Operation Azm-e-Istehkam (“Resolve for Stability”)

On the 23 June, 2024, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, after a meeting of the Central Apex Committee on National Security, announced the inauguration of Operation Azm-e-Istehkam, translated “Resolve for Stability”. For many days, CommandEleven has held back on providing an analysis of the proposed operation, its targets and the potential pitfalls it will face because we know how Pakistan operates, and how quickly public statements are backtracked from grand operations to minor grunts of force.

The Apex Committee is made up of Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif has the chairman, key ministers of the federal cabinet, including the Deputy Prime Minister & Foreign Minister, Defence Minister, Interior Minister, Finance Minister, Law Minister, and Information Minister, all provincial Chief Ministers, including Gilgit-Baltistan, all services chiefs, and all provincial Chief Secretaries, along with other senior civilian, military, and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) officers.

Granted, we didn’t hold back with our comments on X about the operation, providing snippets of some of the items we will cover in this analysis. Links to the tweets have been embedded into the above sentence.

Many analysts feel that Pakistan has undertaken this operation due to the pressure from China to fight terrorism, or as China said in one of their media outlets – China wants Pakistan to launch an Operational Zarb-e-Azb type of operation against terrorism.

Sadly, since the announcement of the “operation,” we have also developed the same understanding. This operation is in response to Chinese pressure because past history has shown that Pakistan doesn’t act against terrorism until the fire has engulfed the nation.

The Press Statement

When Prime Minister Sharif announced the inauguration of this operation, he was clear to point out the following operational items:

• a comprehensive, reinvigorated counter-terrorism strategy, founded on a complete national consensus and system-wide synergy
• symbolise national resolve to eradicate extremism and terrorism from the country in a comprehensive and decisive manner
• efforts will be intensified to curtail operational space for terrorists through regional cooperation
• renewed and full-blown kinetic efforts of the armed forces will be implemented with the full support of all law enforcement agencies, empowered by effective legislation to address legal voids that hinder effective prosecution of terrorism-related cases and exemplary punishments
• the information space, which we can only assume to mean digital media, will be leveraged to promote a unified national narrative in support of the campaign
• No one will be allowed to challenge the writ of the State without any exception

It was also announced that a “new” Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) had been approved to enhance the comprehensive security of Chinese citizens in Pakistan, which will be discussed towards the end of this analysis.

The Grand History of Military Operations in Pakistan

Pakistan has openly declared close to 22 kinetic military operations since 2004 against various terrorist factions ranging from al-Qaeda (AQ) to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), each have met various levels of success. 

The 22 operations, as per our records, are listed below:

• Operations in WANA (2004)
• Al-Mizan (2002 – 2006)
• Operation Silence (2007)
• Sirat-e-Mustaqim Khyber (2008)
• Eagle Swoop I (2008)
• Rah-e-Haq I (2007)
• Zarb-e-Kaleem (2008)
• Rah-e-Haq II (2008)
• Sher Dil (2008)
• Daraghalam (2008)
• Biya Daraghalam (2009)
• Khwakh Ba De Shum (2009)
• Operation Toar (2009)
• Operation Zalzala (2008)
• Eagle Swoop II 
• Rah-e-Raast (2009)
• Rah-e-Nijaat (2009 – 2010)
• Koh-e-Sufaid I (2011)
• Koh-e-Sufaid II (2012)
• Zarb-e-Azb (2014)
• Operation Radd-Ul-Fasaad (2017)

It should be made clear that prior to 2007, most of the operations were containment operations and negotiated settlements (The Sarawakai Agreement, The Wana Accord, The Sararogha declaration, etc), meaning that warlords and fringe terror group leaders were paid to stop fighting against the State or LEAs. Post 2007, when operations were started, Pakistan was fighting for its own survival, as terrorism had spread and engulfed the entire nation. 

