“You can sway a thousand men by appealing to their prejudices quicker than you can convince one man by logic.” – Robert A Heinlein

The United States has decided to withdraw from Afghanistan, they did it due to growing ground resistance and frustration with an environment not willing to be tamed, finally losing patience. However, the decision was political, and not military.

There is a lot of evidence to support this, but the perception now is that the United States has ‘lost the war’ and have been defeated by the Taliban.

As this perception of a US defeat builds up, another supporting one is also developing:

That Pakistan is providing safe havens to the Taliban and that alone is the basis of the Taliban successes. Pakistan can bend over backwards and deny such claims but our own pseudo-intellectuals and armchair keyboard warriors eagerly contradict the establishment’s position. It is very difficult for them to understand that Pakistan does not have the resources or the capacity to fund, resource and direct a proxy war at this scale.

An odd incident, brought on record, involving some junior operator, carried away by his importance, in some far flung area, offering money or access to an individual Taliban, is quoted as strategic substance to this theory. In Pakistan, it is customary to habitually take an exception and present it as the rule. We do this to accrue two minutes of glory under the sun while it shines or then because in such contradictory and accusatory behavior there is some benefit to the accuser.

Conspiracies and rumours rule the moment while any logic and reasoning are set aside so to develop false perceptions situated to satisfy a predetermined position. These perceptions are then promptly quoted by the likes of Christine Fair and Hussain Haqqani with enthusiasm, authority and cross references as Pakistan is continually painted to be the devil.

However, in almost every engagement, the Taliban are outnumbered anything between 5/6 to 1, which implies that normally about 200 militants are taking on about 1,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers. Two Afghan Army Chiefs have been sacked. There must be some reason for them to have been served such marching orders.

Nevertheless, how do these soft acquittals by the ANA involve Pakistan? Was Pakistan instrumental in motivating or influencing the ANA to lay down their arms? What has this woeful performance of the Afghan Military Establishment got anything to do with Pakistan

The Afghan Army and Police were organized as a force of 450,000 men, (including police) supported by air, armoured vehicles, artillery and were designed to combat terrorism/insurgency. Yet, a force no larger than, at its very best, 85,000 militants, armed with small arms, mortars and rocket launchers are sweeping across Afghanistan capturing province after province, as if it is a walk over.

How does Pakistan fit into this equation or then be held responsible for the ANA’s dismal performance?

With all that went on in Afghanistan, I found that with all the reverses, lack of progress and downright failures, everyone was blamed except the United States, the ANA, the Afghan Police or National Directorate for Security (NDS), formerly KHAD. These people could do no wrong. No inquiry or investigation ever pointed a figure at the disappointment and catastrophe they caused, nor were any corrective measures suggested. It was always business as usual.