Originally published February 20, 2026 on Dead Drop Intel and republished here in full.
▶ VISUAL V00 GOES HERE: Hero image (featured image).
Prior to 2001, terror groups were not as mature as we see them today. Any GWOT veteran will happily explain during the invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban could barely hit their targets because they were hampered by both weapons and skill sets. The use of suicide bombers and car bombs in Iraq was largely due to the inefficiency of the terrorists. Today, that picture has significantly changed and presents a massive threat to nation states.
Mumbai was the first test, or example, of how the terrorists had modified their warfare capabilities. The attack, while planned by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), was not a single group exercise. LeT ground assets spent close to 2 years carrying out surveillance and counter-intelligence activities in Mumbai, building a comprehensive understanding of:
- capabilities of law enforcement to react to a terror attack
- identifying ingress and attack locations where significant damage could be delivered before the attacker was neutralized
- defining a rally point (or siege location) that would deliver the greatest psychological impact both to India and globally
- understanding the number of terrorists needed to carry out the attack
With this information being gathered and continually transmitted to LeT leadership in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, LeT enlisted al Qaeda’s leadership in Afghanistan to organize the attack itself. Keeping in mind AQ has always believed a “spectacular attack” model, where they are able to deliver significant impact on a single target with limited loss of resources, the AQ leadership took over command and control of the operation.
When Mumbai was carried out, the ingres point from the ocean, selected for its vulnerability. Once ashore, the 10 terrorists split into 5 teams, dressed in denim jeans, t-shirts, and Hindu religious wristbands, so they blended in with the city’s population making detection more difficult. Each terrorist was carrying a backpack loaded with a folding stock AK-47 or AK-56, multiple pistols, grenades, rations, ammunition, and communication equipment, including satellite phones to maintain communications with their commanders in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Communications were used by the commanders monitoring live Indian news broadcasts and social media news feeds to gather live intelligence during the attack. First, they built a massive base of intelligence on the entire city of Mumbai, then they use Indian television and social media to provide their terrorists with up-to-date information to increase the complexity of the attack for local law enforcement.
Communications were also used to provide psychological encouragement to young, inexperienced terrorists to continuing killing civilians and law enforcement.
The Attack
The 5 teams were quickly moved through the city, with 2 teams taking taxis – one to the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus and hospital, the other to the Oberoi Trident Hotel. Both of these teams planted timer-based improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the taxis, while the other 3 teams moved on foot – one to the Nariman House, one to Leopold Café, and the other to the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel.
In the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, 2 attackers calmly, over 20 minutes, calmly moved through passenger halls and terminals, shooting anyone they encountered. The Railway and local police were sorely under-equipped for what they were facing and were outgunned. When the terrorists left the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, 58 were dead and hundreds injured.
These attackers moved to the Cama and Albless Hospital, intermittently shooting Mumbai residents and structures, until they reached the hospital. Even though the hospital administration had received alert calls and locked the doors of wards, the terrorists moved through the hospital and terrorists were still able to kill guards, police, take hospital employees as hostages and exit the complex to move to their next target.
A second group of 2 terrorists attacked the Leopold Café, where they detonated a grenade and indiscriminately opened fire on the crowded café, killing ten and wounding dozens. This group left the café and move toward the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, their primary target. Eyewitnesses reported that one of the terrorists made a phone call prior to starting the attack, coordinating and getting instructions from their commanders.
While moving towards the hotel, this group placed an IED on a road, which failed to detonate.
In the Oberoi Trident Hotel, the terrorists entered the lobby, opening fire and throwing grenades into crowded restaurants and cafes within the hotel, before taking up positions in the higher floors of the hotel to continue their attack via indiscriminate gunfire and grenades. In the span of 15 minutes, 2 IEDS dropped outside the hotel detonated, making police entry into the hotel more difficult.
During these attacks, the Mumbai police, the Quick Response Force, and the Anti-Terrorism teams were all easily encountered by the terrorists and neutralized. From 9:20 pm on the November 26th to 2:40 pm on November 28th, the 2 terrorists were able to effectively counter police, Marine commandos, National Security Guard’s counter-terrorism team, killing 30 and wounding 20, before being neutralized.
At 9:44 pm on November 26th, 2 terrorists entered the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel and opened fire into the crowded lobbies and restaurants. At the same time, the 2 terrorists who had attacked the Leopold Café entered the hotel via another entrance and fired on those around the swimming pool area, before joining the first 2 terrorists to form a four-man assault team.