During Zardari’s government (2007-2013), Pakistan was brutalised daily by terror attacks, bomb blasts targeting innocent civilians in shopping centres and cities, the settled districts of Swat and Malakand Division were taken under the complete control, first by the Tehrek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-Mohammadi (TNSM) led by Sufi Muhammad’s son-in-law, Mullah Fazlullah (also known as Mullah Radio), then converted to TTP – Swat (TTP-S), when Fazlullah pledged his allegiance to Hakeemullah Mehsud, the Emir of the TTP at the time. The TTP, during Zardari’s government, expanded its control to such a position that many feared that it would be able to strike Islamabad and collapse the federal government.

Pakistan’s Armed Forces, law enforcement agencies and innocent citizens paid the ultimate sacrifices to turn the tide against the terror groups and put them on the run.

During the Nawaz Sharif government (2013-18), what is considered the most successful operation – Operation Zarb-e-Azb – was undertaken to comprehensively neutralize the TTP, after the Army Public School Peshawar attack, which took 140 innocent children’s lives, along with numerous teachers and administrators who were attempting to protect the children. Sadly, at that time, the US was occupying Afghanistan and felt betrayed by Pakistan, therefore refused to seal the border allowing TTP fighters to cross into Afghanistan, where they already enjoyed safe haven and Afghanistan intelligence and state support as reported by The New York Times, The Washington Post and three authors of books on the India-Pakistan relationship during the War on Terror.

With the TTP pushed across the border into Afghanistan, it was the responsibility of Pakistan’s elected government to accomplish the following objectives:

• Seal the border to stop any infiltration into Pakistan from Afghanistan
• Build up and provide socio-economic opportunities to the areas that had been neglected in the past and destroyed during the reign of terror
• Comprehensively identify, target and eliminate all terror camps in Pakistan, and Afghanistan, including madrassas that taught extremism, training and recruitment centres in FATA, Punjab and other parts of the country.

Pakistan did none of these things.

Many point to President Musharraf’s “Good and Bad Taliban” strategy, as the reason for Pakistan’s problems. Others will point out, the Pakistan Army’s long-held Afghanistan strategy to support the Taliban to create a client state, a strategy grandfathered by General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief Martial Law Administrator during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Lt. General Hameed Gul, the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) during the same timeframe.

Rather that resolve the past mistakes or missteps, with no political clarity or will, incompetence in all departments, political agendas, missed intelligence opportunities and the misuse of the State apparatus, Pakistan again became a target for terrorism. This time, with Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) and India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) providing the support, as detailed in My Enemy’s Enemy and Spy Stories.

The interesting part of this discussion is that the operations were limited to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), no operations were carried out against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Laskhar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Sipah Sabah Pakistan (SSP), Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), Baluchistan Republican Army (BRA) or another other insurgent/terrorist/extremist groups based in Punjab, Sindh or Baluchistan, which is where the “good Taliban and bad Taliban” argument gained ground internationally. Today, Punjab has a more violent version in Tehreek-e-Laibaik (TLP), who has marched on Islamabad, and on numerous occasions forced the government to bend a knee to their demands.

For Pakistan, the grand counter-terror operations have failed because when the kinetic operation succeeded in regaining the territory from the terrorists, the civil bureaucracy and politicians failed to provide the socio-economic opportunities to keep individuals from either allowing terrorists to return or supporting them for an income of some kind.

Negotiating with Terrorists

None of us at CommandEleven believe there is has ever been a silver bullet created that can end terrorism anywhere in the world. Successful operations in Pakistan have proven it. The US withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan have proven it. There are numerous examples from around the world, where kinetic operations, while have a key role in the fight against terrorism and insurgency, are successful, the keys to ending the menace of terrorism and extremism are in the hands of the civil bureacracy and the democratically elected politicians. 

One thing, however, is for sure, negotiations must also be undertaken with a solid base of victory in hand. You cannot negotiate from a position of perceived weakness and expect to gain advantage.

Pakistan has failed to recognise this and the US massively failed to recognise this when they negotiated the Doha Accords with the Taliban.

