The TTP has gained significant strength for 2 reasons:
- the State policy of the Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS), Hamid Karzai, and Ashraf Ghazi
- to support the TTP against the Pakistani state under the concept of “strategic depth,” which Pakistan itself used with the Taliban.
This policy was called out by both The New York Times and The Washington Post, as well as CommandEleven.
- the collapse of their governments and the return of the Taliban to power significantly emboldened the TTP.
Emboldened for the reason that the Taliban could not take action against them because senior al-Qaeda (AQ) commanders and fighters believed the TTP was right in striking Pakistan for their position during the War on Terror. Noor Wali Mehsud was so confident on this belief that he told both the Prime Minister and the Deputy Defence Minister of Afghanistan that if the Taliban continued to push the TTP to stop cross-border attacks they would pledge their allegiance to ISKP.
These should not come as a surprise to our readers, because we’ve stated that numerous times in our reports, articles, tweets and podcasts.
What we haven’t discussed publicly is the role of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the emir of the Haqqani Network and one of the most senior strategists “supporting” the Taliban.
Haqqani is playing a triple agent role against the Taliban and Pakistan, and the sooner we realise it, the sooner we can resolve it.
Haqqani fooled the government of Pakistan with negotiations, allowing the TTP to gain strategic advantage inside Pakistan by moving their fighters and weaponry into various parts of the country, including #Punjab, without resistance during the “peace” negotiations.
Haqqani has also successfully manoeuvred one of his own commanders, Sanaullah Ghafari, into the Emir of ISKP’s seat. With Ghafari taking control of ISKP, he quickly announced that ISPP would no longer have operations inside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, ISKP absorbed the KP into their operational structure.
That is significant because it gave the TTP massive support within KP and allowed them to expand into other provinces much quicker. You will recall end of 2022 – beginning 2023, the TTP launched a branches of their group in both north and south Punjab, and offered a partnership to the #BLA in #Balochistan.
Simultaneously, Haqqani brought the splinter groups back to the TTP fold with his support and backing. Didn’t you ever wonder why all these groups came running back to the core TTP when their Emir has no military command or operational leadership?
The comment that the TTP is a “rag-tag” group is incorrect.
The TTP was a rag-tag group when Baitullah Mehsud first founded the group in 2007. From 2008-2013, they became a proper insurgent group, which morphed into a deadly terrorist group. That cannot be denied and anyone who continues to believe they are a rag-tag group doesn’t understand the dynamics of how they’ve developed. Under Fazlullah, we saw the brutality level they could reach, and that will return if they again wage war on Pakistan.
Thus far, the TTP have kept their target military and law enforcement in a bid to win public support for their cause. Many will not remember the new manifesto that was released where the TTP themselves stated this and gave the same reason that we’ve cited. You’ll also notice that none of their affiliated groups has targeted civilians.
This is core to understanding TTP 3.0. They’ve learned from their comprehensive failures and designated their targets as military and law enforcement.
Just a few days ago, we posted a tweet where we discussed why the government and military have failed to counter the TTP violence.
- there is no national consensus on the fight against terrorism.
- there is no leadership on fighting the violence. Whatever reasons you want to cite for this, it comes back to the same issue – no leadership. When Pakistan pushed the TTP across the border into Afghanistan with Zarb-e-Azb, the nation stood on one page under the leadership of General Raheel Sharif. We are not there today
- we continue to believe the Taliban will take action against them in Afghanistan, which we know they will not. Until we break this belief and strike inside their borders, they have no motivation to fight them or ISKP.
We have to accept this is our failure, as a nation, as a government and as a military.
Attrition is because they are successfully infiltrating Pakistan and targeting our security forces and law enforcement, but not attacking civilians.
What’s the solution?
Pakistan needs to launch strict hunt and neutralise operations in FATA and Afghanistan. These operations must include drone strikes, PAF strikes and wet work teams that carry out targeted attacks on camps inside Afghanistan. On our side of the border, we need to use our military like a scalpel instead of a sword in FATA, KP and Punjab, dismantling their camps, depots and support networks.
Pakistan needs to take a stricter position with the Taliban. Any terrorist attack inside Pakistan will result in an air strike on Taliban, AQ and ISKP leadership. Period. Cut the head off the snake.
We’ve seen, in recent days, that the Taliban is providing cover fire when TTP fighter infiltrate the border. They can’t handle the problem so they are providing support to facilitate their infil into Pakistan. This will only stop when they are forced to pay a higher price than us.
Pakistan also needs to decide how to deal with Sirajuddin Haqqani. His duplicitous role must be exposed and dealt with before he become more bold and does something more devastating, which we know he’s already planning.
Forget he’s the Interior Minister of Afghanistan.
Forget that the US pays the top 5 leaders of the Taliban $15 million per week, just for the 5.
Pakistan needs to deal with the cog that holds the threat together. Haqqani must be resolved permanently for Pakistan’s, and the region’s, security.
All of these steps will lead to revenge attacks inside Pakistan. We need to understand that and be mentally ready for it. They will attempt to force us to bleed so we stop fighting. We must resist the urge to stop.
Also, while wiping out the TTP and ISKP, we should also take the opportunity to eliminate BLA and BRA from the environment as well. The methods & tactics for neutralisation are the same.
Syed Khalid Muhammad, the Founder and Executive Director of CommandEleven, brings over three decades of leadership experience, guiding organizations globally in the realms of security, technology, marketing, and management. Notably, he authored "Agency Rules: Never an Easy Day at the Office," a pioneering espionage novel published in 2013. This novel holds historical significance as the first English-language espionage novel written by a Pakistani, achieving international bestseller status and currently available on Amazon.
Furthermore, Syed Khalid Muhammad has made notable appearances on several international TV channels, providing insightful analysis on security and geopolitics.
Since the establishment of CommandEleven in 2015, Khalid has expanded his expertise to encompass analysis, risk and threat assessment, and consultancy in the fields of terrorism, counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, geopolitics, and cognitive warfare. Within CommandEleven, he has successfully cultivated a comprehensive human and electronic intelligence network spanning from MENA to the Indian subcontinent. Continuously growing, this network extends into various conflict zones globally, providing CommandEleven with actionable, real-time intelligence that forms the foundation of its analytical endeavors.
CommandEleven currently serves multiple clients, including corporate giants, by assisting them in analysis related to security, threat assessment, and threat mitigation strategies in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
 commanders and fighters believed the TTP was right in striking Pakistan for their position during the War on Terror. Noor Wali Mehsud was so confident on this belief that he told both the Prime Minister and the Deputy Defence Minister of Afghanistan that if the Taliban continued to push the TTP to stop cross-border attacks they would pledge their allegiance to ISKP.){kind=link}