When police entered the hotel, they were met with assault fire and grenades pinning them down. With the commanders watching the entire attack on live television, the terrorists were told to start fires on the different floors of the hotel so the international media would broadcast the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel was on fire.
The interesting part of this attack is the terrible response of the local law enforcement, even the Marine commandos and Indian Army, even though calls were made for urgent assistance and hostages being tied up and moved to secure locations under terrorist control.
From 9:44 pm on November 26th to 8:50 am on November 29th, the 4 terrorists were able to take over 150 hostages, killing 30 guests, staff and security personnel and wounding hundreds more, before being neutralized by the National Security Guard commandos.
What Do We Know
Interestingly, after the Mumbai attack, the US Congressional Research Service produced a paper – Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for US Interests – which has been largely ignored by the US federal government and law enforcement, as the US still stands undefended against similar attacks on US soil.
What we have coined 9/11 2.0 describes a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack (CCTA) on 25 to 30 mid-sized US cities with major medical complexes, which CommandEleven Intelligence has set out in its US Hospital Threat Assessment.
Even with the vast amount of intelligence, including National Counterterrorism Center Director Joe Kent testifying that the US admitted some 18,000 known and suspected terrorists from Afghanistan in 2021, and the NCTC publishing a threat alert on the potential for an al Qaeda attack on US soil, the US federal, state and local governments have still not taken the threat seriously.
One of the biggest advantages CommandEleven Intelligence has is that it is based in Pakistan, the testing ground for every tactic terrorists use in attacks around the world. We have seen the assault teams, the UAV attacks, and the use of vehicles loaded with explosives, so we are able to understand what tactics will be used in other countries during a CCTA or a terror attack. Every tactic that we expect to be used in the United States and Europe during these CCTAs has been seen, experienced and repulsed in Pakistan since 2007.
Our assessment, in outline, is a coordinated campaign by the Islamic State and al Qaeda against multiple US cities, carried out by highly trained fighters drawn from across the global jihadist movement. It would combine ground assaults on soft “live, work and play” locations and siege positions in hospitals with simultaneous cyberattacks on infrastructure by hostile states to slow the response. CommandEleven Intelligence does not publish the operational detail of this scenario in public reporting; it is provided to government and law enforcement clients.
What The West Hasn’t Learned
The sheer breadth of what the US has not learned from the numerous terrorism attacks around the world is huge. If you, as a reader, are unsure of this fact, take a look at all the hoax bomb threats, active shooter situations, holes in the electric grid that can be capitalized upon, the unwillingness of the federal government to acknowledge even the potential of an attack taking place on US soil.
To those who understand, it feels like September 10, 2001 all over again – nothing can happen on our soil – which is definitely not the case.
Understanding Mumbai as the core attack model, instead of the October 7 attack in Israel, we have a much better understanding of the planning, skill set and potential impacts that will result from an attack of this level.
The things that need to be done immediately are:
- citizens must begin preparing for an attack like this
- there must be an understanding that no one is coming to save you. Law enforcement will be engaged with stopping the terrorists attacking main locations in your city, while other terrorist groups will be moving door-to-door. What that means is:
- talk to your family members and prepare a bug out/bug in plan, including communication methods
- no matter where you go, look for exfil (escape) routes to get off the X as quickly and safely as possible
- learn to walk around without your mobile phone in your hand or distraction. The more situational awareness you have, the safer you are, the quicker you move from the X and the more aware you are of where your family is during an attack
- prepare and train with your weapons with stress inoculation. Firing a weapon at a shooting range is great for getting comfortable with your weapon, but it will not prepare you for an attack situation, where people are trying to kill or take you hostage
- build a neighborhood security team (mutual assistance group (MAG))
- build a church security team
- develop communication methods between your team members that are not easily seen or understood by the enemy
- test, improve, re-test, improve, re-test, until you’re ready for any attack that could come through your door
For law enforcement agencies:
- review, modify and re-train on your Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to respond to a terror attack that will be multiple shooters, multiple targets and a siege situation, all simultaneously
- modify your SOPs to stop bunching entire police forces into one location during any incident. This makes you a very easy target for an IED, grenade, suicide bomber, or sniper
- improve your SWAT team and regular officer training on small unit (tactical unit) operations. Get a GWOT veteran to assist if your police force doesn’t have the skill set itself
- understand the terrorists will also be dressed like your first responders, which means every citizen needs to understand exactly how a police officer, EMS member, and SWAT team personnel looks. This includes understanding how hospital staff looks and operates during normal conditions. The more aware you are, the safer you are
This is the first step in the understanding what is coming. We will be writing additional articles to provide more detail and tips to help you, as a private citizen, prepare.