Whether Asif Zardari’s Pakistan People’s Party (2007-2013), Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (2013-2018), Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrek-e-Insaaf (2018-2021), the combined coalition government post-Imran Khan’s removal as Prime Minister (2020-2023), and we expect, the current Shehbaz Sharif led Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz government (2023-??), engaged in negotiations with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, at various times to bring kinetic operations to a successful end.

Imran Khan’s PTI, who many believe held a soft corner for the terror groups, sent the former Director General – Inter Services Intelligence, and the Corps Commander Peshawar at the time, Lt. General Faiz Hameed to Kabul to take part in the negotiations that were sponsored by Sirajuddin Haqqani and his Haqqani Network, where Pakistan had some influence for many years. 

Many will still recall the video of Lt. General Faiz Hameed standing in the tea party at the Kabul Serena Hotel, smiling broadly, telling reporters that everything will be alright now. 

Since then, Pakistan has again seen a massive return of terror attacks on our military installations and law enforcement agencies, a national expansion of terror groups that were once contained to pockets in Afghanistan, and Pakistan again launching a counter-terrorism operation.

It must be made clear that Sirajuddin Haqqani made a fool of Pakistan by sponsoring negotiations between the TTP and the Government of Pakistan. Haqqani had no intention of bringing peace between the two groups. His intention, which was clearly stated in the TTP demands, was the surrender of territory, specifically the newly merged Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Malakand Division, where the TTP once had complete control. While the Government of Pakistan was willing to negotiate on many of the points the TTP brought to the table, these were out of the question. 

Haqqani engaged Pakistan’s government and military leadership in useless negotiations, while using the same time to facilitate the tactical movement of resources and fighters throughout KPK, into Punjab and Baluchistan, to re-engage splinter groups and, in the end, tell the TTP to walk away from the negotiations in Dec 2022 and declare war on Pakistan again.

What was different this time was that the Taliban had control of Afghanistan because of the US withdrawal, not a military victory against US or NATO forces. The Doha Accords were nothing more than the “guidelines” for the withdrawal of US forces and administration officials from Afghanistan, nothing more, which has been proven by the Taliban’s absolute refusal to follow conditions set in the Doha Accords, but continuing to receive over US$ 87 million in aid money and black funds from the US government, USAID and the CIA. This doesn’t include the US$ 15 million that is paid to the top 5 Taliban leaders on a weekly basis to keep them from attacking each other.

And Pakistan had sold its own relationship with the Taliban by supporting the US in the Global War on Terror. The Taliban, al-Qaeda, and all the other terror groups operating in Afghanistan during the 20-year span held the same beliefs. The Taliban fully believes they owe Pakistan nothing and have shown on repeated occasions that they will support the TTP before coming to Pakistan’s aid. 

The second, and significantly greater, difference was that the Taliban, and all its affiliated terror organisations, now had access to US & NATO weaponry, which made the fight against the terrorists much more difficult.

Pakistan, with the Taliban in power in Afghanistan, was left without power or influence over a group they had supported for decades, and unable to force them to take a stand against the terrorists that were attacking Pakistani soil from Afghanistan.

Operation Azm-e-Istekham

Realistically, we expect nothing to happen from this operation. This will be a great deal of fanfare against the Taliban, ISKP and the TTP, but at the end of the day, it will be minor operations targeted in specific areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and some in Baluchistan, but the core activities that are required will not be undertaken, and nothing on the level of what Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced will every come forward.

There are two possible ways to look at this operation.

First, this is an operation that will target political opponents of the current regime. As we’ve seen since the “elections,” the courts, the judiciary and law enforcement agencies have been used to target political opponents. What will define the real objectives of this grand operation will be the guidelines set forward before the National Assembly, where Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrek-e-Insaaf (PTI) has demanded an in-camera briefing from both the government and the service chiefs on the scope and rules of engagement of this operation.

The second way to consider this operation is from the point of view of limited impact, low-return operations in areas, where the presence of terrorists is not only well-documented, but easily seen. What that will mean is more “confessional” videos will be released like the one of Mawlawi Nasrullah Mansoor, a senior TTP commander captured on 26 June during an operation in Baluchistan. These confessional videos will hold no value, because anyone who has seen the video can easily tell that Mawlawi Nasrullah Mansoor is reading from a script and not speaking in his own words.

