivery systems. Though India is extensively working on development of Ballistic Missile Shield comprising of indigenous as well as off the shelf purchases of missile defense systems, but due to geographic constraints & several other factors, BMDs still counts little in South Asian strategic environment particularity after development of long range stand-off munitions as well as multiple independent targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) by Pakistan. Continuous nuclear proliferation in South Asia raises a credible question, are both India & Pakistan heading towards the situation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)?

MAD is not a new term in strategic studies as it was extensively discussed during Cold war era. Since pretty much nuclear parity still exists between United States & Russia, thus this term is still valid & may find another axis i.e. South Asia, other than classical Washington vs Moscow example. A glimpse at modernizing plans of India and Pakistan points out that these states are also heading towards the same path which was once followed by Soviet Union and United States.

Mutual Assured Destruction can be defined as the condition in which both rival nuclear armed states have capability to conduct massive first as well as second nuclear strike leading to destruction of both states on massive scale. It’s like ‘’reversible’’ massive retaliation. Just like Massive Retaliation, MAD also involves striking counter force in addition to counter value targets of adversary. Even today, despite of superiority of United States in conventional grounds, pretty much parity exist in nuclear forces between USA & Russia. Hence condition of MAD is still alive. USA is conducting extensive Research & Development related to development & integration of credible Missile Defense Shield.

This shield, consisting of multilayer defense interception systems, ground based radars & passive sensors, satellites, early warning systems integrated with each other and run by advance command & control systems, in near future will be able to dissolve the risk of MAD at least from American perspective. Russians have responded in similar fashion but their technology is not as advance, integrated & comprehensive as that of Americans.

Thus, Moscow still follows the path of MIRV based ICBMs and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW) with hostile doctrinal posture. Along-side, it has focused to achieve advancement related to SEAD (Suppressing Enemy Air Defense) and DEAD (Destroying Enemy Air Defense). These measures & counter measures justify the security dilemma which still exist between both arch rivals to this day, with MAD at focal point.

For MAD to exist, following conditions must fulfill:

1. Rival States must have sufficient stockpile of operational nuclear warheads.
2. Number of warheads & their destructive power is linked with geographical facts & figures. Bigger the enemy, more warheads will be needed. Mountainous terrains receive less damage from nuclear strike compared to plain or desert terrains. In case of Soviet Union & United States, both states have large land mass and are also geographically apart. For complete destruction of counter force & counter value assets of both states, a large number of nuclear weapons were needed. And both USSR & USA possessed and still possess enough nuclear stock pile to carry out this role, thus fulfill this criterium.
3. Antagonists must have credible delivery systems for carrying those warheads. In case of USSR & USA, most eminent delivery mode was (still is) Inter Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) for overcoming the geographical large distance between both. These ICBMs are installed in land based fixed silos, mobile launchers called TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher) in addition to SSBM (Nuclear Ballistic Submarines). Along-side, Washington raised numerous off shore air force bases for housing long range strategic bombers which could carry & deliver nuclear payload, thus completing nuclear triad. Soviet Union followed the same approach, however it focused less on offshore bases and relied on its own geographical periphery for establishment of military bases of nuclear strategic importance.
4. Both States must have assured second strike capability and that capability must be sufficient enough to retaliate massively. Otherwise the responding state will not beable to strike back as hard as the aggressor state first strike, hence losing the meaning of ‘’mutual’’ in concept of Mutual Assured Destruction.
5. Another condition includes a robust command & control system which can survive the first strike and still properly manipulate own strategic assets through-out the nuclear conflict. An advance early warning & alert system can allow to build up capacity of ‘’launch on strike’’ which involves the detection of hostile missile launch & launching of own strategic missiles before that upcoming enemy missile could hit its assigned target.
6. An aggressive doctrinal posture, particularly which involves the threat of massive retaliation also paves the way for Mutual Assured Destruction. As states develop their strategic forces based upon their strategic posture, so states having a posture which involves rapid deployment & launching of several strategic missiles greatly enhance the probability of MAD condition to occur.

While dealing with contemporary strategic environment of South Asia, it’s easy to comprehend why situation of MAD is yet to establish since several crucial conditions related to MAD are absent. However, in near future, provided that India & Pakistan continue to proliferate & enhance their strike capabilities, a situation of MAD may create.

New Delhi & Islamabad already have enough fissile material to raise 130 & 140 nuclear warheads respectively and their missile systems easily cover entire up land mass area of each other. But what they lack is robust command & control system; capable of surviving the first strike while remaining operational, and assured second strike capability up to the scale of massive retaliation. As far as doctrinal postures are concerned, there exist ambiguity to how much extent can both state practically follow their nuclear doctrines of Minimum Credible Deterrence, Massive retaliation, First Use and No First Use policies. By nature, it’s wise to assume that Pakistan has active offensive nuclear doctrinal posture while India has reactionary offensive nuclear doctrinal posture. Such doctrinal postures, if maintained in future too can pave the way of Mutual Assured Destruction condition in South Asia; at least theoretically.