The Operation Pakistan Needs

After decades, both before 9/11 and after, of dealing with an extremism and terrorism problem in Pakistan, the solution to Pakistan’s problems are not easily attainable, nor quickly achieved. As a nation, we must work very diligently to counter the problems and achieve success so that Pakistan can actually declare itself free of terrorism.

I – The Feeder System

The first step in the process is stopping the feeders, which means ending the points where radicalisation occurs. Many would like to believe that means specifically the Islamic schools (madrassas), but that would be incorrect. 

Islamic schools do have a role in the radicalisation process, but if we were to target just the madrassas, we would again lose the war.

In terms of the madrassas, all must be forced to register with the government, identify all sources of funding, share the education and training level of each of their teachers/instructors, share all materials that are used for training and teaching of the students, and allow unannounced inspections to assure they are not violating any laws.

The review of all of these materials and inspections must be carried out by actual Islamic scholars, who have never had any ties or associations with extremist or terror groups.

Any Islamic school that refuses to adhere to these rules, must be closed immediately. 

The same applies to Imams of mosques (masjids). All imams must be observed without notifying the people of the mosque to find what they are teaching and what they are preaching in their Friday sermons. After the covert assessment is completed, the imams must be interviewed and any issues or problems identified. 

II – Solve the Socio-Economic Reasons for Militancy

The reasons that militancy and radicalisation have so easily taken hold in Pakistan are simple to identify and understand.

1 – The Absence of Governance

2 – The Collapse of the Judiciary

3 – The failure of the State Institutions to take swift action

4 – the lack of understanding of what radicalisation and terrorism are and how they must be eliminated

5 – the interference of non-informed individuals/institutions in matters where they provide no value

While most of the points are very easy to understand, we are going to focus on the last 2 because those are core to building a national understanding and narrative.

Over the past 20 years, Pakistan’s media has become “free” to a greater extent, but the media hasn’t learned what to do with that freedom, which has caused pressure from different quarters to stop broadcasts and remove anchors from programmes.

Post 9/11, President Bush’s Chief of Staff, Karl Rove, flew to Hollywood and New York and sat down with all the studio and television channel owners. His message was clear – this is how we brand our enemy. For the US, that is an easy equation but for Pakistan it is not. We are not looking for ways to brand our enemy, rather we are looking for ways to help our population identify methods and centres of radicalisation.

What does that mean?

Pakistan’s media industry needs to sit down with Islamic scholars and understand how Islam is being taught to children and adults to radicalise them. Then, they need to develop dramas, movies, and television mini-series, to help enlighten the public on how to recognise radicalisation, because most people won’t even know if someone in their own home is being radicalised.

This is not an attack on Islamic schools. This is an attack on the mentality that teaches intolerance is acceptable in the form of insults or violence. Debates, the exchanges of ideas, should be encouraged but with people who actually understand what they are speaking about, not those who are part of the problem.

We can still recall early in the War on Terror, Pakistani television anchors having the spokesman of Lal Masjid, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and other extremists groups on the air, and allowing them to speak openly to the people of Pakistan about their cause and the injustice that was being carried out against them.

Pakistan needs to be taught how to, first, recognise extremism in its initial stage so it can be rooted out immediately, and second, it needs to be taught that the fight against extremism isn’t a fight against Islam, but those who have misused Islam to turn good people into terrorists.

That also means that Pakistan needs to establish true de-radicalization centres, where those who have been radicalised can be de-radicalized.

Without successfully achieving this, and the other three points mentioned, we will never be able to end terrorism in Pakistan.

The Kinetic Military Operations

Notice, how we put the military operations at the end. Once you’ve been able to build the right system around the people, the military operations will be effective. But as long as the system isn’t efficiently operating, the kinetic operations will achieve limited results that are quickly reversed.

In terms of the kinetic operations, we must operate from a multi-faceted approach.

Before starting any kinetic operation, we must develop a centralised intelligence sharing complex. Intelligence is only useful when it reaches the right hands at the right time. There is a great deal of intelligence spread across law enforcement agencies, military and intelligence institutions, mobile operators, internet service providers, banks and other organisations, which must be centralised and processed so that proper decisions can be made. 

We are not saying there should be an intelligence centre in every province, rather there should be one intelligence centre, where all intelligence is gathered, processed by both human hands and artificial intelligence, then supplied to an intelligence board that reviews the information and forwards it to the right institution for action to be taken.

First, UAV and air strikes inside Afghanistan on ISKP, TTP and BLA camps. It is essential that their infrastructure is destroyed. We would also add in attacks on Haqqani Network camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as the HQN has provided significant support to ISKP, TTP and BLA.

Second, UAV strikes in FATA and Baluchistan. These UAV strikes should not be done from a base somewhere in Pakistan, but there must be a ground intelligence asset that identifies the base coordinates for targeting at the time of targeting. The reason we put in the requirement of a ground intelligence asset is to assure that innocent civilians are not put in harm’s way to neutralize terrorists. Innocent civilians are propaganda for the terrorists and the media to defeat the effectiveness of the operation as a whole.

Third, a full recon, capture and neutralise operation within the settled districts and cities of Pakistan. The terrorists have been able to spread throughout the country and to eliminate any threat they could pose in the future, we must capture or neutralize them throughout Pakistan.

Fourth, a comprehensive recon, capture, and neutralise operation of their support networks from safe houses to financiers and weapons suppliers. When a well-strategised kinetic operation is initiated, finding them will not be difficult, but again it must be a well-strategised kinetic operation.

The Relationship with China and Chinese Citizens in Pakistan

Pakistan has comprehensively failed in satisfying China’s demands in relation to the attacks on, or the security of, Chinese citizens. 

After the Besham attack, many restrictions were put on Chinese citizens in Pakistan, including the requirement that they must move in bulletproof/blast-proof vehicles. Simultaneously, the Ministry of the Interior implemented a ban on the issuance of Non-Objection Certificates for the same vehicles, so they could not be purchased domestically nor imported. This is a staggering level of irresponsible behaviour for a nation-state.

We know that some Chinese security companies have applied for licenses to operate in Pakistan to protect their own citizens, which have been refused. We also know that China requested permission from the Pakistan Army to form a joint counter-terrorism force to carry out operations together, which was also refused.

At one point, the federal government even announced the formation of a 140 commando force drawn from the Islamabad Police to protect Chinese citizens in the federal capital. 140 commandos to protect how many Chinese citizens?

Our sources within the Chinese business community have told CommandEleven, under anonymity, that there isn’t even fluidity in the policies across the provinces, much less the federal government. Lahore, Peshawar, Karachi and Quetta all have different SOPs for the movement and protection of Chinese citizens and businesses, while the federal government is attempting to present an all encompassing single strategic document.

We are currently unaware of the new Standard Operating Procedures, as they have not been made public on any forum, that have been defined by the Apex Committee, but if they are similar to those we have seen post-Besham, we can only expect relations between Pakistan and China to become further strained.

Conclusion

Whether you choose to agree or disagree with the arguments presented above, Pakistan is in an extremely precarious position, where the potential of fracture actually exists. For this operation to succeed where others have failed, Pakistan needs to devise a comprehensive strategy to deal with all facets of the extremism, radicalisation and terrorism problems, otherwise the result will be dramatically worse than the past operations.

The multi-faceted strategy that we have provided is a suggestion on how to achieve success. It covers all the areas that need to be addressed and, most importantly, how to build an national narrative against the menace of terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.

The question for every member of government, armed forces and civilian bureaucracy is very simple – are you willing to fight for the country that we all love or is this just another attempt to deceive the people and international community that Pakistan is taking the domestic terrorism problem seriously?